Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 12 August 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

Between the evenings of 10 and 11 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 11 and 12 August, the SMM again recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM observed the bodies of two men, one who appeared to be deceased, at separate checkpoints near the contact line. The SMM observed an armed man inside the Zolote disengagement area and ordnance disposal activity in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and again near Zaichenko, Bezimenne and Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. It also observed hundreds of crates of ammunition and rockets at a compound in Khrustalnyi. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical water infrastructure in Obozne.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 10 and 11 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 90), compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions). Between the evenings of 11 and 12 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 60 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 10-11 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded an incoming explosion and two projectiles in flight, all 100-500m west-south-west, as well as about 60 undetermined explosions and about 180 projectiles in flight, all 0.5-3km at directions ranging from east to south-west.

On 11 August, positioned near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions at undetermined distances north-north-east, five shots of small-arms fire 1km east and another shot of small-arms fire at an undetermined distance east.

On the evening and night of 11-12 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 20 explosions and about 280 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-10 kilometres east-south-east, south-east, south-west and north-east.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 10 and 11 August, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 11 and 12 August, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 20 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. All 20 explosions were heard between 01:40 and 02:00 on 12 August while in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), 12-16km north-north-west.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 11 August, in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw an armed man in a military uniform.

The same day, in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed that no civilians were present in the area between the Ukrainian Armed Forces and armed formation checkpoints and that an explosive ordnance disposal team of the Ukrainian Armed Forces had entered the disengagement area. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer later told the SMM that the disposal team had removed a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) tailfin attached to a plastic bottle that had been painted to look like an RPG.

In the evening of 11 August, while in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire 3-4km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a compound north of Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) on 10 August, which were not seen earlier during the day when an SMM mini-UAV flew over the same area (for SMM mini-UAV observations from the same day and area, see below). On 11 August, the SMM saw four MLRS (BM-21) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw 14 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) and six MLRS (BM‑21) in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) on 10 August and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) north of Sopyne (101km south of Donetsk) on 12 August.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, on 10 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted in total 18 towed howitzers (eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and ten 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) in the abovementioned compound north of Khrustalnyi (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2018). About 1km north-west, at another compound, the same SMM mini-UAV spotted an artillery reconnaissance vehicle (PRP-4 Nard) and 775 ammunition crates (some of which were assessed as new), as well as 118 crates of MLRS (BM-21) rockets.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. At three such sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM verified the presence of 19 towed howitzers (13 D-30 Lyagushka,122mm and six 2A65) and five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm). It noted that the following weapons remained missing: two towed howitzers (D-30) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1).

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites whose locations were beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and noted that 21 tanks (11 T-64 and ten T-72) were again missing.                            

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on the night of 10 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variants) north-east of Hladosove (51km north-east of Donetsk), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted in the rear of a truck near Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk). The following day, the SMM saw a tracked armoured combat vehicle (undetermined variant) in Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). On 12 August, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) in Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk), a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Sopyne and an APC (BTR-80) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed demining activities. Near Nikishyne (non-government-controlled, 60km north-east of Donetsk), on 11 August, the SMM observed – at a distance – eight people wearing protective clothes with “MChS” written on them (in Cyrillic) appearing to dig in a marked mine field. Near government-controlled Berezove, on 12 August, the SMM observed seven sappers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces conducting demining activities along road H-20. The SMM observed the de-miners retrieve an unused 152mm artillery shell.

The SMM observed the bodies of two men lying on the ground, one who appeared to be deceased, at two separate checkpoints near the contact line. On 11 August, at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed the body of a man (in his sixties) who appeared to be deceased lying on the asphalt while pedestrians and vehicles passed through the checkpoint less than 5m away. An officer of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service told the SMM that the man had been travelling via bus toward non-government-controlled areas and that he had died after disembarking from the bus at the checkpoint, about an hour before the SMM arrived. On the same day, approximately 200m west of a checkpoint of the armed formations south of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed a woman in a uniform with “MChS” written on the back in Cyrillic performing chest compressions on a man (in his sixties) lying on the road between cars waiting to pass the checkpoint.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to a water pipe near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) on 12 August.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 8 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 9 August, at a crossing point near Chaplynka (90 km south east of Kherson), a member of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service told the SMM it could not enter the crossing point, saying the SMM lacked “proper written communication.”
• On 11 August, at a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).
• On 11 August, at a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage.
• On 11 August, at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage.
• On 12 August, at a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko, two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy and Sakhanka (see above).
• On 12 August, at a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne, four armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage (see above).
• On 12 August, at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk, three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage (see above).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 11 and 12 August, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information about demining activities in the disengagement area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• On 11 and 12 August, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• On 11 and 12 August, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• In Horlivka (nongovernment controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), members of the armed formations wearing uniforms with “police” written on them allowed the SMM to proceed only after inspecting the contents of SMM patrol vehicle trunks.

Other impediments:

• On two occasions on 10 August, the SMM temporarily lost communication with its miniUAV while flying north of Horlivka, assessed as due to signal interference[5].

[1]     For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

*    Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]     Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]     The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5]     The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.