Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 20 July 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded a ceasefire violation near the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three areas as well as, again, near Verkhnoshyrokivske, Siedove and Bezimenne in non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region. The SMM observed a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines near Korsun. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Nelipivka, Zalizne, Bolotene, Novotoshkivske and Zolote-5. It observed again that the wooden ramps on the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were unstable.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 110 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 255 explosions).

On the evening and night of 19-20 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 13 projectiles in flight from east to west, three undetermined explosions, a projectile from east to west, an undetermined explosion, 16 projectiles in vertical flight and 16 projectiles from north-north-west to south-south-east, followed by totals of 13 undetermined explosions, about 60 projectiles (including 30 from west to east and 26 from north-east to south-west) and a burst (about 50 rounds) in vertical flight, all 0.7-4km south. During the same period of time, the camera also recorded, in sequence, two projectiles from west to east, three explosions assessed as impacts, a projectile from north-north-west to south-south-east assessed as a rocket-propelled grenade, an explosion assessed as an outgoing rocket-propelled grenade and a projectile from west to east assessed as a rocket-propelled grenade, all 200-700m south and south-west.

On the evening and night of 19-20 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 12 projectiles in flight from west to east and a projectile from east-south-east to west-north-west, followed by two undetermined explosions, about 60 projectiles (including 34 from west-north-west and east-south-east and 15 projectiles from east to west) and four illumination flares in flight (two from west-north-west and east-south-east, one from east to west and one in vertical flight), all 2-5km north and north-north-east.

On the evening and night of 19-20 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from north-north-west to south-south-east and two from south-south-east to north-north-west, followed by an undetermined explosion, about 60 projectiles (including 33 from south-south-east to north-north-west and 23 from north-north-west to south-south-east) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 2-9km east-north-east and east.

On the evening and night of 19-20 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded seven undetermined explosions and 17 projectiles in flight (16 from west to east and one in vertical flight), all 2-7km south.

During the day on 20 July, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and about ten shots of small-arms fire, as well as 15 minutes of uncountable and overlapping shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-3km west.

The same day, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and about 50 bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-3km south-east and south. Positioned about 2km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions and 25 bursts of small-arms fire, all 4-7km south-east and south.

Positioned in Fedorivka (non-government-controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions 4-5km east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (14), compared with the previous reporting period (11 explosions).

During the day on 20 July, positioned in Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions 5-8km east-south-east.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 19-20 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion 4-6km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The same day, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), west of the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 19 July, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) at a compound in a residential area of Korsun (31km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 20 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk). The same day, the SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk), a fire control vehicle (MT-LB variant) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Novotoshkivske and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) in a south-west part of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk).

On 20 July, on a street at the southern edge of Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed about 15-20 houses occupied by about 20-25 Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, some of whom were armed, including with assault rifles (AK-type). The SMM saw them in the yards or in front of the houses.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 19 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) at the abovementioned compound in Korsun. On 20 July, a mini-UAV spotted an APC (BTR-80) near Pryvitne (11km north of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to high-voltage power lines in Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), water intake station boreholes in Bolotene (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), water pipelines near Novotoshkivske and a water pipeline in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). Repairs to the water pipelines near Novotoshkivske were interrupted for about half an hour due to ceasefire violations which the SMM heard in the area, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians at the entry-exit checkpoint near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. Positioned near the wooden ramps on the broken section of the bridge, the SMM saw three people (one man and two women in their seventies) in wheelchairs being carried down and up the ramps by three porters. The SMM observed that the southern end of the southern wooden ramp was unstable and that the ramp was bouncing when people walked on it (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 6 July 2018).

The SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about half an hour, the SMM saw 13 cars (three with Ukrainian and nine with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates), a minivan (with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plate) exiting Ukraine, and nine cars (three with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

In Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), on 19 July, members of the armed formations returned parts of an SMM mid-range UAV to the SMM. (The Mission had lost contact with the UAV flying near Shyroka Balka (non-government-controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk) on 13 July. See SMM Daily Report 18 July 2018.) The SMM saw that the right wing of the UAV was broken and that its fuselage was scratched. It also noted that the UAV’s left wing and a secure digital (SD) card were missing. The members of the armed formations said that they had recovered it from an area near Horlivka.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 19 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 600m east of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, nongovernment-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it passage. (See SMM Daily Report 23 May 2018.)
• At a checkpoint about 1km northwest of Siedove (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it entry into the village. (See SMM Daily Report 7 July 2018.)
• At a checkpoint on road E58 north-west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage, citing “an ongoing anti-terrorist operation in the area”. (See SMM Daily Report 19 July 2018.)

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (governmentcontrolled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that mines on the road south of the bridge were still present. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [5]

Other impediments:

• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its miniUAV flying over Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), assessed as due to jamming.[5]

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.