Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 1 May 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw a fresh crater on the side of a road near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near government-controlled Bobrove and at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of non-government-controlled Luhansk city.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities near Zolote-4/Rodina, Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and Katerynivka, as well as continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also denied access at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Pikuzy.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 100), compared with the previous reporting period (50 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south, south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol). Positioned about 2km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 400-500m south and left the area immediately.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (about 20), compared with the previous reporting period. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly and easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 30 April, the SMM saw a fresh crater outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), about 300m south of its southern edge on the northern side of a road leading from Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) to the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area, as well as dirt, gravel and pieces of concrete scattered across the same road. The SMM did not assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire.

On 1 May, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

On 1 May, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

On 1 May, the SMM saw seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), seven multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), and ten towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 26 April 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

On 1 May, the SMM saw six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and seven tanks (T-72) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[3]

At two heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

On 1 May, the SMM saw that three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), 31 mortars (18 2B11 Sani, 120mm, 12 M-120 Molot, 120mm and one BM-37, 82mm), 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and six towed howitzers (D-30) continued to be missing.

Indications of military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Non-government-controlled areas

30 April

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Yashchykove (46km west of Luhansk) and
• two newly dug trenches (one about 160m-long and another about 50m-long) in fields about 2km south-west of Mytkovo-Kachkari (93km south of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 8 April 2019).

Presence of unexploded ordnance and mine hazard signs

On 30 April, the SMM saw exploded remnants of two of five previously observed anti-tank mines, with their fuses removed, about 10m south of road T-0504 and about 400m south-west of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in the eastern outskirts of Popasna. A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at the checkpoint told the SMM that they had conducted demining activities in the area on 27 April.

On 1 May, in Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw that a previously observed tailfin of a 120mm mortar round protruding from the asphalt on the edge of the road was still present.

On the same day, on the eastern edge of Chermalyk, the SMM saw that a previously observed red mine hazard sign, with “Stop Mines” written in Ukrainian and “Danger Mines” in English, attached to a rope extended across a road leading to a cemetery, was still present.

Border areas outside of government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 70 minutes, the SMM saw 36 cars (four with Ukrainian and 29 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three with “DPR” plates), three mini-vans (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as one with “DPR” plates), a bus (with “DPR” plates) and seven pedestrians entering Ukraine. It also saw 27 cars (two with Ukrainian and 16 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as eight with “DPR” and one with “LPR” plates), three covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) and three buses (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

SMM facilitation of demining activities

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities reportedly carried out by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in and around cemeteries near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 29 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint north-east of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations (one of them armed) prevented the SMM from proceeding further, citing “ongoing heavy shelling in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that anti-tank mines present across the road leading north had not been cleared.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.