Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 2 August 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and observed ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, as well as new firing positionsinside the Zolote disengagement area assessed as belonging to Ukrainian Armed Forces. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as near Siedove, Rivnopil and Novoazovsk.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM observed an anti-tank mine for the first time near Novotroitske. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to other essential civilian infrastructure near Artema, Novotoshkivske, Popasna and Stanytsia Luhanska. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a ceremony organized by the Roma community commemorating the victims of the 1941-1943 massacres at Babi Yar. In Lviv, the SMM again observed vandalism of tombs at a Second World War memorial.  

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 170 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions).

On the evening and night of 1-2 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 24 explosions (21 assessed as undetermined, two as outgoing and one as an impact of an artillery round), 100 projectiles in flight (mostly from east to west and west to east, and one from south-east to north-west assessed as from a rocket-propelled grenade), two muzzle flashes, an illumination flare in vertical flight and a burst of an undetermined weapon, all 0.5-4km south.  

On the evening and night of 1-2 August, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded five undetermined explosions and 294 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and from south to north), all 1-4km east. 

On the evening and night of 1-2 August, the SMM camera east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km NE of Mariupol) recorded five undetermined explosions, 65 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to south-south-east and from south-south-east to north-north-west) and two bursts of an undetermined weapon, all 1-3km east-north-east.  

On the evening and night of 1-2 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded 25 undetermined explosions, 103 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to south-south-east and from south-south-east to north-north-west), seven illumination flares in vertical flight and two muzzle flashes, all 2-4km east-north-east. 

On the evening of 1 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded four undetermined explosions, 20 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east), four illumination flares (three in vertical flight, one from south-west to north-east) and a muzzle flash, all 1-4km north.  

On the evening and night of 1-2 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint inPyshchevyk recorded nine explosions, 121 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east and from east to west) and six bursts of an undetermined weapon, all 2-7km south.  

During the day on 2 August, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions and about 100 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-10km south-east and south. 

During the day on 2 August, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 71 undetermined explosions and about 110 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-12km north as well as at directions ranging from south-south-east to south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations (four explosions). In the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.* 

While on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, in the early morning of 2 August, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 3-4km west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. 

On 1 August, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three new firing positions (not visible in imagery from 9 July 2018) assessed as belonging to Ukrainian Armed Forces, attached to a previously observed 40m-long trench (see SMM Daily Report 28 July 2018) on the southern side of the railway line inside the Zolote disengagement area, about 600m south of its northern edge and about 2km east of its western edge. The UAV also spotted a path cleared of trees and vegetation leading about 200m further north, across the railway line and through tree lines, as well as over 100 logs deposited on the ground near positions on the northern side of the tree lines (not visible imagery from 26 July 2018).

The same day, inside the Zolote disengagement area, the UAV spotted an area cleared of grass (not visible in imagery from 26 July 2018) near a previously observed trench, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, about 900m north of the disengagement area’s southern edge and about 1.4km west of its eastern edge (see SMM Daily Report 25 July 2018). 

Near to a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint just outside the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw a light armoured vehicle (Cougar KRAZ) with a heavy-machine-gun mounted on top, outside the disengagement area, travelling north. 

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. 

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 2 August the SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Pidhorodne (73km north of Donetsk). On 1 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five self-propelled howitzers (three 2S1 and two 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in a residential area in Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 1 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a convoy of eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) travelling from Lozivskyi (32km west of Luhansk) to Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk). The UAV also spotted 12 tanks (six T-64 and six T-72) near Khoroshe.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage areas in a government-controlled area, on 2 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Kremenivka (78km south of Donetsk).

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region and observed that 23 self-propelled howitzers (21 2S1 and two 2S3) were missing. 

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), an anti-aircraft gun[3]and other signs of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas on 2 August, the SMM saw a command post and communication ACV (BTR-60 R-145 BM) moving north on road H-20 nearHranitne (25km north of Mariupol).On 1 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two ACVs (BMP variants) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 1 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2) and three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) near Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on top of an APC (MT-LB) in Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk), three IFVs (BMP-1) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk), two APCs (BTR-80) and an IFV (BMP-2) on the western edge of Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk), an APC (MT-LB) near Lozivskyi and 19 IFVs (six BMP-2 and four BMP-1, the remainder undetermined) near Khoroshe.

The SMM continued to observe the presence ofmines and mine hazard signs. In Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed an anti-tank mine for the first time, assessed as fused, partially concealed by branches and rocks on the eastern edge of a paved road about 850m from road H20. A woman (60-70 years old) living 100m from the mine told the SMM that she was not aware of its presence. About 30-50m further down the road, the SMM observed a red mine hazard sign attached to barbed wire hanging across the road. On 1 August, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 14 anti-tank mines on a road between Dolomitne (53km north-east of Donetsk) and Novoluhanske (see SMM Daily Report 5 July 2018).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), a water system near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and to a fibre-optic cable 1km south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

In Kyiv, at the Babi Yar ravine in the north-west of the city, the SMM monitored a ceremony organized by the Roma community commemorating the victims of the massacres that took place at the site from 1941-1943. The SMM saw about 50 members of the Roma community in attendance, including musicians and dancers that performed in front of the monument dedicated to the Roma victims who were killed there. A speaker also paid tribute to the young Roma man killed in an attack in Lviv on 23 June (see SMM Daily Report 25 June 2018). The SMM saw six police officers present during the ceremony. 

In Lviv, the SMM again saw vandalism of tombs at the Memorial of Glory to Heroes Fallen in Second World War on Pasichna Street, including the Ukrainian national symbol. One of the tombs was spray-painted with yellow and purple, while another had a political slogan on it (see SMM Daily Report 25 June 2018).  

The SMM continued monitoring in Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Odessa, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments– which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 1 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial:

• Two armed Ukrainian Armed Forces members denied the SMM access to a military compound near Peredove (government-controlled, 68km south-west of Donetsk), saying that they would not provide it access until their commander arrived.
• Two armed Ukrainian Armed Forces members denied the SMM access to a military compound near Rivnopil (government-controlled, 86km west of Donetsk), with one member telling the SMM that the “instruction from their superior command is not to allow anyone to enter the compound”. 
• At a checkpoint on the western edge of Siedove (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the village, saying they had “no order” from the armed formations in Donetsk city to allow the SMM through the checkpoint. The SMM observed civilian vehicles passing through the checkpoint.
• At a checkpoint on the northern edge of Novoazovsk (nongovernment-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing the need for permission from the armed formations in Donetsk city. The SMM observed civilian vehicles passing through the checkpoint and earlier that day experienced no restrictions passing through the same checkpoint. 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO: 

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An unarmed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

- At the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk, the SMM noted that one of three stabilizer steel lanyards of the SMM camera there had been removed from its concrete recess. The SMM assessed that this removal may cause destabilization of the camera pole.

- At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the western edge of Orikhove-Donetske (government-controlled, 44km north-west of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces member asked the SMM if there was a person with a specific name travelling in one of the SMM vehicles, saying that he was a “correspondent” of the OSCE and that they had orders not to let the person through the checkpoint.

 

[1]For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3]This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.