Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 29 August 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

Following a recommitment to the ceasefire on the occasion of the beginning of the school year which began at 00:01 on 29 August 2018, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission heard ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as again in Zaichenko and near Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Vasiukivka and Malynivka. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure in Luhansk region, at a gas distribution station in Krasnohorivka, the Bakhmut Agrarian Union’s pig farm in Novoluhanske and to residential houses in Avdiivka. The SMM saw a fire near Berezove and noted the closure of the entry-exit checkpoint near Novotroitske; it facilitated adherence to the ceasefire to enable firefighting activity near Berezove. In Kyiv and Dnipro, the SMM monitored gatherings in commemoration of the “Ilovaisk battle” and noted calm situations.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions). About 35 per cent of the ceasefire violations recorded, including about 20 explosions, were recorded after the start of the recommitment to the ceasefire at 00:01 on 29 August.

On the evening of 28 August, the SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 11 undetermined explosions, about 60 projectiles in flight and two illumination flares, all 0.3-4km south and south-south-west.

On the evening of 28 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded about 40 undetermined explosions, about 85 projectiles in flight, three illumination flares and a muzzle flash, all 3-5km at directions ranging from south-east to south.

On the evening of 28 August, the SMM camera east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 21 undetermined explosions, about 70 projectiles in flight, two illumination flares and a muzzle flash, all 2-4km north-east and east-north-east.

On the evening and night of 28-29 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and 15 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-8km south-east and south. During the day on 29 August, while at the same location, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 3-4km east.

During the day on 29 August, positioned at the entry-exit checkpoint near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw an explosion assessed as the impact of a mortar (120mm) round 1km south-east.

Positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 0.5-3km south and north-north-west. The SMM also heard about 80 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-3km south, assessed as live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (two explosions, both recorded after the recommitment to the ceasefire), compared with the previous reporting period (about 40 explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 28 August, inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw, for the first time, two rows of white sandbags covered with foliage 20m south of the railway bridge and another set of white sandbags covered with foliage about 20m further west (see also SMM Daily Report 28 August 2018). The SMM saw, for the first time, the remnant of a tailfin of a recoilless-gun, 5m west of the road, 300-500m north of an armed formations’ checkpoint on the southern edge of the disengagement area.

On 29 August, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two military trucks with military licence plates and four people in military-style clothing, assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, in Katerynivka, inside the Zolote disengagement area, entering and exiting the village.

Positioned on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 5-7km south-west and an undetermined explosion 3-4km south-south-east, both assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM noted a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw eight multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM21 Grad, 122mm) near Vasiukivka (82km north of Donetsk) and nine MLRS (BM-21) near Malynivka (82km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Selidove (41km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, on 28 August, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and ten tanks (T-72) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM noted that 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), 30 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm), four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10), three towed howitzers (D-44, 85mm), 42 self-propelled howitzers (20 2S1 and 22 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and an MLRS (BM-21) continued to be missing and three MLRS (BM-21) were missing for the first time.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACVs)[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 28 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two ACVs (type undetermined) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk), two ACVs (type undetermined) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), two IFVs (a BMP-1 and a BMP variant) near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk). On 29 August, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) near Zolote, an APC (BTR-70) near Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk) and an APC (BTR-70) near Stanytsia Luhanska.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 28 August, a long-range SMM UAV spotted nine APCs (two BTR-70 and seven MT-LB), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2), nine IFVs (BMP-1), a combat engineer vehicle (IMR-2) and a trench digger (MDK-3) in Donetsk city. On 29 August, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). On 28 August, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 16 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows on the road between Holmivskyi (49km north-east of Donetsk) and Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk), and, about 1km further north, an additional 13 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across the same road.

On 29 August, in the eastern outskirts of Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 76km south of Donetsk), the SMM again saw a tailfin, assessed as part of a mortar (120mm) round, protruding from the tarmac. On the road between the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk and the checkpoint 700m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed, for the first time, the remnants of 12 anti-tank mines 1m south of the road (11 of which were completely burned).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water channel junction in Stanytsia Luhanska, a water pipeline near Zolote, the Bakhmut Agrarian Union’s pig farm near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk) and a gas distribution station near Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to residential houses in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and it facilitated the transfer of Vodafone mobile telecommunications parts from Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk) to Luhansk city (non-government-controlled).

The SMM facilitated adherence to the ceasefire to enable firefighting activity near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk). From about 13:00 on 29 August until the end of the reporting period, the SMM camera 1km north-east of Berezove recorded large plumes of smoke at easterly directions. At about 15:00, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint near Novotroitske had been closed. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer told the SMM that the closure was due to a wildfire nearby and the risk of explosions from mines and UXO. The SMM saw smoke in the distance, north of the entry-exit checkpoint in the direction of Berezove. Positioned about 3km south-west Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 27km south-west of Donetsk), an area north-east of Berezove, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 2-3km south (see the table below).

The SMM visited a railyard in an area not under government control. At the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed around 37 open freight wagons (contents not visible), six covered freight wagons and nine cisterns.

The SMM monitored gatherings in Kyiv and Dnipro in commemoration of the “Ilovaisk battle” that took place in August 2014. In Kyiv, the Mission monitored two gatherings. In front of the Embassy of the Russian Federation (27 Povitroflotskyi Avenue, the SMM saw about 500 people (mostly men, mixed ages), including around 300 people assessed to be veterans, about 20 Ukrainian flags as well as banners and posters with messages critical of the Russian Federation. On the street in front of the embassy building, the SMM saw white crosses with red paint splashed at their bases and the names and photographs of people who died in the battle. The Mission saw about 90 National Guard and 20 police officers securing the area. On Mykhailivska Square in Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering of about 600 people (mixed genders and ages) and saw two police cars nearby. In Dnipro, the SMM monitored a gathering of about 250 people (men and women, mixed ages) at the Heroes Square (2 Oleksandra Polia Avenue). The Mission saw about ten law enforcement officers present. All gatherings ended without incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “the SMM’s security”.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “an ongoing operation in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.