Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 6 June 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM observed damage to roofs of Bakhmut Agrarian Union's pig farm buildings near Novoluhanske and fresh craters in a residential area of Pikuzy.
- Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle inside the Zolote disengagement area.
- The Mission observed for the first time about 280 anti-tank mines near non-government-controlled Staromykhailivka.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 100), compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly and easterly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), including in the vicinity of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), and at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (50), compared with the previous reporting period (14 explosions). Most ceasefire violations, including most explosions, were recorded at easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).
Damage to roofs of the Bakhmut Agrarian Union's pig farm near Novoluhanske
On 5 June, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted five impacts in roofs of three buildings (not seen in imagery from 31 May 2019) of the Bakhmut Agrarian Union's pig farm near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk). Four impacts were assessed as caused by rounds of an automatic grenade launcher (AGS-17 VOG-25) and one was assessed as caused by a round of an 82mm mortar (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 19 April 2019).
Two fresh craters in residential area of Pikuzy
At Peremohy Street in the southern part of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), accompanied by a member of the armed formations, the SMM observed two fresh craters about 25m and 20m, respectively, north-east of two uninhabited single-storey houses. The SMM also observed pieces of aluminium about 3m south and south-west respectively of the craters, assessed as parts of rocket-propelled grenades (RPG-7). The SMM assessed both craters to have been caused by rounds of rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPG-7) from a west-south-westerly direction. A local resident (woman in her sixties) told the SMM that she had heard shelling in the evening of 5 June.
Small-arms fire directed at SMM mini-UAV inside Zolote disengagement area
Positioned on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) while conducting a mini-UAV flight over the disengagement area, the SMM heard 19 bursts of small-arms fire about 1.2km north-north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 1.2km north-north-west of its position, inside the disengagement area. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*
Disengagement areas[2]
On the evening of 5 June and during the day of 6 June, the SMM recorded eight explosions (one impact and seven undetermined) and 18 bursts and shots of small-arms fire in the 5km periphery of the Zolote disengagement area. Also on 6 June, the SMM recorded 19 bursts of small-arms fire assessed as inside the disengagement area (see above).
During the day on 6 June, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations. [3]
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:
Government-controlled areas
6 June
The SMM saw 11 tanks (T-72), 20 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).
Non-government-controlled areas
2 June
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 12 tanks in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk).
5 June
An SMM long-range UAV spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) in a compound in Shyroke (34km south-east of Luhansk).
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]
Government-controlled areas
6 June
The SMM saw:
- an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) near Popasna; and
- an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk.
Non-government-controlled areas
5 June
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
- 21 infantry fighting vehicles (BMP variants), three APCs (two BTR-80 and one MT-LB) and a combat engineering vehicle (IMR-2) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk).
On 6 June, the SMM saw two electronic countermeasure/electronic warfare systems near Yenakiieve (41km north-east of Donetsk).
Mines seen for the first time near Staromykhailivka
On 29 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time about 280 anti-tank mines laid in two rows running for about 700m from east to west in a field about 50m north of a road on the northern outskirts of Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), near positions of the armed formations.
SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure
The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna as well as near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), to water infrastructure near Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk) as well as to power lines between Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and Yuzhna Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).
The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). Positioned near the pumping station, the SMM also facilitated repair works to high voltage power lines between Yasynuvata and Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk).
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 4 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Other impediments:
- On the evening of 5 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government and non-government controlled areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk).[5]
- While conducting a mini-UAV flight on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 19 bursts of small-arms fire about 1.2km north-north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely.
- In a medical facility in Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), medical staff refused to speak to the SMM without permission from members of the armed formations.
- In a hospital in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) a doctor refused to speak to the SMM, who was following up on reports about four civilian casualties, without written permission from members of the armed formation.
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.