Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 1 August 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk, compared with the previous reporting period, and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske where it observed a situation of calm while positioned there. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to other essential civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Artema and Malynove. In Kherson, the SMM followed up on media reports of an attack on a city council official. The SMM saw anti-Semitic graffiti in Odessa and monitored gatherings in front of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Kyiv.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 110 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 75 explosions).

On the evening and night of 31 July-1 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 37 undetermined explosions, 169 projectiles in flight (mostly from east to west, west to east and in vertical flight), six illumination flares in vertical flight and two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 0.1-3km south.

On the evening and night of 31 July-1 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded seven undetermined explosions, 112 projectiles in flight (mostly from south to north and north to south), nine illumination flares in vertical flight and five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 0.8-3km east-north-east.

On the evening and night of 31 July-1 August, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 13 undetermined explosions, 354 projectiles in flight (274 from north to south and 80 from south to north) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 2-3km east.

On the evening and night of 31 July-1 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions and about 120 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-4km south-east. On the following day, while at the same location, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and 14 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-7km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. In the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, including one explosion.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas and near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a situation of calm.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 31 July, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two tanks (T-72) travelling north-east on a dirt track approximately 3km south of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S19 Msta-S, 152mm) near Kurdiumivka (54km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 31 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) near Vesele (87km north of Donetsk), 11 tanks (six T-64 and five of unknown type) near Spirne (96km north of Donetsk), a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Verkhnokamianka (84km north-west of Luhansk), two self-propelled howitzers (2S5 Giatsint-S, 152mm) near Zvanivka (93km north of Donetsk) and four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Rozdolivka (87km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM observed a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) and 12 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm). It also noted that 23 MLRS (BM-21), two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) were again missing and three tanks (T-64) were missing for the first time.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, on 31 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 26 armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk). In government-controlled areas, on 31 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (BTR-60) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk). On 1 August, the SMM saw an APC (type undetermined) near Zolote.

The SMM observed the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO). In the north-eastern outskirts of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed UXO at the edge of the tarmac road, about 315m south-east of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint, assessed as a fragmentation grenade (VOG-25, 40mm).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and a gas pipeline near Malynove (government-controlled, 19km north-east of Luhansk).

For the first time since 9 July, the armed formations allowed the SMM to pass through a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) and proceed to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). Citing order from his superiors, an armed member of the armed formations said the SMM would be allowed to cross the checkpoint and enter the villages in the area until 3 August.

In Kherson, the SMM followed up on media reports of an attack on 31 July on a city council official. On 1 August, at the Kherson Regional Hospital, medical staff told the SMM that she had been admitted to the hospital in the afternoon of 31 July with acid burns on 30 per cent of her body on the afternoon of 31 July. On the same day, the SMM saw about 20 people (men, aged 20-30), known to the Mission as members of the National Corps, Svoboda political party and the public formation “Buzkyi Guard”, gathered in front of the Kherson regional police headquarters. A participant told the SMM that they had gathered to demand a swift response from the police to the attack. The SMM saw ten police officers present. On 2 August, a representative of the Kherson regional police department told the SMM that forensic experts had confirmed sulfuric acid had been used in the attack and that a criminal investigation had been launched and that a suspect had been identified and was being sought.

In Odessa, on 31 July, the SMM saw anti-Semitic graffiti and a swastika scrawled in black spray paint on the exterior wall of a residential building at 16 Osypova Street, across the street from a synagogue. According to the synagogue’s chief rabbi, the graffiti had appeared on the evening of 29 July. On 2 August, a representative of the Odessa national police regional department told the SMM that an investigation into this incident, as well as two similar previously reported incidents (see SMM Daily Report 27 July 2018 and SMM Daily Report 24 July 2018) had been launched under Article 161 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (“Violation of citizens' equality based on their race, nationality or religious preferences”).

In Kyiv, on 1 August, the SMM monitored two gatherings. In front of the Ministry of Justice at 10 Rylskyi Lane, the SMM observed some 250 people (35-70 years old, 70 per cent women) carrying signs demanding the registration of a political group as a party and asserting the rights of farmers. The SMM observed four police officers nearby.

In front of the Ministry of Internal Affairs at 10 Akademika Bohomoltsia Street, the SMM saw about 25 people (25-50 years old, mixed gender), some of whom said that they had gathered to demand effective investigations into recent cases of physical attacks against public activists in Ukraine, including among others the attack on a city council official in Kherson on 31 July (see above). The SMM saw ten police officers, as well as ten communications police officers. Both gatherings ended without any incident.

The SMM continued monitoring in Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An unarmed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Delay:

• At a Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding area in Donetsk region, the SMM had to wait for about 40 minutes before being granted access to the site.

Other impediments:

• An SMM midrange UAV experienced signal interruptions while flying over an area near Zaitseve (government-controlled, 62km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM landed the UAV without any damage.[5]

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.