Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 21 November 2018
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area.
- It observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines, mostly in non-government-controlled areas.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema and to the Donetsk Filtration Station as well as assessments of a water pipeline near Pervomaisk.
- The Mission visited three border areas not under government control.
- The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted at compounds in Novoselivka and near Siedove, an area close to the border with the Russian Federation.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). About one-third of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east and south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (34 explosions).
Disengagement areas[2]
During the day on 21 November, positioned about 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-4km north-north-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).
The same day, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and in the vicinity of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Government-controlled areas:
21 November:
- a mortar (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) in Kalynove (31km north-west of Donetsk)
Non-government-controlled areas:
20 November:
An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:
- 16 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 19 November 2018);
- eight MLRS (BM-21) near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk);
- six MLRS (BM-21) near Zelenyi Hai (49km south-west of Luhansk); and
- four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).
Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas:
21 November:
- three self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) loaded on flatbed trucks heading east near Dachenske (49km north-west of Donetsk)
- four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at a compound in Pavlivka (51km south-west of Donetsk)
Non-government-controlled areas:
20 November:
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
- 18 towed howitzers (eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and ten 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Zelenyi Hai and
- nine tanks (T-72) at a training area near Ternove.
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]
Government-controlled areas:
21 November:
- two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk)
- two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM2) near Netailove (22km north-west of Donetsk)
- an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk)
- fresh tracks assessed as those of a tank (T-72) chassis originating from a compound in Novoselivka (37km north-east of Mariupol) (see below)
Demining
At two locations near Myrna Dolyna (government-controlled, 67km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw demining activity conducted by an international demining organization. At the first location, about 2km south-east of the village, the Mission saw five de-miners constructing a makeshift tent, which they said was used to temporarily deposit detected explosive objects. At the second location, about 2km east of the village, the SMM saw ten de-miners clearing a field with detectors and other demining equipment.
SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the electrical substation in the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), as well as to enable assessments of a water pipeline between Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.
Border areas not under government control
While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw nine cars (three with Russian Federation, one with Ukrainian and one with Polish licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and six cars (two with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.
While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for 15 minutes, the SMM observed no traffic in either direction.
While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for 20 minutes, the SMM saw 20 cars (five with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, and 11 with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and two cars (one with Ukrainian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks (with Russian Federation licence plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also saw three cars with rectangular white plates (with a red stripe dividing the plates in half and “NK” in Cyrillic letters on the right side) exiting Ukraine.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials of access:
- Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied the SMM access to two compounds in Novoselivka. The SMM observed fresh tracks assessed as those of a tank (T-72) chassis originating from one of the compounds (see above).
- Five armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint west of Siedove (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The SMM continued be restricted in its access to the three disengagement areas, as well as in the ability to travel on certain roads identified by the Mission as important for effective monitoring due to the presence of mines and UXO.
Other impediments:
- On the evening and night of 20-21 November, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming,[4] while flying near non-government-controlled areas of Verkhnii Naholchyk (56km south of Luhansk) and Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk).
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.
[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.