Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 22 May 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
- The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure and to allow for the transfer of a body across the contact line.
- The Mission observed for the first time anti-tank mines near Pyshchevyk and mine hazard signs near Nelipivka.
- A man died from natural causes at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted at non-government-controlled checkpoints near Novoazovsk, Kozatske and Oleksandrivske in Donetsk region.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 130 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 45 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), and at southerly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (50 explosions). Almost all ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).
Disengagement areas[2]
Positioned near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Non-government-controlled areas
19 May
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of seven multiple launch rocket systems (types undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 9 May 2019).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Non-government-controlled areas
19 May
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:
- 12 tanks in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 9 May 2019);
- 11 tanks, seven self-propelled howitzers or mortars and 12 towed howitzers or mortars in a training area near Miusynsk (see above); and
- 23 tanks and three surface-to-air missile systems (types undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk). In the same training area, aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 72 armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[4] (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 25 April 2019).
Other weapons observed[5]
19 May
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 18 pieces of towed artillery or mortars (types undetermined) and five pieces of self-propelled artillery or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above).
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[6]
Government-controlled areas
21 May
An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an ACV and two armoured personnel carriers (Kozak-2) near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk).
22 May
The SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
20 May
An SMM mini-UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP variants) and eight ACVs near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).
21 May
The SMM saw three anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) in Luhansk city.
Presence of mines near Pyshchevyk and mine hazard signs near Nelipivka
On 21 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time at least 120 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in two parallel rows running north to south in a field with previously observed mines about 1.5km south-east of Pyshchevyk.
On 22 May, 3km south of Nelipivka (government-controlled, 50km north of Donetsk) and about 20m east of road T-0516, the SMM observed for the first time two square red mine hazard signs, as well as a square yellow sign with the words “Restricted (Closed) Area. No Entry” written in Ukrainian.
Man died of natural causes at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka
The SMM followed up on information from an officer of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine about a man (in his seventies) who had died from natural causes at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) on 22 May. A member of staff at a hospital in Kurakhove (government-controlled, 40km west of Donetsk) told the SMM that the man’s body had been brought to the hospital’s morgue on the same day.
SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure
The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to a water pipeline near Zolote. It also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
SMM facilitated and monitored transfer of body from government-controlled areas to non-government-controlled areas
The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the transfer of a body of a member of the armed formations from government-controlled to non-government-controlled area in Luhansk region.
People apply for Russian Federation passports in Luhansk region
In non-government-controlled Luhansk city, the SMM observed 32 people (mixed gender, 20-65 years old) standing outside a building. A member of the armed formations told the SMM that they had been standing in line to apply for “LPR” “passports”, “necessary for obtaining a passport of the Russian Federation”, and also that another 15 people (mixed gender, 30-65 years old), which the SMM observed near the same building, had been applying for Russian Federation passports.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 20 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
- At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Novoazovsk or east to the border with the Russian Federation.
- At a checkpoint east of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage towards Markyne (non-government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), citing “ongoing firing exercises at a nearby training range”.
- In Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage east towards Porokhnia (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol).
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska was not operational.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[4] The ACVs mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[5] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.
[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.