Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 13 May 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission saw damage to civilian properties from shelling in non-government-controlled Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
- Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
- The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted near non-government-controlled Zaichenko, as well as at a non-government-controlled border crossing point near Izvaryne.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 76 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 190 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, as well as the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas north-east and east of Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk) and in areas south of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 25 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 300 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west and west-north-west of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) and in areas north-east, south-east and south of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).
Fresh damage to civilian properties caused by shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka
On 12 May, the SMM saw damage from shelling to several civilian properties in the north-eastern part of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), most of which was assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction.
At 1 Pervomaiska Street, the Mission saw a fresh crater (about 1m in diameter) about 3m west of an inhabited one-storey house. The SMM saw two shattered window panes, one shattered window frame and shrapnel damage to the wall on the house’s west-north-west-facing side and two shattered window panes on its south-facing side. It saw shards of glass scattered on the ground beneath the broken windows. The SMM also observed that a section of a wooden fence about 1m east of the crater had been destroyed and that there were at least 50 holes in the remaining parts of the fence.
At the intersection of Pervomaiska and Poshtova Street, around 30m north of the above-mentioned house, the SMM saw an impact (10cm in diameter) and burned grass 1-3m south of it. About 5m south-east of the crater the Mission saw holes in a gas pipeline, in a concrete pylon of an electrical line and in a tree. It also saw a 10cm hole in the front hood of a civilian car parked around 15m south of the crater. The SMM observed seven workers conducting repair works to the damaged pipeline.
In a yard at 9 Poshtova Street, about 20m south-south-east of an inhabited one-storey house, the SMM saw another fresh crater (about 1m in diameter) and a shattered window on the south-facing wall of a wooden shed standing about 20m north-north-west of the crater, as well as partially ripped off bark on three nearby trees.
At 10 Poshtova Street, around 20m south-south-west of an inhabited one-story house, the SMM saw another fresh crater (about 1m in diameter). The Mission saw a broken south-west-facing window covered with plastic sheeting and at least 40 holes in the south-west-facing wall of the house.
Three people (a man in his thirties, a man in his fifties and a woman in her eighties) who introduced themselves as residents of the above-mentioned properties told the Mission that they had been at home in the evening on 11 May when they had heard sounds of shelling nearby.
Small-arms fire directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka
On 13 May, while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard two shots of small-arms fire 100-200m north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 100m north-east of its position. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*
Disengagement areas[2]
On 11 May, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (type undetermined) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck near residential houses, both assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 May 2019).
Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3]
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Government-controlled areas
11 May
An SMM mini-UAV spotted two self-propelled anti-aircraft systems (2K22 Tunguska, one of which probable) in Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
12 May
An SMM long-range UAV spotted three probable self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a field about 700m from the nearest residential houses in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district.
13 May
The SMM saw:
- 19 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk);
- two towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) on road T0504 in Irmino (54km west of Luhansk); and
- an MLRS (BM-21) on road T0504 in Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
13 May
The SMM saw four surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) loaded on rail cars at a train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).
Weapons storage sites
At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region
13 May
The SMM noted that three MLRS (BM-21) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) remained missing.
Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]
At a heavy weapons holding area in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region
13 May
The SMM saw that the site was abandoned and noted that seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) remained missing.
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]
Government-controlled areas
11 May
An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (an MT-LB-M with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted atop and two MT-LB) and three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk), and
- 16 IFVs (BMP-1) in Bila Hora (see above).
An SMM long-range UAV spotted three ACVs in Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk).
12 May
An SMM long-range UAV spotted two IFVs (a BMP-1 and a probable BMP-2) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk).
13 May
The SMM saw:
- an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and
- an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
12 May
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
- nine IFVs (a probable BMP-1 parked in the yard of a residential house and eight BMP-variants) in Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk) and
- 12 APCs (11 MT-LB and a BTR variant), four armoured recovery vehicles (two BTS-4A and two VT-55), six IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in compounds in Donetsk city’s Leninskyi district (the UAV also spotted hulls of 24 IFVs/APCs and of 23 tanks).
Mines near Pyshchevyk
On 4 and 9 May, in a field about 1km south-south-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), SMM mini-UAVs spotted for the first time about 3,000 anti-tank mines (type undetermined) placed in four rows running from north to south for about 3.5km. The SMM assessed most of these mines as not recent; however, it also noted that some mines had been placed near mines that had previously detonated. Near the mines, the same UAVs spotted about 40 sticks with pieces of red tape attached to them fixed in the ground, as well as two square signs (all assessed as mine hazard signs).
On 11 May, in a field about 1.5km east-south-east of Pyshchevyk and about 15m north of a road to Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time about 120 anti-tank mines (TM-62M) placed in two rows running for about 300m from north to south as well as six red square signs (assessed as mine hazard signs) about 20m of the above-mentioned mines.
SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure and demining
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) as well as to a water pipeline between Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
The SMM also monitored adherence to the ceasefire in order to enable a transfer of funds from non-government- to government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, reportedly related to water payments.
Border areas outside government control
At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a car with Russian Federation licence plates and a covered cargo truck with “LPR” plates entering Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*
While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about an hour, the Mission saw five pedestrians entering and five pedestrians exiting Ukraine.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials of access:
- At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from their superiors”.
- At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
- The SMM was unable to access a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, as its gate was locked and no guards were present.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Other impediments:
- On 11 May, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its dual GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over areas near Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk).
- On 12 May, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its dual GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region near Kreminets (16km south-west of Donetsk), Ivanivka (78km south of Donetsk) and Vesele (92km south of Donetsk).[6]
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.
[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.
[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.