Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 30 July 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a sharp increase in the number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, where it observed no ceasefire violations. Its access remained restricted in all three areas, as well as again near Bezimenne and Zaichenko.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Kalynove. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Stanytsia Luhanska, Artema, Novotoshkivske and Zalizne

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded a sharp increase in the number of ceasefire violations[1], including about 245 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (15 explosions).

On the evening and night of 29-30 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, nine undetermined explosions, one projectile in flight from west to east, six undetermined explosions and a projectile from north-west to south-east, followed by a total of 102 undetermined explosions, 337 projectiles (the majority from east to west and west to east), 16 muzzle flashes (including two assessed as outgoing mortar rounds) and two illumination flares (one in vertical flight and one from west to east), all 0.2-3km south and south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 29-30 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded 138 projectiles in flight (the majority from south-south-east to north-north-west), six illumination flares (three in vertical flight, two from north-east to south-west and one from east-north-east to west-south-west) and a burst of an undetermined weapon, all 1-4km east-north-east.

On the evening and night of 29-30 July and during the day on 30 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an outgoing round of an undetermined weapon and its subsequent impact 3-4km south-east, as well as 83 undetermined explosions and about 450 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-5km south-east and south.

During the day on 30 July, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions and at least 480 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-10km at directions ranging from south-south-east to north-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 22 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area and inside the Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 29 July, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a towed mortar (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, on 30 July, the SMM saw three tanks (T-72) near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), anti-aircraft guns[3] and trenches in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 28 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk), three ACVs (types undetermined) near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk), three ACVs (types undetermined) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), as well as two APCs (MT-LB) and five infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Zolote. On 30 July, the SMM saw four IFVs (BMP-2) near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a 180m-long trench about 2km east-south-east of the south-eastern edge of Zalizne (formerly Artemove, 42km north-east of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 1 June 2018) and a 120m-long trench in Pivdenne (formerly Leninske, 40km north-east of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 23 May 2018).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 28 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two APCs (MT-LB) near Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk), an ACV (type undetermined) near Zolote 5 (Mykhailivka) (61km north-west of Luhansk) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk). On 29 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2), three APCs (MT-LB variants) and two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23-2) mounted atop military trucks near Kadiivka (50km west of Luhansk).

At 171 Shevchenko Street in Ilovaisk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-east of Donetsk), on the eastern side of the street, the SMM saw a metal object partially buried in a cavity in the pavement, which it assessed as a 122mm projectile. The SMM marked the object with red paint and a warning sign reading “Do not approach” in Russian, and asked a member of the armed formations present on the site to facilitate its removal.

The SMM observed demining activities in non-government-controlled areas. It saw at least eight members of the armed formations, some of them with metal detectors, in a field west of a road 0.6km north of Nikishyne (60km north-east of Donetsk). The Mission saw that the area was marked with white tape. Approximately 1.5km west of Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) and 300m east of road T0517, the SMM observed at least four members of the armed formations in military-style clothing with demining sticks on both sides of the road.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to the water distribution network in Stanytsia Luhanska, the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the Nyzhnie-1-Novotoshkivske-Svetlichanska water system (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk) and the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne. Imagery from an SMM mid-range UAV on 28 July indicates that the level of phenol sludge in the reservoir has not increased, compared with previous imagery from May, June and July 2018. The imagery also showed new soil deposits on the reservoir’s western and eastern banks, likely due to ongoing repair and maintenance work, and it revealed no changes to military positions, compared with previous imagery (see SMM Daily Report 18 July 2018).

The SMM visited three border areas outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw two buses (one with Russian Federation licence plates and an undetermined number of passengers and one with Ukrainian licence plates and 25 passengers on board), three covered cargo trucks (with Russian Federation licence plates), 11 cars (five with Ukrainian, three with Lithuanian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) and ten pedestrians (five women, five children) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw a bus (with Russian Federation licence plates and 25 passengers on board), seven covered cargo trucks (four with Russian Federation licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) and 12 cars (three with Russian Federation licence plates and nine with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 90 minutes, the SMM saw 45 cars (16 with Ukrainian and 16 with Russian Federation licence plates, and 13 with “DPR” plates) and five pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also saw 26 cars (12 with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation and one with Polish licence plates, and seven with “DPR” plates), two buses (with “DPR” plates, 43 and 38 passengers respectively) and eight pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) entering Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw a male pedestrian (in his thirties) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 27 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from superiors” (for previous denials see, for example, SMM Daily Report 28 July 2018 or SMM Daily Report 30 July).
• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (nongovernment-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, claiming that “it was for SMM’s safety due to ongoing operations in the area” (see SMM Daily Report 30 July).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• While preparing to launch its midrange UAV flight near Novotroitske (governmentcontrolled, 36km south-west of Donetsk), the UAV experienced a continuous loss of GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming. The SMM cancelled the flight.[5]

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.