Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 20 September 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM saw military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as again near Verkhnoshyrokivske.* Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a multiple launch rocket system in violation of withdrawal lines near Buhaivka. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance works to critical water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and Slovianoserbsk and to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka, as well as demining in Pishchane. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering regarding the status of non-Ukrainian ATO veterans.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (58 explosions).

On the night of 19-20 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded two explosions assessed as impacts of 30mm grenades 0.5-1.5km south as well as four explosions (one assessed as an impact and three undetermined) and 22 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east), all 2-5km at southerly directions.

During the day on 20 September, positioned about1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and two shots of small-arms fire, all 2-4km at directions ranging from south-south-west to north.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (41 explosions).

During the day on 20 September, positioned about 2km east-north-east of Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 11 artillery explosions over a period of 15 minutes, 1km north-east, assessed as live-fire training outside the security zone. (See observations from training area near Myrne below.)              

During the day on 20 September, positioned near Malomykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 36km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven artillery explosions over a period of about 15 minutes, 6km north-east, assessed as live-fire training outside the security zone.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

South of the railway bridge crossing road T1316 in the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw two soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, each carrying an automatic rifle, walking south along the road.

Near but outside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw an ambulance with military licence plates and a green Volkswagen Transporter minivan with Ukrainian civilian licence plates driving from the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the disengagement area towards Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk). Five minutes later, the SMM observed another ambulance with military licence plates and a dark green minivan driving through Zolote‑1/Soniachnyi (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) towards the aforementioned checkpoint at high speed. Through the window of this ambulance, the SMM was able to see two persons holding intravenous bags.                                                                                                                        

Positioned north of Petrivske, the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an impact and saw a cloud of black smoke emanating from 2-3km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a multiple launch rocket system (type undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) on 18 September.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, at the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw four self-propelled howitzers (2S5 Giatsint-S, 152mm), five towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) loaded on a train. (Loaded on the same train, the SMM saw ten armoured personnel carriers (APC), one command and fire control vehicle and more than ten military trucks. [3]) Later the same day, the SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S5) loaded on trailers near the same railway station.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence, on 18 September, of 26 tanks (undetermined types) in a training area near Buhaivka, 20 tanks (undetermined types) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) and 18 tanks (undetermined types) 14 pieces of towed artillery (undetermined types) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). On 20 September, the SMM saw a tank (type undetermined) and seven towed howitzers (undetermined types) near the same training area near Myrne.

Also on 18 September, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 26 pieces of towed artillery (undetermined types) and four surface-to-air-missile systems (undetermined types) in a training area near Buhaivka (in the same area, aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 75 armoured combat vehicles) and a probable piece of towed artillery in a training area near Shymshynivka (in the same area, aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 27 armoured combat vehicles).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[4] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 19 September, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk). On 20 September, the SMM saw an APC (BTR‑4) near Novobakhmutivka, an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) being towed near Myrne (40km north-east of Mariupol) and an APC (BTR-4) being towed in Artema (26km north of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas on 20 September, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, non-government-controlled, 67km south-east of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska, where workers installed water pipes to sanitary facilities about 100m south of the nearby entry-exit checkpoint, and Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk) and demining in Pishchane (government-controlled, 22km north of Luhansk).

The SMM visited a border area outside of government control. While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM observed no pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a large gathering regarding the status of non-Ukrainian ATO veterans. Gathered in front of the national parliament building at 5 Hrushevskoho Street, the SMM observed about 500 individuals (90 per cent men between 16 and 35 years old), some displaying flags of National Corps, Natsionalni Druzhyny, Svoboda, Veterans Brotherhood and Right Sector, chanting “passports to volunteers” and carrying a large banner reading “Citizenship for Volunteers.” According to speeches being given at the gathering, the group was demanding that all non-Ukrainian ATO veterans be granted Ukrainian citizenship. The SMM saw about 800 National Guard and riot police officers, some carrying anti-riot shields, standing between the national parliament building and the crowd. At one point, the SMM observed some members of the gathering throw fireworks and attempt to break through a police cordon protecting the entrance to the national parliament building.  Later, about 100 people broke off from the crowd and proceeded to the entrance of the Presidential Administration Building at 1 Bankova Street (where about 200 National Guard and riot police officers were stationed), where some of them chained themselves to a fence. The participants subsequently dispersed without further incidents.

In Kherson, the SMM attempted to follow up further on reports of the hazardous pollution emanating from a chemical plant on the Crimean peninsula (see SMM Daily Report 14 September 2018). Representatives of the State Consumer Service of Kherson told the SMM that tests had been conducted on air, water, soil and food chain samples, and all had fallen within acceptable limits but that monitoring would continue.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 17 September) The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing risks to the SMM’s security. The SMM saw civilian cars crossing the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]   Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2]   Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3]   This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]   This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5]   The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.