Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 31 January 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed fresh impact craters in Kriakivka and Molodizhne as the result of shelling.
• The SMM observed a ceasefire violation inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and operations of essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas as well as in non-government-controlled Izvaryne and Sievernyi, areas near the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 25 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 75 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded mainly at southerly and south-westerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and in areas south-west and west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 60 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 165 explosions). Almost all ceasefire violations were explosions, of which about 95 per cent were recorded at south-south-westerly and east-south-easterly directions of Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk), including about 40 explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds recorded in areas east-south-east of Kriakivka.

Fresh impact craters as the result of shelling in Kriakivka and Molodizhne

On the western edge of Kriakivka, the SMM observed a fresh crater on the northern side of a road. The snow around the crater was covered by soot, and small trees and branches north of the impact site were lacerated, which the SMM assessed as shrapnel and blast damage. The SMM assessed that a projectile had been fired from a southerly direction but could not assess its type or calibre. The SMM observed civilian houses about 100m from the crater and a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint about 250m from the crater.

About 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two fresh impact craters near road T-0504: the first, 5m north of the road, and the second around 50m south of the road. Due to security considerations, the SMM could not make further assessments.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 31 January, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded a burst at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

Positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) and north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

30 January

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• 26 tanks (T-64) in a wooded area near Loskutivka (72km west of Luhansk).

31 January

The SMM saw:

• a towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) traveling north-west on T-1306 road in Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk) and
• a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) being transported on a flatbed truck traveling north-west on road T0516 near Ivanopillia (51km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

30 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in the area of the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk). (For previous observations see SMM Daily Report 31 January 2019.)

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

30 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Loskutivka.

Non-government-controlled areas

31 January

The SMM saw:

• three infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-2) near Sentianivka (44km west of Luhansk);
• six armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) on the eastern edge of Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (MT-LB) in northern Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), water pipelines near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk), the phenol sludge reservoir in Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), power lines in Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and water pipelines near the neighbourhood of Shakta 6-7 in Horlivka, as well as to enable an inspection of water wells at the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Border areas outside of Government control*

While at a border crossing point near  Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for 11 minutes, the SMM observed 41 trucks (15 with Ukrainian, nine with Belarusian, seven with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as nine with “LPR” plates) queuing to exit Ukraine. A truck driver in the queue told the SMM he had already been waiting 41 hours at the crossing point. Two members of the armed formations, one visibly armed, told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw four people exiting Ukraine and one person entering Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 11 minutes, the SMM observed four people entering Ukraine and no pedestrians exiting Ukraine. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), two members of the armed formations, one visibly armed, told the SMM that it did not have “permission” to be present at the border crossing point and to leave the area. (For previous observations see SMM Daily Report 25 January 2019.)
• At a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (non-government-controlled, 50km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that there “is no cooperation between the “LPR” and the OSCE” and told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some SMM cameras.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its   camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.