Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 24 February 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 22 and 23 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 23 and 24 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Two persons were killed and one person was injured in a mine explosion near a checkpoint close to the contact line in Donetsk region.
• The Mission saw fresh damage caused by shelling in Oleksandrivka.
• It saw weapons in violation on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.
• It was also restricted near Zaichenko, Petrivske and Verkhnoshyrokivske, at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region,  at a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region as well as  near Izvaryne and Sievernyi, areas near the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 22 and 23 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 35 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 50 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east, south-south-east and south of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

Between the evenings of 23 and 24 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 275 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west of the central railway station in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) and at southerly and south-westerly directions of Chermalyk.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 22 and 23 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-north-east and north-east of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 23 and 24 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 300 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations (including all explosions) were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled 69km west of Luhansk).

Mine explosion kills two civilians, injures another near checkpoint close to the contact line in Donetsk region

On 23 February, the SMM saw the burning wreckage of an overturned mini-van on the soft ground of a median strip between the lanes of road H-20, south of the forward position of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) (see SMM Spot Report 25 February 2019). The Mission also saw a fresh crater in the median strip, assessed as caused by an explosive device (probably an anti-tank mine) detonated by the vehicle. Following up on reports of three civilians involved in the incident, on 24 February, the director of the morgue in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk) told the SMM that the bodies of a man (aged 34) and of a woman (aged 85) had been brought to the morgue on the afternoon of 23 February. He added that the two individuals had died from severe injuries caused by a mine explosion. In Shakhtarsk (non-government controlled, 50km east of Donetsk), a man (aged 59) told the SMM that on 23 February, he had been travelling with his mother and a driver in the abovementioned van and that an explosion had occurred after the vehicle entered the abovementioned median strip south of the forward position of the armed formations near Olenivka. He had scratches and bruises on his cheeks, as well as a bandage covering his head.

Fresh damage caused by shelling to a residential house in Oleksandrivka

On 22 February, at 339 Horkoho Street in Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a shattered outer window pane on the east-facing side of a single-storey house, as well as a fresh hole (7cm in width) in the west-facing side of a shed (about 3m east from the house) and 20 fresh shrapnel holes (2-6cm in width) on the surface of a concrete yard (about 4m east of the same house).

The SMM assessed the damage to the shed as caused by a round of a weapon (30mm calibre) fired from a south-westerly direction and the damage to the yard and the window of the house as caused by shrapnel from the abovementioned round. The owners of the house (a man and a woman, aged 50-60) told the SMM that in the morning of 19 February, the woman had been alone in the house when she had heard an explosion in their yard. They said that they had found a piece of shrapnel (with several holes in it) in the yard and that members of the armed formations had come that same day and had cleared the yard. 

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 23 February, positioned in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard six shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1.5-2km south-south-east (assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area) and a shot of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1.5-2km east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area. Positioned about 1.3km north-north-east of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three shots of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 2-3km north-north-east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

On the same day, positioned in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-8km south and south-west and five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 2-3km east (all assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area). Positioned on the southern edge of the disengagement near Zolote, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day of 24 February, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an impact of a mortar round and a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-east (all assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area), as well as 21 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

On 23 and 24 February, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations. [3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled

22 February

The SMM saw:

• eight multiple launch rocket systems  (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Nykanorivka (86km north of Donetsk).  

24 February

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in the yard of a house being used by military personnel near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) stationary near railway tracks on the north-eastern edge of Olhynka (40km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled

22 February

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• five towed howitzers (undetermined variants) near Yasnodolsk (41km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled

22 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• ten tanks (T-72) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observation, see SMM Daily Report of 21 February 2019).

Government-controlled

24 February

The SMM saw:

• ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) loaded on tractor trailers at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

22 February

The SMM noted that:

• 25 tanks (T-64) and  ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were present (for the first time) and
• 102 self-propelled howitzers (62 2S1 and 40 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), 86 tanks (T-64) (of which 31 were missing for the first time)), 67 mortars  (54 2B11 Sani, 120mm (of which three were missing for the first time), 12 M-120 Molot, 120mm and one BM-37, 82mm), 21 MLRS (BM-21), 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), nine towed howitzers (six D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm and three D-44, 85mm), six towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm) and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) were again missing.

