Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 27 November 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission observed towed howitzers in violation of the withdrawal lines near Mykhailivka.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and the Petrivske disengagement areas.
• The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a protest against Russian businesses in Ukraine. It observed a calm situation in front of the Embassy and the Consulate of the Russian Federation.
• The Mission observed a calm situation at the crossing point in Chonhar and at a Ukrainian Border Guard Service position in Valok in the south-eastern part of Kherson region.
• The access for the SMM remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Markyne, an area close to the border with the Russian Federation,* and near Zaichenko.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, and a similar number of explosions (about 90), compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west and west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) (including 44 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds), north-west of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) and south of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 13 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north of Krymske (government-controlled, 42km north-west of Luhansk).

 

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 27 November, positioned in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-6km east and south-south-west, both assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). About an hour later, positioned on the northern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina, the Mission heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 5-8km south-south-west, both assessed as outside the disengagement area.

The same day, positioned north of Petrivske, the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an outgoing round of an undetermined weapon and four undetermined explosions, all at an assessed range of 1-4km north and north-west, as well as about 150 bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-4km west and west-north-west. The SMM assessed all above-mentioned ceasefire violations as outside the disengagement area.

The same day, the SMM saw two fresh holes in the south-facing wall at the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces located 500m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk). The Mission assessed the damage as caused by small-calibre bullets fired from a southerly direction.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas:

27 November:

• Six towed howitzers (D20, 152mm) near Mykhailivka (37km north-west of Donetsk)

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas:

24 November:

• Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed 11 self-propelled howitzers (types undetermined) and 12 towed mortars (types undetermined) at a training area south-east of Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk).

26 November:

• An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted two tanks (T-72) at a training area about 4km south-west of Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas[4]:

27 November:

• An armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk)
• An armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Zolote
• An IFV (BMP-2) and two APCs (MT-LB) in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk)
• An APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk)
• An APC (Saxon) near Valentynivka (35km north of Donetsk)
• A trench digger (type undetermined) near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Mariupol)

Non-government-controlled areas:

• An anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck near Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk).

Civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints

At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw around 600 people queuing to travel toward government-controlled areas. The Mission saw another 300 people queuing at a nearby bus stop and about 300 cars parked in an adjacent parking lot.

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 70 minutes, the SMM saw 20 cars (six with Ukrainian and six with Russian Federation licence plates, and eight with “DPR” plates) and ten covered cargo trucks (five with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw also 22 cars (six with Ukrainian and 11 with Russian Federation licence plates, and five with “DPR” plates) and nine covered cargo trucks (five with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

Protest in Kyiv

The SMM monitored a protest in front of a shopping mall at 176 Antonovycha Street. There it saw about 50 people (almost all men) holding flags of a political party and about 50 tyres in front of the mall’s main entrance, on which messages against Russian businesses in Ukraine had been spray-painted in the Ukrainian language. The Mission heard some protestors calling for a boycott of Russian products. At the site, it saw about 40 police officers.

The Mission observed a calm situation in front of the Embassy and the Consulate of the Russian Federation (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 26 November 2018).

The SMM observed a calm situation in Chonhar and Valok, south-east of Kherson

On 25 November, the SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point in Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson). The next day, at the same location, the Mission observed more officers of the Ukrainian Border Guard Service than usual. One of the officers told the SMM that the situation was calm but they had received instructions to be on full alert. The same day, at a Ukrainian Border Guard Service security position in Valok (188km south-east of Kherson), an officer told the SMM that the situation was calm but they were on full alert.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from traveling west toward Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south toward Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “the SMM’s safety”. The SMM saw civilian cars pass through the checkpoint.
• At a military-type compound in Markyne (non-government controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), near the border with the Russian Federation, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area. During its presence, inside the compound the Mission saw members of the armed formations loading ammunition boxes onto a truck and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] In the SMM Report of 26 November 2018, “an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area (see above)” should have been placed in the “non-government-controlled areas” subsection.