Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 7 September 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission saw multiple launch rocket systems in violation of withdrawal lines. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, and again near Zaichenko and Novoazovsk.* The Mission continued to monitor the situation at the closed entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska where it saw that construction and repair works were ongoing. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure near Pervomaisk and Krasnyi Lyman.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1] including, however, fewer explosions (about 90), compared with the previous reporting period (about 260 explosions).

On the evening and night of 6-7 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions and about 200 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 3-5km south-east. During the day on 7 September, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 2-5km south-east.

On the same evening and night of 6-7 September, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded about 80 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south) and two illumination flares, all 1-4km east-north-east, east and east-south-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded two undetermined explosions, 57 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east) and two illumination flares, all 1-3km south-south-west.

During the day on 7 September, positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and about 380 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-4km south-east, south-south-west and north-west. 

On the evening and night of 6-7 September, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded ten undetermined explosions, about 360 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and south to north) and 18 bursts of undetermined weapons, all 2-4km east-north-east, east and east-south-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera south-west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 14 undetermined explosions and five projectiles in flight, all 0.5-3km north-north-east, north-east and east-north-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 17 explosions (16 undetermined and one assessed as an impact) and 33 projectiles in flight (mostly from east-south-east to west-north-west), all 2-4km north-north-east, north-east and east.  

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including two explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (four explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 7 September, positioned 250m south of the Stanystsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 1-2km north-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On the evening of 6 September, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a burst of an undetermined weapon 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

During the day on 7 September, positioned near the Petrivske and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw 12 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Poltavka (54km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted seven tanks (T-72) and a mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) mounted atop an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 5 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two APCs (BTR-variants) south of Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk). On 7 September, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) moving west near Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed that the entry-exit checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge remained closed. The Mission saw no pedestrians present at the entry-exit checkpoint or at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge. In the vicinity of the entry-exit checkpoint, it continued to observe ongoing repairs to the pedestrian road and parking lot, as well as the construction of concrete shelters and fencing and connecting of communication cables to offices at the site.

The SMM saw demining activity. In a field about 1.5km south-east of Lomakyne, the SMM saw two people wearing clothing bearing the logo of an international demining organization demining.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the station, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to water infrastructure near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Two armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) again prevented the SMM from accessing Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south through Zaichenko citing security concerns, thus preventing the SMM from following up on reports of shelling in Pikuzy.
• Three armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), citing orders from a “superior,” thus preventing the SMM from following up on a recent civilian casualty at the hospital in Novoazovsk. While at the checkpoint, the SMM saw civilian vehicles passing in both directions.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• At a hospital in Donetsk city, medical staff refused to provide information without permission from the armed formations while the SMM was following up on people injured from the explosion in Donetsk city centre on 31 August 2018. At two other hospitals in Donetsk city, medical staff provided limited information to the SMM on people injured in the abovementioned incident, however refused to provide further information without permission from the armed formations.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access   to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.