Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 20 March 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
- The SMM observed military presence in the Petrivske disengagement area and again saw anti-tank mines and military presence in the Zolote disengagement area.
- It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions including repairs to the wooden ramps in the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored a transfer of persons convicted before the conflict from non-government- to government-controlled areas in Luhansk region.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Zaichenko, Donetsk region.
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 560 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 75 explosions). Almost half of the ceasefire violations were recorded at northerly, southerly and westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), including explosions assessed as outgoing and impacts of mortar rounds.
On the evening of 20 March, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 200-500m east-south-east and about 1.5km south-west of the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).
In Luhansk region,the Mission recorded fewerceasefire violations, including about 290 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 890). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and north, west and north-west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).
Disengagement areas[2]
On 19 March, inside the disengagement area near Zolote, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (two BMP-1 and a probable BMP-1), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, each about 250, 500 and 900m south of the disengagement area’s northern edge.
On 19 March, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 33 anti-tank mines (TM-62), laid in six rows running east to west for about 500m, about 550m north of its southern edge and about 1km west of its eastern edge, as well as at least 37 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows from east to west for about 350m, in an area about 700m west of the aforementioned 33 anti-tank mines. On the same day, the same UAV again spotted at least 12 anti-tank mines (TM-62), laid in two rows running east to west across road T1316 about 1.1km south of its northern edge.
During the day on 20 March, positioned on the western edge of Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and north-east of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 146 ceasefire violations, including 21 undetermined explosions (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). Positioned on the northern edge of Zolote, western edge of Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and west of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions and six bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire assessed as near the disengagement area.
On 19 March, inside the Petrivske disengagement area, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 1km east of its western edge and about 1km north of its southern edge as well as three people in camouflaged clothing assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces and a military truck (Ural) near previously reported positions about 700m east of the disengagement area’s western edge and 1.5km north of its southern edge.
During the day on 20 March, positioned 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 54 ceasefire violations, including 52 shots of small-arms fire assessed as near the disengagement area.[3]
Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
Government-controlled areas
19 March
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
- a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Chermalyk (77km south of Donetsk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Non-government-controlled areas
19 March
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 22 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 12 March 2019).
20 March
The SMM saw three tanks (T-72) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).
Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn
At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region
20 March
The SMM noted that:
- 24 towed howitzers (18 2A65 Msta-B,152mm and six D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 13 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) 31 mortars (18 2B11 Sani, 120mm, 12 M-120-15 Molot, 120mm and one BM-37 82mm) and 23 self-propelled howiters (2S1 Gvozidka, 122mm ) remained missing.
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]
Government-controlled areas
19 March
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
- an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Opytne (12km north-west of Donetsk);
- three armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (probable BMP variants) near Orlivske (82km south of Donetsk);
- an IFV (BMP-1) near Pyshchevyk;
- five IFVs (three BMP-2 and two BMP-1) near Chermalyk; and
- three IFVs (BMP-1) near Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk).
An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk).
An SMM mini-UAV spotted a 150m eastwards extension to a previously observed trench system near Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk) (not visible on imagery from 5 March 2019).
20 March
The SMM saw a probable anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) being transported near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
19 March
An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- at least 12 IFVs (BMP-1) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk) and
- an APC (MT-LB) near Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk).
On 20 March, the SMM observed freshly refurbished and reinforced military trenches around 300m long on both sides of a local road about 2km south of Ohulchansk (25km east of Luhansk).
SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the water supply network nearDonetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk), as well as to enable an assessment of a water conduit in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) and repairs to the power transformer station near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk). TheMission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk).
The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an international organization to replace the broken planks on the floor of the wooden ramps connecting the broken parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.
SMM facilitated and monitored the transfer of persons convicted before the conflict
The SMM also facilitated and monitored a transfer of persons convicted before the conflict from non-government- to government-controlled areas in Luhansk region. Both a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer and a member of the armed formations told the SMM that 60 persons (including a woman) had been transferred.
The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that theJoint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 19 March 2019).The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
- At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) two armed members of armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “risks to the security of the SMM”.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.
[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3]Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[4]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.