Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 12 August 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM saw that demining works continued inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
- The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, including multiple launch rocket systems near non-government-controlled Khrustalnyi.
- The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs of and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure, as well as to enable the removal of unexploded ordnance between the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk and the checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued; the Mission observed the presence of mines close to the Petrivske disengagement area and inside the one near Zolote. SMM unmanned aerial vehicles were subjected to signal interference.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (65), compared with the previous 24 hours (17 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-south-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas north-north-east of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however no explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (eight explosions). Almost all ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).
Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area
Inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw up to 12 deminers of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine clearing vegetation and conducting demining activities on both sides of the road, about 50-100m north of the northern wooden ramp of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).
The Mission also saw about eight deminers from non-government-controlled areas clearing vegetation and conducting demining activities on both sides of the broken section of the bridge, starting from the northern wooden ramp and further south. The Mission saw up to six members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them south of the bridge.[2]
The SMM saw that the shuttle bus continued operating between the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) outside the disengagement area and the broken section of the bridge. At the EECP the SMM observed about 700 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas and about 20 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM saw a steady flow of people traveling in both directions.
Other disengagement areas[3]
On the evening and night of 11-12 August, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded 13 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-3.5km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the evening of 11 August, the SMM camera in Popasna recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.
On 11 August, inside the disengagement area near Zolote, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted 12 anti-tank mines laid in two rows across road T-1316 about 1km south of the area’s northern edge near positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Government-controlled areas
- August
An SMM long-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35, Strela-10) (one probable) near Chernenko (21km north-east of Mariupol).
12 August
The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Popasna.
Non-government-controlled areas
10 August
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
- seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 2 August 2019);
- two towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Vilkhivka (40km east of Donetsk); and
- 22 MLRS (BM-21) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
12 August
The SMM saw:
- at least ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) and
- three tanks (type undetermined) near Manhush (25km south-west of Mariupol).
Non-government-controlled areas
7 August
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:
- three tanks (type undetermined) at a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see the SMM Daily Report 18 July 2019) and
- 16 tanks and 16 pieces of towed artillery at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see the SMM Daily Report 24 July 2019).
10 August
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
- 20 tanks (types undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk);
- three tanks (probable T-64) near Khrustalnyi (see above); and
- five self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and eight tanks (types undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (see above).
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]
Government-controlled areas
10 August
An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk);
- two IFVs (BTR-3DA) near the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) (outside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area);
- two IFVs (BMP-1) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk); and
- an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM) near Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk).
An SMM long-range spotted an armoured combat vehicle near Pyshchevyk.
11 August
An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armored personnel carrier (BTR-70) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk).
12 August
The SMM saw:
- an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a military truck near Popasna and
- an IFV (BMP-1) on the north-western outskirts of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).
Non-government-controlled areas[5]
10 August
An SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable IFV near Ozerianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, 35km north-east of Donetsk).
Mines near the Petrivske disengagement area and between Pisky and Lozove
On 10 August, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted three anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across the road between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), about 150m north of the disengagement area near Petrivske, as well as 33 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across the same road about 100-200m further, all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
On 11 August, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 40 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in two rows across a road leading from Pisky (government-controlled, 11km north-west of Donetsk) to Lozove (non-government-controlled, 13km west of Donetsk), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. About 1km south of the aforementioned mines, the same UAV again spotted 20 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in two rows on the same road, assessed as belonging to the armed formations.
On 12 August, the SMM saw that two previously observed mine hazard signs about 2km north-east of Hannivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), one located about 15m east of the road and the other about 40m east of the road, had been removed.
SMM facilitation of repairs and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure
The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs of water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna and of power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk); as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).
The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the removal of a previously reported piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) located in the middle of the road between the EECP in Pyshchevyk and the checkpoint of the armed formations west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol). After about four hours, a representative of a demining team from non-government-controlled areas told the SMM that the piece of UXO had been removed. During demining activities, the SMM observed uninterrupted traffic towards non-government-controlled areas and in the opposite direction.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Other impediments:
- On the night of 10-11 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, non-government-controlled, 56km south-west of Luhansk) and Sadove (non-government-controlled, 44km east of Donetsk) and Khrestivka (formerly Kirovske, non-government-controlled, 45km east of Donetsk).6
- On the night of 11-12 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between Stepanivka and Hranitne (government-controlled, 78km south-west of Donetsk) as well as between Novopokrovske (government-controlled, 29km north-west of Donetsk) and Ivanopillia (government-controlled, 51km north of Donetsk). 6
- On two occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference while flying over areas near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) and Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), assessed as caused by probable jamming. [6]
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Petrivske and Kriakivka were not operational during the reporting period.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.
[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[5] In the last sentence of the indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone section of the SMM Daily Report 7 August 2019 “a combat engineering vehicle (IMR-3)” should have read “a combat engineering vehicle (IMR-2).”
[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.