Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 24 August 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission saw fresh damage caused by small-arms fire to the administration office at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and Shchastia, as well as again in Zaichenko and Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines near Zhelanne Druhe. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure near Pervomaisk and demining in Berezove. The SMM monitored gatherings on the occasion of National Flag Day and Ukrainian Independence Day in several locations, which took place without incidents.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 70), compared with the previous reporting period (about 55 explosions).

On the evening and night of 23-24 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded four undetermined explosions, 60 projectiles in flight and an illumination flare, all 0.5-4km south and south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 23-24 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded 20 undetermined explosions, 75 projectiles in flight and a muzzle flash, all 2-4km north, north-north-east and north-east.

On the evening of 23 August, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) recorded six undetermined explosions and about 55 projectiles in flight, all 1-2km east-south-east, south-south-east and south.

During the day on 24 August, positioned in Pavlopil (government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 12 explosions (six assessed as outgoing and six assessed as impacts) and six bursts of small-arms fire, all 2-5km east.

Positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and 15 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-3km at directions ranging from south to west-north-west. Positioned at the same location, the SMM heard over an hour of uncountable shots of small-arms fire 2km south-east, assessed as live-fire training within the security zone, in breach of the 3 March 2016 Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on the full cessation of live-fire exercises.

Positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and 21 bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-2km south-east, assessed as live-fire training within the security zone, in breach of the 3 March 2016 Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on the full cessation of live-fire exercises.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 75 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (at least 510 explosions).

During the day on 24 August, positioned 4km south-west of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 23 explosions (six assessed as outgoing mortar rounds and the remainder undetermined) and small-arms fire, all 1-5km south-east. On the same day, positioned in Muratove, the SMM heard 18 explosions (four assessed as impacts of artillery rounds and the remainder undetermined), all 3-5km south-south-east.

The SMM saw fresh damage to the administration office at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM saw a bullet hole in the south-facing window of the administration office, assessed to have been caused by small-arms fired from a southerly direction. A member of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service told the SMM that the damage had occurred at 15:45 on 23 August (see SMM Daily Report 24 August 2018). The SMM noted that the checkpoint had not been opened on the morning of 24 August and did not observe any civilians queueing during the day.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 23 August, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion 1-1.5km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day on 24 August, positioned in Zolote, the SMM heard 11 shots of small-arms fire 2-3km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same day, the SMM again saw a man in military-attire with a machine gun, assessed as a member of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, near the bridge inside the Zolote disengagement area.

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area and inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Zhelanne Druhe (29km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed eight self-propelled howitzers (2S19 Msta-S, 152mm) and noted that eight towed howitzers (2A35 Giatsint-B, 152mm) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), anti-aircraft guns[3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled-areas, on 23 August, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk), two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) and a probable self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk), two ACVs (type undetermined) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), an IFV (BMP-2) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk), an IFV (BMP-1) near Znamianka (36km north-west of Luhansk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2), an APC (BTR variant) and nine IFVs (five BMP-1, two BMP-2 and two BMP variants) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Dacha (53km north of Donetsk) and four IFVs (BMP variants) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk).

On 23 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a series of fires over an approximately 180m stretch of land about 3km north-east of Zholobok (non-government-controlled, 47km west of Luhansk). On 17 August, an SMM long-range UAV had spotted at least 16 houses engulfed in fire in an eastern part of Zholobok (see SMM Daily Report 20 August 2018).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 23 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23) near Holubivske (51km west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed mines. On 23 August, the SMM saw, for the first time, two anti-tank mines on road M04 at a newly constructed checkpoint, about 2km north-east of Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water pipeline near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and demining to a 100-square-metre area on the western edge of Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians living near the contact line. At the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka, a group of about 150 people (mostly women, aged 50-70) stood in front of an SMM vehicle and prevented it from passing. They told the SMM that they had been waiting for over two hours in the heat due to the absence of a public bus that was supposed to come from a checkpoint on road H-15 east of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk). About ten minutes later, the SMM was able to proceed. At the checkpoint east of Kreminets, the SMM noted a large number of vehicles in a queue towards government-controlled areas. Two members of the armed formations told the SMM that the number of vehicles was unusually high due to the closure of the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (see above).

On 23 and 24 August, the SMM monitored gatherings on the occasion of National Flag Day and Ukrainian Independence Day (see SMM Daily Report 24 August 2018) in Chernivtsi, Dnipro, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kramatorsk, Lviv, Mariupol, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Pokrovsk (55km north-west of Donetsk), Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk) and Zaporizhzhia; the SMM observed no incidents during the events which gathered, on average, between 200 and 3,000 people. In Kyiv, the SMM saw at least 15,000 people gathered. The SMM also monitored a gathering of at least 2,000 people in Kharkiv marking the liberation of the city in August 1943.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, nongovernment-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) citing “orders not to allow the SMM passage”.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (nongovernment-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern side of the bridge in Shchastia (governmentcontrolled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that mines had not been cleared on the road leading north toward Shchastia. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.