Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 11 June 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• A girl was injured due to an explosion near Vesele and a woman was injured due to shelling in Zaitseve.
• The SMM saw fresh damage and craters caused by shelling near residential houses in Pikuzy.
• It saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• Anti-tank mines were spotted near Krasnohorivka and Olenivka, some for the first time, and unexploded ordnance was seen near Donetsk city.
• Civilians faced hardship and long queues at checkpoints in Luhansk and Donetsk regions.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The SMM’s freedom of movement was also restricted at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region and at a border crossing point near non-government-controlled Dovzhanske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 150), compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions). Over half of the ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, about the same number of explosions (about 150), compared with the previous reporting period. Over half of the ceasefire violations, including almost all of the explosions, were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), including 12 undetermined explosions assessed as caused by mortars near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Girl injured due to an explosion near Vesele, woman injured due to shelling in Zaitseve

On 10 June, at 47 Vilnyi Lane near Vesele (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a girl (aged 7) with a scab on her left forearm. The mother (aged 30) and grandmother of the girl (aged 60-70) told the SMM that she had been in the yard of their house when an explosion occurred 10m away in the yard of the neighbouring house on the evening of 30 May. On 31 May, the SMM saw damage to a garage at the neighbouring house, assessed as caused by a round of an anti-tank guided missile system (9M113 Konkurs) (for further details, see SMM Daily Report 1 June 2019).

On 10 June, at Hospital No. 2 in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), medical staff told the SMM that a woman had arrived at the hospital on 9 June with a shrapnel wound on her left shoulder and that she had been treated and returned home on the same day. On 11 June, the SMM spoke by phone with a woman (in her eighties) who told the Mission that she had been outside of her house in Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) on the evening of 8 June when she felt a pain in her left shoulder and saw that she was bleeding. She told the SMM that, due to ongoing shelling, she could not leave her house for medical care and had treated the wound herself until her grandson had arrived on 9 June and taken her to a hospital in Horlivka. The SMM was unable to access the house in Zaitseve due to security concerns.

Fresh damage and craters caused by shelling near residential houses in Pikuzy

At 47 Akhmatovoi Street in the centre of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw three fresh craters in the garden of an inhabited residential house. Two craters were located 30m and 22m north of the house, and the SMM saw fuse tunnels from 82mm mortal shells embedded in both, as well as pieces of shrapnel in the soil, which it assessed as caused by 82mm mortars fired from a west-north-west direction. A third crater, located 25m north-east of the house, contained a fuse tunnel, the remnants of a tailfin, as well as pieces of shrapnel, and was assessed as coming from an 82mm mortar that had been attached to an RPG-7 propellant charge and fired from a westerly direction. About 15m west of the third crater, the SMM saw about 20 holes in the south-facing outer wall of a wooden shed, as well as a tree with broken branches, all assessed as caused by shrapnel.

At a crossroads about 35m south of the house at 47 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw a fourth fresh crater about 4m south of the road with metal fragments of a fuse embedded inside of it as well as shrapnel in the soil, assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar fired from a west-north-west direction (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 3 June 2019). The SMM also saw a hole in a glass window of a barn located about 30m north of the crater, assessed as caused by shrapnel. Three residents of the area separately told the SMM that they had heard shelling on the morning of 9 June.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 9 June, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed that a previously reported trench, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, that protruded through the northern edge of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) to about 400m west of the area’s eastern edge had been extended by about 9m inside the area.[3]

On the evening and night of 10 and 11 June, positioned on the northern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard about 130 explosions, including 12 assessed as mortar rounds, and at least 50 bursts and shots (of small-arms, heavy-machine-gun and automatic grenade launcher fire), all assessed as within 5km of the Zolote disengagement area’s periphery.

On 10 June, inside the disengagement area near Zolote, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck, about 600m south of its northern edge and about 1km east of its western edge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 11 June, positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

10 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) parked between residential houses in Mykolaivka (57km north of Donetsk).

The SMM saw an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk.

11 June

Non-government-controlled areas

The SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

The SMM noted that:

• seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were present and
• 31 towed howitzers (18 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and 13 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), 24 MLRS (BM-21), 18 anti-tank guns (MT-12) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

The SMM noted that all previously observed weapons were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

9 June

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk).

