Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 30 November 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM observed multiple launch rocket systems in violation of the withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
• The SMM followed up at entry-exit checkpoints on possible impacts of the introduction of martial law.
• The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as near Zaichenko, Novoselivka Druha and at compounds on both sides of the contact line.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, but more explosions (about 185), compared with the previous reporting period (about 160 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east and south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) and areas east of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 115 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 55). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas in and near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 29 November, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded five undetermined explosions and two projectiles in flight (one from west to east and one from east to west), all at an assessed range of 0.5-2km south-south-east. On 30 November, positioned in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk) for about an hour, the SMM heard six outgoing salvos (about ten rockets each) of multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (type undetermined), 50 explosions (assessed as from impacts and from outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons) and five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 2-8km south-east. In the same location, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-8km east and a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km south-west. All abovementioned ceasefire violations were assessed as outside the disengagement area.   

During the day on 30 November, the SMM observed calm situations in the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas:

30 November:

• Four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas:

29 November:

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• six MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) at a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk);
• eight MLRS (BM-21) near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk); and
• 22 MLRS (BM-21) near Bokovo-Platove (54km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas:

30 November:

• Two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) on trucks near Yurivka (32km south-west of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas:

29 November:

• A tank (type undetermined) near a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 21 tanks (20 T-72 and one T-64) at a training area near Ternove;
• 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), seven tanks (T-72) and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) at a training area near Miusynsk;
• two tanks (T-72), 17 towed howitzers (eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and nine 2A65) near Khrustalnyi (56km south-west of Luhansk); and
• six self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 11 towed howitzers (five 2A65 and six D-30) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Bokovo-Platove. 

Weapons that the SMM was unable to verify as withdrawn:[3]

Weapons storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region:

29 November:

• Five self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were present and eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1), six MLRS (BM-21) and 12 mortars (11 PM-38, 120mm and one 2B11 Sani, 120mm) remained missing. 

Weapons storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region:

30 November:

• 39 towed howitzers (13 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and 26 2A65) and 18 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) remained missing.

Weapons verified as withdrawn:

A permanent storage site beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

29 November:

-  11 tanks (four T-64 and seven T-72) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas:

29 November:

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• three armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (type undetermined) near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk);
• two ACVs and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk).

30. November:

• An armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk);
• An  armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk);
• An armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk);
• An armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk);
• An APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• A combat engineering vehicle (IMR variant) near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

29 November

• Three IFVs (BMP or BTR variant) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk); and
• An SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Styla (34km south-west of Donetsk).

30 November:

• An IFV (BMP variant) near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk)

Civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable assessment of a water pipeline near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) on 29 November, for about an hour, the SMM saw 37 cars (14 with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates and 15 with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. Amongst the cars entering Ukraine, the SMM saw a convoy of seven Mercedes cars with tinted black windows escorted by a car labelled “police”. The SMM also saw two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), 28 cargo trucks (24 with closed trailers and four with empty open trailers) (17 with Ukrainian, four with Belarusian, one with Russian Federation licence plates and six with “DPR” plates) queuing to exit Ukraine, and one car with Russian Federation licence plates exiting Ukraine.  

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) on 30 November, for about 15 minutes, the SMM saw a car with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine.

Possible impact of the introduction of martial law

On 29 and 30 November, Ukrainian Armed Forces and State Border Guard Service officers at several entry-exit checkpoints in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region told the SMM that they had not received special orders related to changes in procedures following the introduction of martial law. Some officers said that they had been instructed to perform more thorough inspections of people’s belongings.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 28 November 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a heavy weapons holding area in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, three members of the armed formations (two armed) denied the SMM access, citing orders “not to allow the SMM to enter”.
• At a permanent storage site in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, an armed member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from entering, demanding the SMM sign a logbook before entering.
• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations (one armed) again prevented the SMM from traveling west toward Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “the SMM’s safety”. The Mission was allowed to travel south toward Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM access to a compound near Novoselivka Druha (government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), after the SMM patrol members refused to show their passports.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• North of the bridge in Shchastia, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place in the past 24 hours and that the road south of the bridge was still mined.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Hranitne and Krasnohorivka were not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[4]           The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.