Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 1 August 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM observed demining activities by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
- The SMM noted removal of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines near a road north of Petrivske; it observed that anti-tank mines on a road between Bohdanivka and Viktorivka remained in place.
- The Mission observed multiple launch rocket systems in violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs of power lines and water pipelines, and the drilling of water wells.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a non-government-controlled checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however, fewer explosions (17) compared with the previous reporting period (43 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west and west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, however, fewer explosions (20), compared with the previous reporting period (24 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including half of the explosions, were recorded at westerly directions of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).
Positioned in Lozivskyi (non-government-controlled, 32km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 90 shots and bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km south-south west and west-south-west, assessed as part of a live-fire training exercise in the security zone in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone.
Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area
Inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a white armoured vehicle, assessed as belonging to the State Emergency Services (SES) on the northern part of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk) as well as two Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC)[2] and ten SES deminers nearby, carrying metal detectors and prodding sticks. From the morning until 16:30, the Mission saw the deminers working in fields north of the broken section of the bridge using metal detectors and prodding sticks and cutting down bushes.
During the same day, the SMM saw that pedestrians continued crossing the bridge as well as members of an international humanitarian organization carrying a woman in her eighties on a stretcher, passing through the entry-exit checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. She was then transported in an ambulance towards Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk).
Inside the area, the Mission saw up to five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) between the southern part of the broken section of the bridge and the parking area south-south-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations.
Other disengagement areas[3]
Positioned at the northern edge of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions, assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), but within its 5km periphery. Positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire, assessed as outside the disengagement area, but within its 5km periphery.
Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Non-government-controlled areas
On 28 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of seven multiple launch rocket systems (types undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk).
31 July
An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) on the southern edge of Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk).
1 August
The SMM saw seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Non-government-controlled areas
28 July
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:
- 16 tanks, four self-propelled howitzers or mortars and three towed howitzers or mortars in a training area near Manuilivka; and
- 13 tanks, 11 self-propelled howitzers, 12 towed howitzers or mortars, and a surface-to-air missile system (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (see above).
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]
Government-controlled areas
30 July
An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (two BMP-1 and a BMP-2), near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk); and
- an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) on the eastern edge of Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk).
1 August
The SMM saw:
- an APC (BTR-80) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk);
- two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) and two IFVs (BMP-1) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk);
- an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near a residential area in Krasnohorivka; and
- a stationary IFV (BTR-4) east of Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk)
Anti-tank mines spotted again near Sakhanka and Bohdanivka and anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines removed near Petrivske
On 27 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted in total 16 anti-tank mines laid across road M-14, about 2.5km south-west of Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and about 1km north-east of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 20km east of Mariupol), and an additional mine that was burned out, all assessed as belonging to the armed formations (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 19 June 2019).
On 1 August, the SMM observed again three anti-tank mines laid across the road between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), about 150m north of the disengagement area near Petrivske, as well as 35 anti-tank mines about 225m further east across the same road, all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. About 500m north-north-east of the northern edge of the Petrivske disengagement area, in a field 12m east of road CO51532, the SMM observed that at least seven anti-personnel mines (at least four MON-100 and three MON-200) and three anti-vehicle mines (TM-83), previously reported, had been recently removed.
Trench extensions and recent impact craters near Vodiane and Pikuzy
On 30 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of three trench extensions (20m to 60m in length), 1-2km north-east and east of Vodiane (government-controlled, 19km north-east of Mariupol) and two trench extensions (40m and 65m, respectively) 4km east of Talakivka (government-controlled, 17km north-east of Mariupol), all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
The same aerial imagery revealed the presence of two trench extensions (30m and 60m, respectively) 3.5km west of Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, non-government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and a 25m trench extension 1km north of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), all assessed as belonging to the armed formations. The same imagery revealed about 20 recent impact craters in the same area as the above trench extension 1km north of Pikuzy, as well as multiple recent impact craters about 2km north of Pikuzy. None of the above trench extensions and impact craters was visible in imagery from 14 July 2019.
SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure
The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka and dismantling of equipment at the wells of Kondrashivka in Stanytsia Luhanska.
The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).
Unexploded ordnance (UXO) detonated due to wildfires near checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske
On 31 July, the SMM saw burning grass and wood at the eastern part of a tree line near a checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) and heard an explosion, assessed as detonation of a piece of UXO, at a distance of 500-600m west of its position. The Mission also saw wildfire approaching the treeline 200m east of the checkpoint.
Border areas outside government control
On 1 August, while at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the Mission saw 11 cars (two with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as five with “DPR” plates), and a truck (cargo not visible) and a bus (both with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. The Mission also saw 22 cars (four with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 11 with “DPR” plates) as well as four trucks (cargo not visible) and three buses, all with “DPR” plates, exiting Ukraine.
The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials of access:
- At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “orders from superiors”.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Delay:
- At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske, four members of the armed formations delayed the SMM passage with no specific reason provided. After about 30 minutes of waiting at the checkpoint, the Mission was allowed to proceed.
Other impediments:
- An SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk).[5]
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.
[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position.