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

22 February

The SMM noted that:

•  13 anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Non-government-controlled

22 February

The SMM saw:

• three infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1) in Mykhailivka (30km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a military truck with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on top and an IFV (BMP-2) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk).

Government-controlled

23 February

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (undetermined variant) moving west near the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk ( 45km north-east of Donetsk);
• an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-1) in Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk); and
• an IFV (BMP-2) at a military-type compound in Luhansk city.

24 February

The SMM saw:

• two military personnel holding two mini-UAVs and one holding a control panel for a mini-UAV near Popasna.

Presence of mines and demining activities

On 24 February, about 500m north-north east of the northern edge of Petrivske, the SMM saw for the first time six anti-vehicle and directional mines (three assessed as MON-200 and three assessed as TM-83) laid about 10m of each other in a field about 12m east of road CO51532.

On 24 February, the SMM saw about 50 new mine hazard signs (red with skulls and crossbones reading “Stop Mines” in Russian) laid out over an area of 700m in a field 200m north-east of a road leading to the northern edge of Sartana (government-controlled 15km north-east of Mariupol). About 100m north from the aforementioned signs, the SMM saw seven members of a non-governmental organization dressed in blue uniforms conducting demining activities (using mine detectors and marking clearance areas) in the same field.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

On 23 February, the Mission monitored the overall security situation in the area of the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and on 23 and 24 February, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Border areas outside of government control

On 24 February, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 15 covered cargo trucks (14 with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) and a vehicle (with Ukrainian licence plates) queuing to exit Ukraine, as well as two covered cargo trucks (with Belarusian licence plates) and two pedestrians (women, aged 30-40) entering Ukraine. After seven minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw one pedestrian (woman, aged 40) exiting Ukraine. After two minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw 15 cars (with Russian Federation licence plates), two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates), two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), two mini-buses (with Russian Federation licence plates) and two milk tankers (with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw 44 cars (11 with Ukrainian, 25 with Russian Federation and two with Georgian licence plates and six with “DPR” plates),  25 covered cargo trucks (17 with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates and seven with “DPR” plates),  two open cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), two buses (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates)  and a tanker truck with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 23 February, an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint near Petrivske, citing the presence of “a sniper” in the area and lack of permission from superiors.
• On 23 February, two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) citing “security concerns”.
• On 23 February, at a heavy weapon holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk, the SMM was denied access by an officer of the Ukrainian Armed Forces citing lack of permission from superiors.
• On 24 February, at a border crossing near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), an unarmed member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 24 February, at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (non-government-controlled, 50km south-east of Luhansk), an unarmed member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 24 February, two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), after the SMM refused to show its patrol plan.
• On 24 February, the SMM was unable to enter a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region because the gate was locked. A civilian guard at the site told the SMM that the site had been closed and it should return on another day.

Conditional access:

• On 23 February, at a checkpoint of the armed formation on road T0513 near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after inspecting its trailer.

Other impediments:

• On 22 February, in Chystiakove (formerly Torez, non-government controlled, 62km east of Donetsk), the head doctor of the hospital told the SMM to address senior members of the armed formations for a meeting.
• On 23 February, while positioned 1.5km south-west of Sarabash (formerly Komunarivka, non-government-controlled, 30km south of Donetsk), conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM lost control over the UAV due to what the SMM assessed as external interference,  most likely caused by jamming of the control link.[6] The UAV landed about 240m south-east of the SMM in a field marked with mine hazard signs. The SMM was unable to recover the UAV.  
• On 24 February, while positioned on the north-western edge of Makiivka (non-government-controlled, 12km north-east of Donetsk), while conducting  two mini-UAV flights, the SMM lost control over one of the UAVs due to what the SMM assessed as external interference, most likely caused by jamming of the control link.[7] The SMM was able to regain control over one of the UAVs which landed safely while the other one crash-landed 10m east-south-east of the SMM’s position (and sustained damage to its propeller).  

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.