Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 28 August 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission saw fresh damage from gunfire to a Culture House in non-government-controlled Holubivske.
• The SMM saw that the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area continued to be dismantled.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints in non-government-controlled Zaichenko and Verkhnoshyrokivske, and at a heavy weapons holding area in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, more explosions (about 130), compared with the previous reporting period  (95 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), including 56 undetermined explosions; in areas north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk); and at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (19), compared with the previous reporting period (four explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

 

Fresh damage from gunfire to Culture House in Holubivske

At 41 Shyroka Street in the north-western part of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw that a fragment of plaster on the bottom part of the north-west-facing brick wall of the Culture House was ripped off. The Mission also saw that three ground-floor windows in the same wall were shattered. On the ground beneath the shattered windows it saw shards of glass and two metal fragments which it assessed as the tailfin of a 73mm round from a recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) or an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon. The Mission assessed that the damage to the building was fresh and caused by a 73mm round fired from a northerly direction. It also saw another object, assessed as the tailfin of a 73mm round from a recoilless gun (SPG-9) or IFV (BMP-1) cannon, embedded in the ground about 10m east of the building. The Mission assessed that this round was also fired from a northerly direction.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

The SMM continued to monitor the situation and facilitate activities in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening of 27 August, the SMM camera in the parking lot south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded two projectiles in flight and nine airbursts, all at an assessed range of 2-3km north-north-west, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 28 August, inside the disengagement area, the Mission saw that the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge as well as the former forward position of the armed formations south of the bridge’s broken section continued to be dismantled. The SMM also saw 20 members the State Emergency Services of Ukraine conducting demining activities on the western side of the road about 300-400m north of the broken section of the bridge. On the eastern and western sides of the southern edge of the broken section, it saw two members of the armed formations burning tyres, branches and logs which produced dense black smoke.

The Mission saw up to seven members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them on the southern edge of the broken section of the bridge and near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge.[2]

In the afternoon, the SMM saw four deminers from government-controlled areas inspecting the area below the broken section of the bridge and four deminers from non-government-controlled areas standing nearby.

 

Other disengagement areas[3]

In the early morning hours of 28 August, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two illumination flares at an assessed range of 1.5-2.5km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. Also in the early morning hours of 28 August, the SMM camera in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) recorded an airburst at an assessed range of 4-6km east, assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area. During the day on 28 August positioned in two locations in Popasna, the Mission heard five undetermined explosions and about 70 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at easterly directions at an assessed range of 3-6km, all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation. It again accessed its camera site in Petrivske.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

27 August

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 120mm) near Oleksandro-Kalynove (47km north of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Chernenko (21km north-east of Mariupol);
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) near Vynohradne (10km east of Mariupol); and
• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) near Novoselivka (31km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

27 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (probable T-64) near Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

25 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• a tank (type undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 22 August 2019);
• 15 tanks in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 15 August 2019); and
• nine tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 23 August 2019).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region*

28 August

The SMM noted that four anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

28 August

The SMM noted that five mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) were again missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

27 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol);
• a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Chernenko;
• two self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZU-23-4) near Vynohradne;
• an APC (BTR-70) near Prymorske (39km north-east of Mariupol); and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Novoselivka.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable IFV (BMP-2) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

28 August

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-80) in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Mines at destroyed Donetsk International airport and near Dokuchaievsk

On 26 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 132 anti-tank mines within the area of the destroyed Donetsk International airport: the first group of 60 mines was laid in three rows across the former runway; the second group of 50 mines was laid in three rows across a former taxiway, 900m south-west of the first group; and the third group of 22 anti-tank mines was laid in three rows on a former taxiway about 150m south of the second group. These mines were assessed as not recent and belonging to the armed formations.

On 28 August, the Mission saw for the first time five anti-tank mines (TM-62) on the side of a road near a checkpoint of the armed formations on the northern edge of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk). Next to the mines, it saw a mine hazard sign (a red square with skull and crossbones).

Situation at checkpoints along the contact line

At the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw that ten new containers with processing booths were operational. The Mission observed about 60 cars queuing to travel to non-government-controlled areas and about 30 cars queuing to travel in the opposite direction. A member of the armed formations at the checkpoint told the SMM that additional processing booths had been opened on 27 August. Two civilians (men, mixed ages) – one travelling towards non-government-controlled areas, the other one travelling towards government-controlled areas – said that the waiting times at the checkpoint had decreased after the new facilities were opened.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to power lines near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk), Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk) and Hladosove (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk). It also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border area outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about 25 minutes, the SMM saw 14 cars (four with Russian Federation and two with Georgian licence plates, and eight with “DPR” plates) as well as eight covered cargo and two tanker trucks (all with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 24 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “ongoing demining activities”.
• At a heavy weapons holding area in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer did not allow the Mission to check the serial numbers of the weapons present at the site.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again allowed the SMM to proceed only after 30 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 27 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas between Pleshchiivka (government-controlled, 51km north of Donetsk) and Soledar (government-controlled, 79km north of Donetsk); Vidrodzhennia (government-controlled, 66km north-east of Donetsk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk); and Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Komyshuvakha (government-controlled, 68km west of Luhansk).[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Between the evenings of 27 and 28 August, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.