Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 14 September 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near all three disengagement areas. The SMM’s access remained restricted in the disengagement areas, as well as again near Verkhnoshyrokivske and Yuzhna-Lomuvatka.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines near Myrne. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance work at the Donetsk Filtration Station as well as to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska, Slovianoserbsk and between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata, and to facilitate demining and repairs at a gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including about 50 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions).

On the evening and night of 13-14 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 22 undetermined explosions, 58 projectiles in flight (mainly from west to east), 31 muzzle flashes and an illumination flare, all 0.5-2km south and south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 13-14 September, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded three undetermined explosions, 104 projectiles in flight, 12 muzzle flashes and a burst, all 1-3km in easterly directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 34 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (16 explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

While on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard 33 undetermined explosions and about 40 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5-6km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard about ten shots of small-arms fire 3-5km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). About 500m north-north-west of a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM observed remnants of various types of rocket-propelled grenades scattered on and along road T1316 for the first time. About 400m south of the northern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM observed remnants of another rocket-propelled grenade for the first time. At a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces just north of the disengagement area, the SMM observed two portable rocket-launchers (RPO-A Shmel, 93mm). Recent fires have cleared vegetation in the disengagement area, allowing for explosive remnants of war previously obscured by foliage to be seen.

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard 15 minutes of uncountable overlapping shots of small-arms fire 1-1.5km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, the SMM saw three stationary self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a compound near Myrne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 13 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR variants) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk), an APC (BTR variant) near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk), four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a military truck near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk) and two IFVs (BMP-1) near Zolote.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 13 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk) and, on 14 September, the SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to observe mines. On 13 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted that 11 anti-tank mines (TM-62) remain laid out in two rows across road H20 near Novokalynove.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations in the area near the station, despite explicit security guarantees (see table below).

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk) the South Donbas water pipeline between Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM also monitored adherence to the ceasefire and facilitated the repair of the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 12 September 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• North of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), an officer of the Ukrainian Armed Forces informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5

Other impediments:

• An SMM long-range UAV experienced jamming for two minutes near Shyroka Balka (non-government-controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk).[5]

[1]     For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

*    Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]     Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3]     This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]     The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5]     The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.