Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 20 August 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and a similar number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
- A man was injured by a mine explosion near government-controlled Illienko in Luhansk region.
- Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Luhansk city.
- The SMM continued to monitor the situation in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
- The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
- It saw a fortified position and trenches of the armed formations near Novooleksandrivka.
- The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs to a phenol sludge reservoir.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 100), compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east and south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas south-west, west and north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), where the majority of explosions were recorded.
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including however more explosions (about 30), compared with the previous reporting period (one explosion). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west-north-west of non-government-controlled Luhansk city, assessed as aimed at the SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), as well as in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and west-south-west of Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk), all of which were explosions.
Man injured by a mine explosion near Illienko
On 1 August, medical staff at a hospital in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) told the SMM that a man (35 years old) had been admitted on 3 July with injuries caused by a mine explosion. On 7 August, the man told the SMM over the phone that he had sustained injuries after his tractor drove over a mine on 3 July in a forested area near Illienko (government-controlled, 27km east of Luhansk). On 19 August, a police representative told the SMM that a man had been injured after his tractor had hit a mine in a forested area near Illienko and that police had opened a criminal investigation for the incident.
Small-arms fire assessed as directed at SMM mini-UAV near Luhansk city
Positioned on the north-eastern edge of non-government-controlled Luhansk city, while conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard ten shots of small-arms fire about 1km west-north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 1km west-north-west. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area. *
Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area
Positioned at the checkpoint of the armed formations inside the disengagement area, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed distance of 500m east of the checkpoint, assessed as inside the disengagement area.
The SMM saw at least 15 deminers of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine entering the disengagement area through the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska. Inside the disengagement area, the Mission saw eight deminers about 50m west of the asphalt road cutting branches and trees. The SMM saw members of the civil-military administration of Stanytsia Luhanska and four police officers accompanied by an Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) walk to the broken section of the bridge and back towards the EECP.
Inside of the disengagement area, south of the broken section of the bridge, the Mission saw four deminers from the non-government-controlled area walk to the broken section of the bridge and up to seven members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them. [2]
Other disengagement areas[3]
On 20 August, while positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 1-2km north-west, which it was unable to assess as inside or outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). While positioned in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), in Orikhove and in Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions, all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.
Inside of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM again saw a 120mm mortar tailfin embedded in the ground on the eastern edge of the T-1316 road between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations. It again saw 12 anti-tank mines laid across the same road about 1km south of the area’s northern edge near positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and about 350m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations, the SMM again saw a spool wire stretched across the same road.
On 18 August, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed trench modification by filling in a branch of a 30m long trench near the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 280m south of its northern edge and about 650m east of its western edge (not visible in the imagery from 6 August 2019). Outside the disengagement area, the same aerial imagery revealed a 15m long extension of a previously reported trench, assessed as belonging to the armed formations. The imagery also revealed the presence of a tank outside the disengagement area’s eastern edge (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 24 July 2019).
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Non-government-controlled areas
19 August
An SMM mini UAV spotted:
- five tanks (T-72) and two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in a training area south of Zernove (70km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014 (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 16 August 2019); and
- four tanks (three T-72 and one undetermined type) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
19 August
The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in a compound near Kremenivka (27km north-west of Mariupol).
20 August
The SMM saw two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) towed by military trucks and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, 65km south-west of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
19 August
An SMM mini-UAV spotted three probable mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) in a training area south of Zernove (see above), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.
Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]
At a heavy weapons holding area in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region
20 August
The SMM noted that 23 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) remained missing.
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]
Government-controlled areas
20 August
The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) inside a concrete shelter outside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska and an APC (BTR-70) in Stanytsia Luhanska.
Non-government-controlled areas
19 August
An SMM mini-UAV spotted seven infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (five BMP-1 and two BMP-2) near Boikivske (see above).
20 August
The SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BTS-4A) near Panteleimonivka (26km north-east of Donetsk).
Non-SMM UAV seen inside Zolote disengagement area
The SMM saw a UAV flying 30-50m above its position inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
Fortified position and trenches of the armed formations near Novooleksandrivka
The SMM saw two armed members of the armed formations digging trenches around a newly fortified bunker made of logs and sand bags with a gun port on the front pointed in the direction of Novooleksandrivka (government-controlled, 65km west of Luhansk) between the road T-0504 and a wooded area, about 70m east of the T-junction leading south to Novooleksandrivka and about 600m west-north-west of a checkpoint of the armed formations. The SMM also saw a camouflage shield made of small trees and branches on the shoulder of the road T-0504 about 5m west-north-west of the aforesaid bunker (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 1 July 2019).
Unexploded ordnance near Popasna and Uzhivka
On the road T-0504, near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces east of Popasna, the SMM again saw a round of a rocket-propelled grenade laying in the centre of the road and a tailfin from a 120mm anti-tank guided missile laying on the south shoulder of the road.
In Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw that a previously observed tailfin of a 120mm mortar bomb protruding from the asphalt on the edge of the road was still present.
SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure
The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and to power lines near Yasne (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, (16km north-west of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
Border areas outside of government control
While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 32 cars (four with Ukrainian and twelve with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 16 with “DPR” plates), five covered cargo trucks (three with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates), two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and 24 pedestrians (17 women, 7 men, 20-60 years old) entering Ukraine. It also saw seven cars (two with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as one with “DPR” plates), seven covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and five with “DPR” plates) and 15 pedestrians (eight women and seven men, 20-50 years old) exiting Ukraine.
While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw no pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine.
SMM monitored the security situation in south-east Kherson region
On 18 and 19 August, the Mission continued to monitor the security situation along the Sea of Azov coast in Kherson region and at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea and observed a calm situation.
The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
- A member of the Ukrainian Armed Forces denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Delay:
- At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations asked the SMM to provide its patrol plan, citing “new rules”; when the SMM refused to do so its passage was denied; the SMM was however allowed to proceed after 40 minutes of waiting.
- At a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations first denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “demining activities”; its passage was however allowed after about 20 minutes of waiting.
Other impediments:
- While conducting a mini-UAV flight on the north-eastern edge of non-government-controlled Luhansk city, the SMM heard small-arms fire assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV, which it landed safely (see above).
- An SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference while flying in of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), assessed as caused by probable jamming.[6]
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.
[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.
[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position.