Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 11 March 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- More ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours, were recorded by the SMM.
- The SMM observed fresh damage from small-arms fire to a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and fresh impact craters near populated areas in Zolote-4/Rodina.
- The Mission recorded ceasefire violations and observed fresh impact craters inside the Zolote disengagement area.
- The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. Its access was also restricted in non-government-controlled areas, including at checkpoints near Zaichenko and Kreminets and in Izvaryne, an area close to the border with the Russian Federation.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 145 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (50 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations (including 105 explosions) were recorded at westerly and northerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), at south-easterly and southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at south-easterly and westerly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including 110 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (11 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west and south of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), west of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and south-west of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk).
Fresh small-arms fire damage to a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka
In Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed four holes (all 2cm in diameter) in the panes of four partially shattered west-facing windows of a functioning school on Myru Street: one on the first floor, two on the second floor and one on the third floor of the building. The Mission assessed the damage as fresh and as caused by small-arms fire. It also observed several bullets at the site. The director (woman, in her fifties) told the Mission that on the morning of 11 March, the night guard had told her that the school had sustained damage during the night (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 February 2019).
Fresh impact craters near populated areas in Zolote-4/Rodina
On 8 March, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two fresh impact craters (not visible in imagery from 5 March 2019), assessed as caused by probable 120mm mortar rounds, about 150m south-east of the closest residential houses in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) and about 300m north of the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).
Disengagement areas[2]
On the evening of 10 March, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded nine projectiles and a burst, all at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). During the day on 11 March, the same camera recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 5-6km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and six projectiles at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).
On 10 March, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (type undetermined) just west of a railway bridge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as an earthen ramp extending across two railway tracks for the first time, about 40m south-south-west of the aforementioned bridge. The same UAV spotted eight fresh impact craters (around Ukrainian Armed Forces positions) about 60m west of road T1316, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, as well as 34 previously observed anti-tank mines, of which one was assessed as having shifted as a result of the aforementioned impacts. About 250m north of the disengagement area, the UAV spotted 13 fresh impact craters, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, across trenches in a field about 100m west of the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
On 11 March, the SMM saw that six anti-tank mines (probable TM-62), previously observed laid out across a ditch extending across the road 60m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, had been removed (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 March 2019).
During the day on 11 March, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 4-5km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same day, positioned on the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard five bursts of small-arms fire 2km west-north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).
Positioned near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
Weapons in violation
Non-government-controlled-areas
10 March
An SMM mini-UAV spotted two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a residential area in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).
11 March
The SMM saw four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Government-controlled-areas
9 March
An SMM mini-UAV spotted 24 tanks (T-64), about 2,000 crates of ammunition (125mm rounds) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Zatyshne (64km south-west of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled-areas
5 March
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 25 tanks (type undetermined) and 11 pieces of self-propelled and 20 pieces of towed artillery or mortars in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 21 February 2019).
6 March
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 19 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 21 February 2019).
10 March
An SMM-mini UAV spotted:
- 21 tanks (11 T-64 and 10 T-72), six anti-tank guns (MT-12), 12 towed howitzers (D-30), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 15 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) in a training area near Myrne (see above) and
- 22 tanks (T-64) in a training area near Kruhlyk (see above).
Weapons permanent storage sites
At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region
11 March
The SMM noted that seven mortars (four 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and three PM-38, 120mm) and 54 tanks (T-64) were again missing.
At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region
11 March
The SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.
Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone[4]
Government-controlled areas
7 March
An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1), an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Popasna.
10 March
An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Staryi Aidar (20km north-west of Luhansk) and
- a probable IFV (BMP-variant) near Zolote.
Non-government-controlled areas
9 March
An SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).
10 March:
An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- two IFVs (BMP-2) and a communication truck with two antennas (R-161-A2M) near Debaltseve and
- an APC (MT-LB) near Sentianivka (44km west of Luhansk).
On 9 March, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 17 fresh impact craters assessed as caused by automatic-grenade-launcher rounds on both sides of road T0504, about 280m from the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 March 2019).
Presence of mines and new mine hazard signs
The SMM again observed at least six anti-tank mines (TM-62) fixed on a wooden plank on the southern side of road T0504, about 60m east of the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the eastern outskirts of Popasna.
In the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of the city centre), about 20m north of Dunaievskoho Street, the SMM saw for the first time a wooden plank (with the word “Mines” written in Russian) on attached to a wooden stick in the ground.
In Syhnalne (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the Mission observed for the first time two decayed wooden boards (without inscriptions) attached to two sticks about 25m west of a road on the western edge of the village and at a distance of about 100m from each other, assessed as improvised mine hazard signs. It observed that parts of the field between the road and the mine hazard signs were cultivated, while other parts of the same field, west of the mine hazard signs, were uncultivated.
SMM facilitation of operation of civilian infrastructure
The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire in order to enable a transfer of funds reportedly related to water payments across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).
Border areas outside government control*
While at the border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south of Luhansk), the SMM saw one car (with Russian Federation licence plates) and 12 pedestrians (six men and six women) entering Ukraine, as well as 20 pedestrians (mixed genders) leaving Ukraine. After five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area. While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about an hour, the Mission observed five men and four women entering Ukraine, as well as five men and a woman exiting Ukraine.
The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
- At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations requested that the SMM leave the area, citing restrictions on the SMM’s presence near the border crossing point.
- At a checkpoint near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, claiming that only local residents were allowed to use the road.
- At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing risks to “the security of the SMM”.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
- At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared.
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.