Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 5 December 2018
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure as well as damaged houses. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the transfer of human remains across the bridge in Shchastia.
The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted in the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district and at a checkpoint near Zaichenko.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 110 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 450 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and near Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 630 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 290 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-west and west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), including about 410 explosions, and near the disengagement area close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), including about 150 explosions.
Disengagement areas[2]
On the evening of 4 December, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions and about 15 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 3-5km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).
During the day on 5 December, positioned on the eastern edge of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 25 undetermined explosions and 25 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-5km east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area). On the same day, positioned in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 120 undetermined explosions and 135 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 3-5km north-north-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). Positioned on the western edge of Pervomaisk, the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and about 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 5-7km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area).
During the day on 5 December, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of the withdrawal lines
Government-controlled areas
4 December
- An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:
- a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
4 December
- An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- a mortar (2B-11 Sani, 120mm) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk);
- a tank (T-64) near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk); and
- five tanks (four T-72 and one probable T-72) near Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk).
5 December
- An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) near Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.
Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
4 December
- An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- nine tanks (T-64B) on a pier in the port of Mariupol.
Non-government-controlled areas
4 December
- An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- 21 tanks (16 T-72 and five T-64) in a training area near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk).
Weapons that the SMM was unable to verify as withdrawn:[3]
Weapons storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region:*
5 December
- Three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) were present and
- 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm),13 towed howitzers (seven 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and six D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 13 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), and 28 mortars (15 2B11, 12 M-120 Molot, 120mm and one BM-37, 82mm) remained missing.
Weapons verified as withdrawn:
At a permanent storage site beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region
5 December
- A tank (T-64) remained missing.
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]
Government-controlled areas
5 December
- an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk)
- an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk)
- five APCs (BTR-80) near Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol)
- five IFVs (BMP variant) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-1) near Trudivske (47km south of Donetsk)
Non-government-controlled areas
4 December
- An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- four IFVs (BMP-1), an APC (MT-LB), an armoured command vehicle (BMP-1 KSh), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and an armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) near Dovhe and
- an APC (BTR-80) and a trench digger (TMK-2) near Khoroshe.
5 December
- An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- two IFVs (BMP-2) and three APCs (one MT-LB with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) and two BTR-80) in Luhansk city.
Presence of mine hazard signs
On the northern edge of Luhanske (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time three mine hazard signs (red and white squares with “Danger, mines” written on them in Russian) attached to barbed wire, which stretched across a road into an adjacent field. It also saw for the first time two mine hazard signs in a field next to a road leading from Luhanske to Syhnalne (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk): one was a red and white square with “Mines” written on it in Russian and the other one was a wooden square with “Mines” painted on it in Russian. The SMM saw for the first time at least ten mine hazard signs, white squares with “Mines” written on them in Russian in fields on both sides of a road leading to the Cargill plant about 2km north-east of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk).
SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to a water pipeline near Popasna, to water pipelines near Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), to power lines in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), to damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), as well as to the Marinka Gas Distribution Station in Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
SMM facilitation of transfer of human remains across the bridge in Shchastia
The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the transfer of human remains from non-government- to government-controlled areas of Luhansk region across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 3 December 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials of access:
- An armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint in the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district, citing instructions from his “superior”.
- Two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint north of Zaichenko, preventing the SMM from travelling west towards Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south towards Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Hranitne was not operational during the reporting period.
[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.
[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.