Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 14 February 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines near government-controlled Krasnohorivka and Kapitanove.
• The Mission recorded a ceasefire violation near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to and operation of essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and again near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske and Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 550 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 170 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), near Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and near Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (seven explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in non-government-controlled areas south-south-east of Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk) and at north-easterly directions of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 14 February, positioned in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the Zolote disengagement area).

The same day, positioned north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) and inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

14 February

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) heading south near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) travelling south near Kapitanove (49km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

13 February

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted:

• 33 tanks (24 T-72 and nine T-64) in a training area near Ternove (15km south-east of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

14 February

The SMM saw:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk);
• three IFVs (two BMP-1 and a BMP variant) near Zolote (60km west of Luhansk);
• an armoured personnel carrier (Saxon) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk); and
• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) in Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water pipeline near Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk) and maintenance works to power lines in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) and to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk). A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and a representative of the Luhansk Energy Association told the SMM that the maintenance works in Katerynivka had been suspended due to ceasefire violations in the area (the Mission heard an undetermined explosion in the area). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

On 14 February, the SMM observed seven mine hazard signs around a compound in Amvrosiivka (non-government controlled, 56 km south-east of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 12 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access

• On two occasions, armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), citing “ongoing special operations” both times (the SMM was subsequently able to cross the checkpoint and enter the village on the third attempt).
• Three members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) after the Mission refused to show its patrol plan. This denial prevented the SMM from travelling to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.