Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 24 May 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored the transfer of persons convicted before the conflict from non-government- to government-controlled areas in Luhansk region.
• The SMM’s freedom of movement continued to be restricted in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere.*

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Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (185), compared with the previous reporting period (about 240 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, as well as the majority of explosions, were recorded at westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at southerly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (five), compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at north-westerly directions of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 23 May, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded about 50 projectiles in vertical flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (all assessed as inside the disengagement area).

During the day on 24 May, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation. [3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

23 May

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) about 1km west of Novoselivka (31km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

19 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 17 pieces of towed artillery (types undetermined) and eight pieces of self-propelled artillery (types undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). In the same training area, aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 59 armoured combat vehicles[4] (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 16 May 2019);
• 50 tanks in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 25 April 2019); and
• 20 tanks in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 26 April 2019).

22 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and 11 tanks (T-72) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk).

23 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), 21 tanks (11 T-64 and  ten T-72), eight mortars (2B11 Sani,120mm), as well as six probable surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) in a training area near Myrne (see above).

Indications of military presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

23 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier near residential buildings in Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk) and
• three infantry fighting vehicles (two BMP-1 and BMP-2) in Heorhiievka (27km south-west of Donetsk).

24 May

Positioned near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the northern edge of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), the SMM saw a dark-coloured UAV flying at an altitude of about 300m.

Mine hazard sign in Makariv Yar

The SMM saw for the first time a mine hazard sign (a red square with written “Stop, mines” in Russian language) in a field next to a road about 4km south-west of Makariv Yar (formerly Parkhomenko, non-government-controlled, 28km east of Luhansk). 

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). Despite security guarantees having been provided that a localized ceasefire would be adhered to, the SMM heard ceasefire violations close to the DFS (see table below) and left the area.

SMM facilitated and monitored the transfer of persons convicted before the conflict

The SMM facilitated and monitored a transfer of persons convicted before the conflict from non-government- to government-controlled areas in Luhansk region. A representative of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and a representative of those in control in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region separately told the SMM that about 60 persons (including three women) had been transferred.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 23 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The armoured combat vehicles mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.