Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 24 September 2018
This report is for the media and the general public.
The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM corroborated reports of civilian casualties and observed impact sites in Sakhanka. The SMM saw military presence inside the Petrivske and Zolote disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted close to Dovzhanske, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance works to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne and to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska, Slovianoserbsk and near Artema, as well as demining in Pishchane. The SMM observed a protest in Odessa and followed up on reports of the explosion of a grenade in Kyiv.
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 110 explosions).
On the evening and night of 23-24 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded nine undetermined explosions and 17 projectiles in flight (mostly from west-north-west to east-south-east), all 1-4.5km south-south-east and south-south-west.
On the evening and night of 23-24 September, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded three undetermined explosions and about 110 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to south-south-east), all 2-4km east-north-east and east.
On the evening of 23 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 33 undetermined explosions and about 70 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-7km south-east and south.
During the day on 24 September, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions and about 20 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-6km at westerly directions.
Positioned on the south-western outskirts of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 2-6km at southerly directions.
Positioned about 2km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions and about ten bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 0.5-5km at southerly and northerly directions.
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (11), compared with the previous 24 hours (16 explosions).
Positioned 2.5km north-west of Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 77km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fire and their subsequent impacts, as well as four bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-1.4km south (all assessed as live-fire training outside the security zone).
The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties. On 24 September, at a hospital in Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a man (aged 50-60) wearing bandages on his chest, legs and arms. He told the SMM that on 23 September at around 9:00, while he had been outside his house in Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) with his wife, he had heard an explosion nearby, after which he felt pain and sought help (see below). He also said that his wife had been wounded in the same explosion. Medical staff at the same hospital told the SMM that a man (aged 56) and his wife (aged 46) had been admitted to the hospital on 23 September, adding that the man had sustained shrapnel wounds to his legs, chest, arms and lower back and that his wife had sustained shrapnel wounds to her lower leg and arm. Medical staff added that the woman had been discharged the same day.
The SMM observed impact sites in Sakhanka. On 23 September, at 2 Zhovtneva Street, the SMM observed two fresh craters: the first one was in a yard, about 2m north-west of a one-storey house; the second crater was in the same yard, about 6m west of the house. The SMM saw blood stains on the western-facing steps of the front of the house (see above).The SMM assessed that both craters were caused by an automatic grenade launcher round but was unable to assess the direction of fire.
The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*
On 22 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted, inside the Petrivske disengagement area, five people, including one digging an extension of a previously observed trench, about 1-2km east of the western edge of the disengagement area (all assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel).
During the night of 23-24 September, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 6-10km south-south-west and an undetermined explosion 3-4km west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).
On 24 September, the SMM saw three armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel entering the Zolote disengagement area. On the same day, positioned on the northern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 15 shots of small-arms fire 1-2.5km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area).
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 23 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a towed howitzer (D-20, 152mm) in Dyliivka (49km north of Donetsk) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Ozarianivka (52km north of Donetsk).
In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 23 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Perevalsk (38km west of Luhansk) and two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Sofiivka (40km north-east of Donetsk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 22 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air-missile-system (9K33 Osa) near Kalynove (35km north of Donetsk). On 24 September, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) near Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, on 23 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm), three tanks (T-64) and three towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm) near Perevalsk (see above).
The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm).
The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines and noted that eight tanks (seven T-72 and one T-64) continued to be missing.
The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), an anti-aircraft gun[3] and other indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 22 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-70) near Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV near Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk), a probable ACV near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), an ACV and three IFVs (two BMP-1 and one probable BMP-1) near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk), an IFV (a probable BMP-1) near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk) and an APC (BTR-70) near Chermalyk (77km south of Donetsk). On 23 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Ozarianivka and an ACV near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk). On 24 September, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Vodiane (24km north-east of Mariupol).
On 22 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a 50m-long newly built extension of a previously observed trench near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk). On 23 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a fresh 70m-long trench on the eastern edge of Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
In non-government-controlled areas, on 22 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Tavrycheske (76km south of Donetsk) and, on 23 September, four IFVs (one BMP-2, two BMP-1 and one undetermined variant), three APCs (MT-LB) and an ACV near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk); eight APCs (one BTR-80 and seven MT-LB) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk), as well as an IFV (BMP-1) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk). On 22 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an excavator digging new trenches near Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk) as well as five APCs (one MT-LB and four BTR undetermined variant) near Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Yenakiieve (41km north-east of Donetsk).
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), as well as to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska, Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk) and near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM facilitated access for Vodafone employees from Horlivka to Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire, as well as demining in Pishchane (government-controlled, 22km north of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report of 24 September 2018).
The SMM visited two border areas outside of government control.* While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for 25 minutes, the SMM saw seven cars (two with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw 12 cars (four with Ukrainian, five with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.
While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for 20 minutes, the SMM saw a covered cargo truck with “LPR” plates and four cars (three with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw a bus with Russian Federation licence plates, two cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) and a pedestrian (man, aged 30-40) entering Ukraine. While present, two members of the armed formations, one of whom was armed, told the SMM to leave the area.*
In Odessa, the SMM saw about 100 people gathered in front of the police headquarters at 12 Yevreiska Street. From there, they moved to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office of Odessa Region at 13 Pushkinska Street, where some of the participants addressed the crowd, denouncing, among other things, the increase in attacks against civil activists. The SMM observed approximately 20 police officers securing the event. After about one and a half hours, the gathering dispersed peacefully. (See SMM Daily Report of 24 September 2018.)
In Kyiv, about 10m west of the entrance of a 12-storey building at 7 Revutskoho Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater in the tarmac road, assessed as caused by the impact of a grenade. The SMM also saw four broken ground-floor windows and one broken window on the first floor. According to media reports, an explosion occurred in the area at about 02:00 on 22 September.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
- At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske, two members of the armed formations, one of whom was armed, told the SMM to leave the area.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
- The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
- The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
Conditional:
- At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk, three armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after conducting a visual inspection of the interior and trunk of the SMM vehicles.
Other impediments:
- An SMM long-range UAV experienced jamming near Smile (non-government-controlled, 31km north-west of Luhansk).[5]
[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.
[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.
[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.