Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 18 September 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM observed damage as a result of shelling in residential areas of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as again near Verkhnoshyrokivske.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of the respective withdrawal lines in Kremenivka. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance works to critical water infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as demining and repairs at the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka. The SMM followed up on the situation of civilians living near and crossing the contact line in Maiorsk and Horlivka. In Kherson region, the Mission monitored the ABL in Chonhar.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions).

On the evening and night of 17-18 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded ten undetermined explosions and 88 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east), all 0.5-4km at directions ranging from south-south-east to south-south-west.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded two undetermined explosions, about 85 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and south to north) and a muzzle flash, all 2-4km from east-north-east to east-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 11 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (seven explosions).

On the evening of 17 September, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded five undetermined explosions, 34 projectiles in flight (mostly east-south-east to west-north-west) and four muzzle flashes, all 2-4km south-west.

On 18 September, positioned near Kruhlyk (non-government-controlled, 31km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west and over 400 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 1-1.5km north-north-west, all assessed as live-fire training exercises outside the security zone.

The SMM observed fresh damage as a result of shelling in residential areas. In Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk) at 2 Myru Street, the SMM saw a large impact in the western wall of an inhabited three-storey residential building and three shattered west-facing windows. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by a projectile fired from a north-westerly direction. A female resident (70 years old) told the SMM that shelling had occurred between 15:00 and 17:00 on 16 September.

At 4 Myru Street, in the second-floor of a three-storey residential building, the SMM saw cracked north-facing windows in two separate apartments and a hole in the wooden frame of one of the windows, and assessed that the damage was caused by small-arms fire originating from a north-westerly direction. A female resident (65 years old) told the SMM that she had been in the same room when the window had been hit.

At 6 Myru Street, the SMM saw a broken window in a second-floor apartment of a four-storey residential building. Residents from both buildings told the SMM separately that shelling had happened during the afternoon of 16 September.

At 11 Lizy Chaikinoi Street, the SMM observed that a section of the western side of the roof of a two-storey residential building had been damaged or was missing entirely and that the supporting wooden rafters were damaged. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by a mortar round impact but could not assess the direction of fire. The SMM observed at 8 Lizy Chaikinoi Street that 12 windows on the north-western side of a two-storey residential building were broken or shattered and at 20 Lizy Chaikinoi Street that a second-floor window on the north-facing side of an inhabited two-storey building was shattered. Residents from all three buildings told the SMM that the shelling had taken place on the afternoon of 16 September.

At 2 Dundycha Street, the SMM saw that three first-floor apartment windows were all broken and there was damage to the north-facing outer wall of the building, which the SMM assessed as caused by shrapnel. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by a projectile fired from a north-westerly direction.

At a power substation in a residential area of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM observed a hole in the roof of the substation and a 30mm wide crack along its south-facing wall. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by an impact of a projectile fired from a northerly direction. Two female residents of the area (55-60 years old) told the SMM that the shelling had taken place on 16 September.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) driving east near the government checkpoint.

Positioned in the Zolote disengagement area and in Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) north-east of Kremenivka (27km north-west of Mariupol).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 17 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted four surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) near residential homes in Maksymivka (53km west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery available to the SMM on 17 September revealed the presence of 51 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk). On 18 September, the SMM saw five tanks (two T-64 and three variants undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (see above and the Ceasefire Table below for information on ceasefire violations observed at the training area).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. At one such site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, the SMM observed 11 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) present for the first time.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft gun[3] and other signs of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 16 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) in the courtyard of a non-functional school in Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk). The next day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) about 3km south of Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk), seven APCs (four BTR-70 and three BTR variants) near Avdiivka  (17km north of Donetsk) and two IFVs (BMP-1) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk). On 18 September, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-4) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk), an APC (MT-LB) near Sartana (15km north-east of Mariupol), an APC (MT-LB) near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk), an APC (MT-LB) in Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk).

On 16 September, between the DFS and road M04, about 600m south-east of the DFS, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a new trench 200m in length from north to south connecting two existing positions as well as a recently upgraded firing position about 600m south of the DFS. The same UAV spotted a 40m extension of existing trenches about 2km south-west of the DFS. (All developments were assessed as belonging to the armed formations, all not seen in imagery from 4 September 2018).

The same UAV spotted about 20 fresh craters assessed as impacts of probable mortar (82mm) rounds (not seen on imagery from 4 September 2018) about 1.5km south-west of the DFS, on road H20 at the junction of road M04.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining and repair and maintenance works to a water pipeline between Zolote and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), a water channel junction in Stanytsia Luhanska and at the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining and repairs to the South Donbas water pipeline between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). A representative of Voda Donbassa told the SMM that the repairs to the South Donbas water pipeline had been completed and that water supply should improve for up to 1.3 million residents on both sides of the contact line in Donetsk region.

The SMM facilitated and monitored demining in Pishchane (government-controlled, 22km north of Luhansk), in an area where an anti-tank mine had reportedly exploded on 7 April 2018 (see SMM Daily Report 12 April 2018).

The SMM continued to followup on the situation of civilians living near and crossing the contact line. At the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), ten civilians (men and women, aged 60-80 years old) told the SMM that crossing the contact line takes many hours, but due to the fact that toilets are either unavailable or in poor condition, they try to consume as little food or drink as possible. In Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM conducted an outreach event with 15 civilians, many of whom highlighted the difficulties of crossing the contact line as well as hardship conditions at checkpoints along the contact line.

On 17 September, the SMM monitored the ABL at the checkpoint near Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and observed that the checkpoint was open and traffic was traveling in both directions.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 17 September) The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), five members of the armed formations (one visibly armed) again denied the SMM passage, citing risks to “the SMM’s security”. The SMM saw civilian cars crossing the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• At two separate checkpoints in Horlivka, members of the armed formations insisted on opening the trunks of the SMM vehicles before allowing the SMM to pass through the checkpoints.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not prescribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.