Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 10 May 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

• The Mission saw fresh damage from gunfire to a functioning school in non-government-controlled Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.

• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw the body of a deceased man at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure as well as to enable demining in Luhansk region.
• The SMM observed events commemorating Victory Day in Odessa, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Uzhhorod.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The SMM’s freedom of movement was also restricted in non-government-controlled areas at checkpoints near Verkhnoshyrokivske and Shevchenko, as well as at a checkpoint near Siedove, close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 450 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-east and south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 725 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 30 explosions). About 90 per cent of them, including about 630 explosions of outgoing artillery and mortar rounds as well as impacts of artillery rounds, were recorded in areas east, south and south-west of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and areas west and west-south-west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

 

Fresh damage from gunfire to a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 8 May, at 4 Myru Street, on the south-eastern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed damage to a functioning school building. It saw two partially shattered first-floor windows in two of the building’s north-north-east-facing walls, one of which also had a hole in the remaining glass; one first-floor north-north-east-facing window with a hole in the glass; two first-floor west-north-west-facing windows with holes in the glass; and a second-floor west-north-west-facing window with a hole in the glass as well as a hole in the wall plaster inside of the window pane. All of the damage was assessed as fresh and caused by shrapnel or small-arms fire. A school representative (woman in her forties) told the Mission that the damage had been discovered on the morning of 8 May and that no one had been present at the school at the time. The same school has sustained damage nine times since December 2018 (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 17 April 2019).

Fresh crater in Troitske

On 9 May, the SMM saw a crater on the south-eastern side of Lermontova Street in Troitske, about 160m south-east of a recently damaged school building on Kvitkova Street (see SMM Daily Report 10 May 2019). The Mission assessed the crater as recent and probably caused by an 82mm round fired from a south-easterly direction. The director of the school and a resident of Troitske (a woman in her fifties) separately told the SMM that there had been shelling in the area on the morning of 6 May. The director added that there had been classes at the school at the time when shelling had occurred.

Man died at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka

On 10 May at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw the body of a deceased man covered with a blanket. Earlier that day, at the same place the Mission had seen paramedics attending to a man (in his sixties) lying on the ground. An officer of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service told the SMM that the man had fallen unconscious soon after he had stepped of out the car in which he and his wife had been travelling to non-government-controlled areas.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 9 May, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded six undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-6km south, two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 1-2km east-south-east, an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-4km east and two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-4km east-north-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3] 

 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

8 May

An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted eight multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Nykanorivka (86km north of Donetsk).  

10 May

The SMM saw four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152 mm) near Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 May

The SMM saw:

• four tanks (T-72) on flatbed trailers heading west in Luhansk city and
• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

10 May

The SMM saw four tanks (T-72) south of Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas in Luhansk region

10 May

The SMM noted that:

• eight towed howitzers (2A65, Msta-B, 152 mm) and 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were present and
• 69 towed howitzers (2A65) continued to be missing.

Weapons storage sites

At a permanent storage site in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

10 May

The SMM noted that 24 tanks (T-64) and six mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm) remained missing.

At a permanent storage site in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

10 May

The SMM noted that eight tanks (T-72), four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and five mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) remained missing.

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

On 10 May, the SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

9 May

The SMM saw:

• five infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (three BMP-1 and two BMP variants), an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB S) in Popasna;
• an IFV (BMP variant) in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk); and
• an IFV (BMP variant) in Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

10 May

The SMM saw four trucks assessed as electronic warfare systems (R-330U or R-330T) south-west of Pyshchevyk.

Non-government-controlled areas

8 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (probable BMP) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time three trenches, each 3m long, (not seen in imagery from 5 March 2019) west of road M03 about 4km north-west of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk).

9 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a concrete bunker under construction in a field about 4.5km south of Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk) and a recently improved trench system (about 100m long) about 1km east of the bunker. The UAV also spotted five recently dug 5m-long trenches in a field about 1.5km north-east of Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk).

10 May

The SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) in Nova Marivka (64km south of Donetsk).

UAV seen flying in the security zone

The SMM saw an unidentified UAV (assessed as a fixed-wing type) flying in a north-westerly direction at an altitude of about 200-300m about 2km south of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol). 

Mine hazard signs

The Mission saw for the first time two mine hazard signs (red squares with “ Stop Mines” written in Russian) about 500m west-north-west of the intersection of roads T1315 and T1303, about 3km north of Stepove (non-government-controlled, 27km west of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure and demining

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire in order to facilitate demining activities by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in fields near Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk).

Celebrations marking Victory Day

On 9 May, the SMM monitored two gatherings commemorating Victory Day at the Alley of Glory and at the Unknown Sailor Monument in Odessa. The Mission saw several hundred people (mixed genders and ages), among them about 25 people displaying the insignia of the Right Sector and Street Front, and about 40 law enforcement officers. It observed some verbal exchanges between the participants and minor scuffles between a few participants and police officers. The SMM also monitored peaceful gatherings commemorating Victory Day in Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Uzhhorod which were attended by 200-1,000 people (mixed genders and ages) (for observations from other cities, see SMM Daily Report 10 May 2019).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 10 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage after it refused to show its patrol plan.
• At a checkpoint in Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk) two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westward to Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol).
• At a checkpoint near Siedove (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation, six armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing exercises in the area.”

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), an officer of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the JCCC told the SMM by phone that there was no information on demining activities in the area. The SMM did not consider safe to proceed.

Delayed:

• At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske, about an hour after the SMM was denied passage (see above), two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed after about 30 minutes of waiting.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.