Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 2 November 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Novoazovsk and Sievernyi – areas close to the border with the Russian Federation – as well as Zaichenko and Bezimenne.* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka and the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema, as well as to enable demining near Novotroitske, Zolote-2/Karbonit and Nyzhnoteple.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 230), compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions).  

On the evening and night of 1-2 November, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded about 115 projectiles in flight (mostly from west-south-west to east-north-east) at estimated ranges of 2-4km east and east-south-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) recorded three explosions (one assessed as an outgoing round of an undetermined weapon and two undetermined) and about 120 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-west to south-east and from south-east to north-west), all at estimated ranges of 2-5km north-east and east-north-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded an undetermined explosion and about 160 projectiles in flight (mostly from east to west and from west to east), all at estimated ranges of 1-4km east, south-south-east and south.

During the day on 2 November, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five hours, the SMM heard and saw three explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 1km west-south-west, nine explosions assessed as impacts: one of an artillery round 1km south-west, one of an automatic grenade launcher (AGL) round 1-2km south, seven of undetermined weapons rounds 2-4km south-west, as well as an undetermined explosion 3-5km south-west. It also heard four explosions assessed as outgoing AGL rounds 1-3km south and south-west, an explosion assessed as the impact of a mortar round 3-4km south-west, as well as three explosions assessed as impacts of undetermined weapons rounds and about 65 undetermined explosions and about 390 bursts and shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm), heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at estimated ranges of 1-6km at easterly, southerly and northerly directions. On the same day, positioned in the same location, it also heard two shots of small-arms fire 200m south-west.

During the day on 2 November, positioned on the eastern edge of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) for about three hours, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and eight shots of small-arms fire 400-500m east and east-south-east, as well as 25 undetermined explosions at estimated ranges of 1-7km at directions ranging from east to south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 70), compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions).

On the morning of 2 November, positioned in Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions at estimated ranges of 4-5km west-south-west.

On 1 November, while it was flying a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Zhovte (non-government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM had heard 40 shots of small-arms fire 2.4km north-north-west of its position (see SMM Daily Report 2 November 2018). Further analysis of the UAV footage shows a man between Zhovte and Lopaskyne (government-controlled, 23km north-west of Luhansk), in an area under government control, firing a rifle at the UAV.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 2 November, while at the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an estimated range of 2.5-3km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the morning of 2 November, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area for about 15 minutes, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions at estimated ranges of 3-5km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same morning, positioned in the southern outskirts of Zolote for about 20 minutes, the SMM heard six explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons and five shots of small-arms fire, all 2km south-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same morning, positioned in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) for about ten minutes, the SMM heard four explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons 10km south-south-east and a shot of small-arms fire 1-2km south, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 1 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable mortar (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) near Lopaskyne. On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four tanks (T-72) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk) and a towed howitzer (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152 mm) near Druzhba (76km west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 1 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable mortar (type undetermined) near Zhovte. 

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 1 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in Chervonyi Zhovten (40km north of Luhansk) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, the SMM saw seven surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) – four of them without missiles or covers. On 2 November, the SMM saw two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33): one near Selidove (41km north-west of Donetsk) and one near Kasianivka (22km north of Mariupol).

The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM noted that 11 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), eight anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), anti-aircraft guns [3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government‑controlled areas, on 1 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three ACVs (type undetermined), a modified armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) and a probable modified APC (MT-LB) with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Lopaskyne. On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk); three IFVs (BMP-1) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk); three IFVs (one BMP-1 and two BMP-2) near Zolote-4/Rodina (60km west of Luhansk); four IFVs (three BMP-1 and one BMP-2) and two APCs (one MT-LB and one BTR variant) near Prychepylivka; three IFVs (BMP-1), three APCs (one BTR-70, one BTR-60 and one MT-LB6M with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on top) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk); and an APC (BTR-70) near Hirske (63km west of Luhansk). On 2 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) mounted on a military truck and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in a military compound near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk). On the same day, the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), an APC (BTR-80) in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 1 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk) as well as 50 metres of new trenches running from north-east to south-west between residential houses in Zhovte (not visible in imagery from 9 October 2018). On 2 November, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-70) near Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol) and 11 APCs (MT-LB) – three of which had mounted anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23-2) – near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk). It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk), Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk) and Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) and recorded about 740 ceasefire violations within a 15km radius around the DFS, including about 150 explosions (see ceasefire table below).

The SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about five minutes, the SMM saw six pedestrians (one man around 70 years old and five women around 50 years old) entering Ukraine. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko, an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing risks “to the SMM’s security”.
• At a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west along road M14, citing “orders from their supervisors”. At the same time, the SMM observed civilian vehicles passing through the checkpoint.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation, two members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through to the city and accessing Siedove (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk). The SMM observed cars proceeding through the checkpoint.
• At a border crossing point near Sievernyi, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.5

Other impediments:

• An SMM mini-UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal due to signal interference while flying near Zernove (non-government-controlled, 70km south of Donetsk).[5]

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.