Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 12 February 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
- The Mission observed craters assessed as caused by mortar rounds in residential areas in Pervomaisk and fresh craters inside the Zolote disengagement area.
- The Mission saw weapons in violation on both sides of the contact line.
- It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 310 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (430 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west and west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and at directions ranging from east-south-east to west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).
On 12 February, positioned about 2.5km south of Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten outgoing explosions and saw three tanks (T-72) at about 2-3km west-north-west of its position. The SMM assessed this as probable live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group as of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone (see withdrawal of weapons section below).
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (five explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).
Disengagement areas[2]
On 11 February, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)spotted at least 50 recent craters, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, inside the disengagement area near Zolote and about 600m north-east of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area.
On 11 February, on the north-western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted eight craters in the gardens of four houses (at a distance ranging between 6m and 50m from the houses), assessed as recent impacts caused by 120mm mortar rounds (for further observations in the same area, see SMM Daily Report 12 February 2019). About 1.5km east of this location and 300m south of the south-eastern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the same UAV spotted two armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) and four recent craters, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, near a position of the armed formations.
Between the evenings of 11-12 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded five projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), 42 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-4km east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). On the morning of 12 February, positioned on the western edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an explosion at an assessed range of 3-5km south (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). Positioned in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and four bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).
During the day on 12 February, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Government-controlled areas
11 February
The SMM saw:
- a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) heading south on road H-20 near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
10 February
An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- three tanks (T-72) in Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk);
- a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) and two probable mortars (one 2B11 and one 82mm type undetermined) north-east of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk); and
- four tanks (T-64) near Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk).
11 February
An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a residential area of Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).
The SMM saw:
- three tanks (T-72) at a training area near Sofiivka (see above).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:
Non-government-controlled areas
11 February
An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- 18 towed howitzers (ten 2A65 Msta-B,152mm and eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), two tanks (T-64, one without main gun) and a self-propelled mortar (2S9Nona-S, 120mm) north of Khrustalnyi (56km south-west of Luhansk).
Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn:[4]
At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region
12 February
The SMM saw:
- three tanks (a T-64 and two T-72) present for the first time and noted that 33 anti-tank guns (30 MT-12 and three D-48, 85mm) and 12 towed howitzers (2A65) remained missing.
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]
Government-controlled areas
11 February
The SMM saw:
- an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Practika Kozak-2) in the yard of a residential house in Kodema (57km north-east of Donetsk).
12 February
The SMM saw:
- an APC (BTR-60) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
10 February
An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant) and an APC (BTR-80)in Novoselivka.
11 February
An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a military truck and two APCs (MT-LB) in Debaltseve.
On 10 February, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three impact craters, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, in a field about 2km north of Sentianivka.
On 11 February, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted about 70 recent craters, assessed as impacts of mortar rounds (82mm and 120mm) near positions of the armed formations west of Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled, 96km south of Donetsk).
On 12 February, the SMM saw a mast with an antenna and an unidentified UAV land next to four armed Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers on a concrete plot on the south-eastern edge of Valuiske (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Luhansk).
Presence of mines
On 11 February, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 63 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid out in two rows in a field near positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces close to Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily 11 July 2018).
SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water pipelines in Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) and Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) as well as to power lines in Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk) and to water wells at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and to monitor the overall security situation in the area of the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable visual inspections related to the possible presence of explosive remnants of war and mines by members of the armed formations near a school and two kindergartens in Holmivskyi, as well as two schools in Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).
The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that theJoint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 12 February 2019).The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.
[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3]Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[4]The SMM visited heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, whose storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.
[5]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.