Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 9 July 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM saw fresh damage to houses due to shelling in Khreshchatytske.
- The SMM saw fresh craters and recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and the operations of critical civilian infrastructure.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including in non-government-controlled Veselohorivka. *
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 170), compared with the previous reporting period (about 190 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west and north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), south-south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), and at south-easterly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 60), compared with the previous reporting period (about 165 explosions). All ceasefire violations were recorded inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) or within 5km of its periphery.
Damage to residential houses due to shelling in Khreshchatytske
On 8 July, in Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM followed up on reports of damage to houses due to shelling on the night of 7-8 July. At 9 Oktiabrska Street, the SMM saw three shattered north-facing windows and one broken west-facing window with its frame dislodged at an inhabited house. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by shelling but was unable to assess the direction of fire. The owner of the house (woman, 80-90 years old) told the SMM that she had been at home when shelling occurred in the morning of 8 July.
About 75m east, at 2 Kosmodemianskoi Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater in a garden, assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a westerly direction. About 2m from the crater, it saw burn marks on the façade of a house and shrapnel scars on its south-south-west facing wall, assessed as caused by the same explosion. The owner of the house (40-50 years old) said that she was at home when shelling occurred on the night of 7-8 July. The SMM had previously observed damage at this address (see SMM Daily Report 3 July 2019).
About 40m south-east, at 7 Oktiabrska Street, the SMM saw displaced corrugated asbestos panels on the north-west-facing part of the roof of an inhabited house and two shattered north-facing windows. Inside, the Mission saw a fresh hole, with a fresh crack and dislodged wall layer around it, in the inner west-facing wall of a bedroom. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by shelling but was unable to assess the direction of fire.
On the same day, the SMM saw about 60 residents (mixed ages and genders) gathered in the centre of Khreshchatytske who expressed their anger and frustration with what they said was the recurrent shelling of their settlement.
Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area
During the day on 9 July, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw up to five members of the armed formations, all wearing blue armbands with “JCCC” written on them, standing in the area between the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and the former forward position of the armed formations south of the wooden ramps on the broken part of the bridge.
On 9 July, inside the disengagement area and north of the bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM saw two Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC)[2] near the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On the same day, south of the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk), inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw four members of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SES) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Kozak) assessed as belonging to the SES.
Other disengagement areas[3]
On 7 July, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed about 110 fresh craters in areas north-west and north-east of the checkpoint of the armed formations on its southern edge and in an area about 1km south of its northern edge and about 1km east of its western edge, as well as in an area west of the entry-exit checkpoint north of the northern edge (outside the disengagement area) (all not seen in imagery from 2 July 2019).
During the day on 9 July, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 2km north, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the same day, positioned at four different locations near the disengagement area, the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions and about 70 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery.
During the day on 9 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Non-government-controlled areas
5 July
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (types unknown) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk).
7 July
An SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in a residential area south of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).
8 July
The SMM saw a tank (T-72) on a flatbed trailer near Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
9 July
The SMM saw:
- ten tanks (T-72) in Pokrovsk (55km north-west of Donetsk) and
- four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Biletske (65km north-west of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled are\as
5 July
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of ten self-propelled howitzers (types unknown), 12 towed howitzers (types unknown) and ten tanks (types unknown) in a training area near Miusynsk.
8 July
The SMM saw tank (type unknown) on a flatbed trailer in Mykhailivka (31km west of Luhansk).
Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]
At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region
9 July
The SMM noted that a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) was present and four MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), 67 towed howitzers (12 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and 55 2A65 Msta-B, 152 mm), six mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm), 12 surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) and 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) remained missing.
Weapons permanent storage site
At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region
9 July
The SMM noted that 49 tanks (45 T-72 and four T-64), 18 anti-tank guns (MT-12) and 12 mortars (six PM-38 Molot, 120mm and six M120-15 Molot, 120mm) remained missing.
Indications of military and military-type in the security zone[6]
Government-controlled areas
7 July
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of six probable armoured combat vehicles near Zolote.
8 July
The SMM saw a mid-range UAV flying from south to north above an area near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), outside the disengagement area.
9 July
The SMM saw:
- an APC (BTR-70) near the entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska;
- an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) and an APC (MT-LB) near Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk);
- 11 IFVs (BMP-2) near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk) and
- four IFVs (BMP-2) near Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
7 July
An SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (BTR-80) and four APCs (MT-LB) in a residential area north-west of Kadiivka.
8 July
An SMM mini-UAV spotted 11 IFVs (BMP-1) and two APCs (MT-LB) approximately 2km north-east of Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk).
Fresh craters near Miusynsk and Kulykove
On 5 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed numerous fresh craters caused by undetermined weapons in a training area near Miusynsk (not seen in imagery of 16 June 2019). On the same day, aerial imagery also revealed ten craters about 3.5km south-east and about 2.5km south-south-east of Kulykove (non-government-controlled, 87km south of Donetsk), assessed as caused by undetermined weapons fired from a westerly direction.
SMM facilitation of repairs and the operations of civilian infrastructure
The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an assessment of land plots corresponding to a water pipeline between Petropavlivka (government-controlled, 27km north of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), as well as repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to electrical transformers in Betmanove (non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk) and to the water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna.
The SMM facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 29 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
- At a checkpoint in Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “the presence of mines”.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Other impediments:
- An SMM mid-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).
- Medical staff at a hospital in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) refused to provide the SMM information about a civilian casualty without permission from those in control.
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.
[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.
[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[5] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The Mission noted that four such sites continue to be abandoned.
[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.