Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 22 August 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and fewer in Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued to monitor the situation in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
- The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near non-government-controlled Bile.
- The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs to a phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint in non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (69), compared with the previous reporting period (50 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east and south-east of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and at south-easterly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (15), compared with the previous reporting period (26). All ceasefire violations, were explosions and were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).
Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area
The SMM saw 37 personnel of the State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine, as well as five vehicles (including white armoured vehicle), three trucks, a crane and a bulldozer entering the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and heard chainsaw being operated around 50m west of the road, north of the broken section of the bridge. During the same day, the Mission saw up to 24 SES personnel and seven vehicles (including white armoured vehicle and a crane), parked near the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
On 21 August, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a remnant of an object stuck on a tree on the southern bank of the river, around 15m south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), assessed as an exploded remnant of OG-9 projectile. On 22 August, the Mission saw that the tree had fallen down.
Inside the disengagement area, around the area south of the broken section of the bridge, the SMM saw two deminers from non-government-controlled areas cutting vegetation, as well as members of the armed formations wearing an armband with “JCCC” written on it.[2]
The SMM saw that the shuttle bus and a golf cart continued operating between the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the broken section of the bridge and back.
Other disengagement areas[3]
Positioned inside the disengagement near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Non-government-controlled areas
22 August
The SMM saw four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
21 August
An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) in a compound in Syrotyne (71km north-west of Luhansk).
An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- at least five tanks (T-80) south of Krasna Hora (76km north of Donetsk); and
- at least six tanks (T-64) and six surface-to-air missile systems (three 9K35 Strela-10 and three 9K33) near Pidhorodne (73km north of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
22 August
The SMM saw nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).
Weapons permanent storage sites[4]
At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region
22 August
The SMM could not verify seven tanks (T-72) as their serial numbers were covered with paint.
At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region
22 August
The SMM could not verify seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1) as their serial numbers were covered with paint.
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]
Government-controlled areas
21 August
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
- at least three armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (type undetermined) near Popasna;
- an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) and three ACVs (type undetermined) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk); and
- two IFVs (probable BMP variant) near Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk).
22 August
The SMM saw:
- an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) outside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk); and
- an APC near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
20 August
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:
- three ACVs (type undetermined) in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk); and
- an ACV (type undetermined) in a training area near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.
An SMM mini-UAV spotted an ACV north of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).
21 August
An SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (probable BRDM-2) in a compound in Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).
New trenches near Zernove, Molodizhne and Petrivske
On 20 August, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a new trench running north-east to south-east for about 100m, as well as an extension to an existing trench running for about 20m south-west to north-east in a training area south of Zernove (non-government-controlled, 70km south of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 5 August 2019).
On 21 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time a 30m-long trench running north-west into a field from a treeline with a mortar firing position about 500m north-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) (not seen in imagery from 5 May 2019).
On 22 August, near a checkpoint of the armed formations on road C-051532 between Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk) and Petrivske, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations digging inside deep trenches, partially covered with logs, as well as unoccupied camouflage-netted firing position located around 20m north of the trenches.
Situation at checkpoints along the contact line
At a checkpoint on highway H-15 near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM again saw at least 280 cars, 22 buses and over 300 pedestrians queueing to travel towards government-controlled areas and at least 30 cars and around 25 pedestrians in the opposite direction.
SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure
The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).
The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
- At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), on two occasions, a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing engineer works along the road”.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.
[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[4] The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.
[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.