Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 7 March 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• It saw fresh damage to a residential house in Shchastia.
• The Mission saw multiple launch rocket systems in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• It observed the presence of mines and explosive remnants of war in Donetsk region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and near non-government-controlled Bezimenne and Dovzhanske, an area near the border with the Russian Federation.*
• In Kyiv, the SMM saw posters in front of the Embassy of the Russian Federation demanding the release of sailors following the incidents at sea, near the Kerch Strait.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 680 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 160 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including one-third of the explosions, were recorded in areas south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), at south-westerly and north-westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas south-east and west-south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including 190 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 15 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at northerly and southerly directions of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

Damage related to gunfire in a residential area in Shchastia

The SMM followed up on reports about damage in a residential area in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk). At 8 Haharina Street, the SMM observed a fresh hole (2.5cm in width) on the south-east-facing wall of a two-storey residential house assessed as from a bullet (12.7mm) from a heavy-machine-gun. A man (aged 50-55) who introduced himself as a neighbour of the owner of the affected house said that there had been heavy-machine-gun fire in the late morning hours of 6 March.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 6 March, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded 11 projectiles in flight and a burst at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east (all assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as three projectiles at an assessed range of 1-1.5km east and east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the day of 7 March, positioned 1.5km west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-6km north-north-east and south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area). Positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds at an assessed range of 1-5km north and east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and 30 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 500m north (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the day of 7 March, positioned near the disengagement areas close to Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled-areas

6 March

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• three multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) (and 16  rockets (220mm) on the ground next to one MLRS) and five probable (MLRS) (BM-27) near Virivka (81km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled-areas

5 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• seven MLRS (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 23 February 2019).

7 March:

The SMM saw:

• eight stationary MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a compound about 2km south-west of Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk) and
• 21 MLRS (BM-21) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

7 March

The SMM saw:

• four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Novoolenivka (48km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

5 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 22 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see  SMM Daily Report 21 February 2019);
• ten tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk); (for previous observations, see  SMM Daily Report 21 February 2019);
• two tanks (type undetermined), a piece of self-propelled artillery or mortar and 12 pieces of towed artillery or mortars in a training area near Miusynsk ; and
• 27 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (15km south-east of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 21 February 2019).

7 March

The SMM saw:

• at least seven tanks (type undetermined) parked in a compound on the northern edge of Khrustalnyi and
•  a tank (type undetermined) being transported on road H-21 near Lutuhyne (20km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

7 March

The SMM noted that:

• 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were present for the first time and
• 33 self-propelled howitzers (22 S1 and 11 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and 30 towed howitzers (24 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and six D-20, 152mm) were again missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

28 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

- an IFV (BMP variant) about 200m north of the Petrivske disengagement area, near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk).

6 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP variant) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) near Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk) and

• a probable armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

Presence of mines and unexploded ordnance

On 6 March, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted 47 previously observed anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out on a road (and adjacent field) between Bohdanivka and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), about 170m north of the disengagement area near Petrivske. About 200m from the abovementioned mines, the same UAV again spotted an additional 25 previously observed anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out across the same road.

On 7 March, about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM again saw two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as 152mm artillery rounds, lying four meters north of a local road.

On the same day, the SMM saw for the first time at least six anti-tank mines (TM-62) fixed on a wooden plank on the southern side of road T0504 about 60m east of the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). About 1.5km south-east, between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations, the SMM saw an object assessed as the tailfin of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) on the same road.  About 500m further south-east, the SMM saw a fresh impact crater assessed as caused by an undetermined weapon on the south-western side of the road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines near Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) and to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Border area outside of government control

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine and three cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. After about six minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to move away from the border crossing point.*

Posters in front of the Embassy of the Russian Federation 

In Kyiv, on 6 March in front of the Embassy of the Russian Federation at 27 Povitroflotskyi Avenue, the SMM saw 20 posters (not seen on 5 March) affixed on tripods placed in a green area in front of the building. The posters displayed the Ukrainian flag and the coats of arms of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Ukrainian Navy as well as slogans (in English) which demanded the release of the sailors detained following incidents at sea, near the Kerch Strait.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west, citing “security concerns”.
• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (non-government-controlled, 84km south-east of Luhansk), two unarmed members of the armed formations told the SMM to move away from the area, citing the need for prior permission from senior members of the armed formations to visit it.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint 5km north-east of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) four armed members of the armed formations again allowed the SMM to proceed only after inspecting its trailer.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.