Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 22 February 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw fresh damage caused by shelling in a residential area of non-government-controlled Holmivskyi.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw multiple launch rocket systems in violation of the withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.
• Its long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted four military jet aircrafts flying over government-controlled Lastochkyne, near the contact line.
• The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk region and demining activities in Donetsk region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas as well as at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Styla.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 50 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 140 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), at south-easterly directions of Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and at westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 80 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (15 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded near the disengagement area close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see Disengagement areas below).

Damage caused by shelling in Holmivskyi

In a residential area of Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), on 21 February, the SMM saw four fresh craters within a radius of 100m, assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a north-north-easterly direction. The first crater was next to the north-north-eastern side of an inhabited two-storey apartment building at 2 Radianskoi Armii Street. The SMM observed shrapnel damage on the east- and north-facing sides of the building and that its two first-floor windows (one facing east, the other north) were broken. The second crater was about 20m south of an inhabited two-storey apartment building at 5 Radianskoi Armii Street. The SMM saw a broken window and shrapnel damage on the building’s south-facing side. The remaining two craters were observed in the area between the two buildings (about 50m from the buildings). A male resident of the first building told the SMM that at around 23:30 on 18 February, while at home, he had heard a “loud explosion”.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 21-22 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-5km south (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area) and two projectiles in flight from south-west to north-east at an assessed range of 1-2km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). In the late afternoon of 22 February, the camera recorded an explosion assessed as an impact at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On the morning of 22 February, positioned south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 90 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-west (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

The same day, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations. [3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

20 February:

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 31 January 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

21 February

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Novoolenivka (48km north-west of Donetsk).

22 February

The SMM saw:

• eight stationary MLRS (type undetermined) near Krasna Poliana (73km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 February:

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• three tanks (type undetermined) and 12 pieces of towed artillery (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 31 January 2019).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

22 February

The SMM noted that:

• 12 MLRS (eight BM-27 Uragan, 220mm and four BM-30 Smerch, 300mm), all observed for the first time, were present and
• ten MLRS (six BM-27 and four BM-30), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and nine towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

21 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• four military jet aircrafts flying over Lastochkyne (19km north-west of Donetsk), from north to south and then turn south-west at an altitude of approximately 3,000 feet.

22 February

The SMM saw:

• four armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-1) near Vesele (21km north of Donetsk) and
• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-1) in Krasnohorivka.

Demining activities and mine hazard signs

Near Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw four vehicles each with the logo of an international demining organization parked on a road and about 50 persons nearby. The Mission observed some of them conducting demining activities with metal detectors in fields adjacent to the road. (See SMM Daily Report 20 February 2019.)

On the south-western edge of Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a mine hazard sign (red and yellow with the “Stop mines” written in Russian) for the first time 1m north of a road. In Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM noted that a previously observed tailfin of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) next to a house was no longer present (see SMM Daily Report 22 February 2019).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable inspection and repairs to water wells at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border area outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for 20 minutes, the SMM saw four cars (one with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw six cars (three with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates) and one covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 18 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint in Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk), three members of the armed formations (one of them visibly armed) denied the SMM passage, saying that it was not allowed to continue as there was a “compound” near the road ahead.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that there had been no demining in the area.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.