Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 8 July 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region between the evenings of 6 and 7 July, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 7 and 8 July the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it saw a recent trench inside the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted in Zaichenko, Starolaspa and Olenivka, as well as at a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region. The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station. The Mission monitored the transfer of mortal remains from government-controlled to non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region. It also monitored gatherings in Kherson and Odessa.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including 48 explosions, between the evenings of 6 and 7 July, compared with the previous reporting period (42 explosions). Between the evenings of 7 July and 8 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 6-7 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, eight projectiles in flight from south to north and one projectile from north to south, followed by totals of three undetermined explosions and 14 projectiles (eight from north to south and six from south to north), all 3-5km east. The following evening and night, the camera recorded, in sequence, five projectiles in flight from south to north, one illumination flare from north to south and two projectiles from south to north, followed by totals of 27 projectiles (16 from south to north and 11 from north to south) and one undetermined explosion, all 3-5km east.

On the evening of 6 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions and about 95 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 3-7km south-east and east. On 7 July, while at the same location, the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions and two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-7km south-east and south-south-east. During the day on 8 July, while at the same location, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3-5km south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including two explosions, between the evenings of 6 and 7 July, compared with the previous reporting period (36 explosions). Between the evenings of 7 and 8 July, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (one), compared with the previous 24 hours.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 6 July, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a recently dug 20m-long trench (assessed as a firing position) emerging from a tree line on the southern side of the railway line, 1.3km from the northern edge of the disengagement area and 1.2km from its western edge (not visible in imagery from 7 June 2018).

On 7 July, on the north-western edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw three unarmed members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces repairing a signal cable, and a fuel tanker with two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers in it travelling west.

On 8 July, inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw a black car with military licence plates and two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers inside entering Katerynivka.

On the night of 6-7 July, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded an undetermined explosion 2-4km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 7 and 8 July, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation. During the day on 8 July, positioned near the disengagement area near Petrivske, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 8 July, the SMM saw 11 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Bohoiavlenka (46km south-west of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 7 July the SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 6 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six tanks (type undetermined) near Vozdvyzhenka (40km north-west of Donetsk). On 8 July, the SMM saw two stationary tanks (T-64) near Memryk (33km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, on 6 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted ten tanks (type undetermined) near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, on 7 July, the SMM saw five self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and noted that 11 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were again missing. On 8 July, in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM noted that 28 mortars (15 2B11 Sani, 120mm, 12 M-120 Molot, 120mm and one BM-37, 82mm), 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] and trenches in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 6 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two probable infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1), one probable armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant) and one armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted five IFVs (four BMP variants and one BMP-1ksh) in the government-controlled Zhovanka neighbourhood of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 6 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a trench line, assessed as recently maintained, in the yard of a house on the western edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (58km west of Luhansk).

On 8 July, the SMM saw three new mine hazard signs near a World War II memorial monument in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. On 7 and 8 July, positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below for details).

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. On 7 July, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 64 cars (22 with Ukrainian, 22 with Russian Federation, two with Lithuanian licence plates, and 18 with “DPR” plates), one bus (with Ukrainian licence plates and around 40 passengers on board (mixed genders and ages)), seven covered cargo trucks (six with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and 15 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM also saw 16 cars (12 with Russian Federation and three with Ukrainian licence plates, and one with “Abkhaz” plates), three buses (two with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) and 14 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) in a queue to enter Ukraine.

On 7 July, the SMM monitored the transfer of mortal remains from government-controlled to non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

On 6 July, in Kherson, the SMM monitored a gathering of some 250people (mostly men, mixed ages) in front of the Regional State Administration building at 1 Svobody Square. It saw some participants in clothing and with accessories identifiable with ATO veterans and others wearing t-shirts with slogans related to the State Initiative ofYarosh(DIYA). At one stage, the SMM saw two intensified verbal exchanges between the head of the Regional State Administration and two participants. On and around the square, the SMM saw about 50 law enforcement officers. It saw the gathering end peacefully.

On 7 July, in Odessa, the SMM monitored a gathering in support of Ukrainian filmmaker Oleh Sentsov, who has been in detention in the Russian Federation. (For similar observations in other cities, see SMM Daily Report 3 July 2018). It saw some 80 people (mostly men, mixed ages) at the Potemkin stairs and some participants holding banners written in multiple languages, including English, Spanish and Russian. The SMM saw four police officers present and observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 7 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 7 July and 8 July, respectively, two armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint near Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) again prevented the SMM from accessing Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) citing “security concerns”.
• On 7 July, two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage at a checkpoint near Starolaspa (nongovernment-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk).
• On 7 July, the SMM was unable to access a permanent storage site in a nongovernment-controlled area of Donetsk region. The gate to the site was locked and no guards were present to open it.
• On 8 July, a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier on two occasions denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area in Donetsk region.
• On 8 July, at a checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 7 and 8 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[3]
• On 7 and 8 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.3
• On 7 and 8 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed on both occasions.

Conditional access:

• On 7 July, at a checkpoint near Horlivka (nongovernment-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), members of the armed formations requested to inspect the trunks of the SMM’s vehicles. The SMM was allowed to pass only after it complied with the request.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. On 6-7 July the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational. On 7-8 July, the SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka and in Avdiivka were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.