10 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• four IFVs (BMP-1) in Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk);
• an ACV near Mykolaivka;
• two ACVs near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk); and
• two ACVs near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Sartana (15km north-east of Mariupol).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

11 June

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) near Netailove (22km north-west of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BTR-4) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• two IFVs (BMP-2) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP variant) and an APC (MT-LB) in Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk);
• three APCs (MT-LB) near Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol);
• an IFV (BTR-4) in Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk); and
• a freshly dug trench, about 50m in length, running south to a freshly dug revetment on the eastern edge of Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk).

Anti-tank mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and mine and UXO hazard signs in Donetsk region

On 9 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted about 1,700 anti-tank mines (next to previously reported 336 anti-tank mines) in fields about 2.5km east of Krasnohorivka, all located near positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 11 June, about 1km south-west of a forward position of the armed formations on road H-2 near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time eight anti-tank mines in the eastern lane of the road, where barriers already existed. About 250m west of the newly-laid mines, the SMM again saw two anti-tank mines (TM-62M) in the median between road lanes. On the same day, the SMM saw for the first time a piece of UXO embedded in the asphalt on road H-15, which is frequently used by both civilians and the SMM, in the Kirovskyi district of Donetsk city (non-government-controlled) and about 150m south-east of residential houses, assessed as not recent and coming from a 122mm MLRS (BM-21).

The SMM saw that three previously observed mine hazard signs on a road leading from Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) to Novomykhailivka (government-controlled, 28km south-west of Donetsk) had been removed and that a new mine hazard sign with “Danger Mines” written in Ukrainian attached to a post had been placed about 18m east of the road. In Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw mine awareness information posters for the first time on a bus stop on a road leading to Novomykhailivka. On a road leading to the SMM camera site in Shyrokyne, the SMM saw a rock wrapped in red and white tape in the centre of a sunburst pattern on the road, assessed as an improvised UXO warning sign and probably the site of an impact.

Civilians faced hardship and long queues at checkpoints in Luhansk and Donetsk regions

On 11 June, the SMM saw the body of a man in his eighties lying on the ground beside the road about 20m north of the wooden ramp on the bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska. The man’s widow (in her late seventies) told the SMM that she had been walking with her husband towards government-controlled areas when he collapsed near the bridge and that he had a history of heart problems. Porters carried the body to a parking lot where medical personnel later examined it.

Near the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the same bridge, the SMM saw elderly people who told the SMM that the porters they had hired to transport them from non-government-controlled-to government-controlled areas had refused to proceed past the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

At a checkpoint near Olenivka, the SMM observed about 200 vehicles queuing to travel to government-controlled areas, as well as about 100 vehicles queuing in the opposite direction (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 11 June 2019). At a checkpoint of the armed formations on road H-15 near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed at least 200 vehicles queuing to travel to government-controlled areas.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), to high voltage power lines in Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk) and to power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to support a funeral in a cemetery bordered by the contact line on the eastern edge of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol). On 10 June, two men who introduced themselves as undertakers in the cemetery told the SMM that they often heard small-arms fire in the area. The SMM saw two bullet holes, assessed as caused by small-arms fire, in the side of their van.

People apply for Russian Federation passports in Slovianoserbsk

In Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw about 50 people (mixed ages and genders) queuing to apply for passports of the Russian Federation, as well as for “LPR passports.”

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) entering Ukraine. After five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 24 cars (six with Ukrainian, 11 with Russian Federation and one with Lithuanian licence plates, as well as six with “DPR” plates), seven trucks (two with covered cargo, two carrying timber, one dump truck, one carrying a shipping container and one transporting cars) (six with Ukrainian and one with Lithuanian licence plates), two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and 42 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 30 cars (15 with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 14 with “DPR” plates) and 20 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) exiting Ukraine.

On 1 June, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw no traffic.

SMM monitored the security situation in south-east Kherson region

On 9 and 10 June, the SMM observed calm situations at the crossing point between Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson), Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) and Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea. At the Chaplynka crossing point, the SMM noticed a strong smell in the area. A State Border Guard Service member told the SMM that emissions from the Titan Plant had a specific, stifling smell recently. The man added that the air pollution level was measured by their unit two to three times per day. On 10 June, the SMM observed a calm situation in coastal areas near Henichesk (176km east of Kherson).

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On two occasions at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to the area, citing lack of permission from superiors.
• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (non-government-controlled, 84km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• An SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Sartana (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol).[6]
• On the evening and night of 10-11 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over government-controlled areas of northern Donetsk region.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The Mission noted that five sites continue to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.