Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 1 July 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region between the evenings of 29 and 30 June, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 30 June and 1 July – and following a recommitment to the ceasefire – the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM observed fresh damage caused by gunfire in a residential area of Yasynuvata. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it saw a fresh crater and again Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel inside the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and was restricted also in Kozatske, near Izvaryne at the border with the Russian Federation and on three occasions in Zaichenko. The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Muratove. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 190), between the evenings of 29 and 30 June, compared with the previous reporting period (375 explosions). Between the evenings of 30 June and 1 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 20), compared with the previous 24 hours. About 45 per cent of the ceasefire violations recorded between the evenings of 30 June and 1 July, including 12 explosions, were recorded after the start of the recommitment to the ceasefire at 00:01 on 1 July, mostly east-north-east of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and in a south-westerly direction of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk)

On the evening and night of 29-30 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk recorded, in sequence, ten projectiles in flight from south-south-east to north-north-west, seven undetermined explosions and three projectiles from south-south-east to north-north-west, followed by totals of 11 undetermined explosions and 204 projectiles (190 from south-south-east to north-north-west, 11 from north-north-west to south-south-east and three from south-east to north-west), all 1-4km east-north-east. On the evening and night of 30 June-1 July, the same camera recorded, in sequence, an explosion assessed as an outgoing round 1-1.5km east-north-east, a projectile in flight from south-south-east to north-north-west and two projectiles from north-north-west to south-south-east, followed by totals of six undetermined explosions and 279 projectiles (216 from south-south-east to north-north-west, 43 from north-north-west to south-south-east, 16 from south-west to north-east and four north-west to south-east), all 1-4km east-north-east.

On the evening and night of 29-30 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 52 explosions assessed as impacts of artillery (type undetermined) and mortar (120mm) rounds 5-15km at directions ranging from north-east to south-east, as well as six explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of mortar (120mm) and infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) fire 5-6km east-south-east and south-east. While at the same location, the SMM also heard 55 undetermined explosions and about 640 shots and bursts of anti-aircraft-gun (ZU-23, 23mm), automatic grenade-launcher, IFV (BMP-2) cannon (30mm), heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 5-12km at directions ranging from north-east to south.

On the evening and night of 29-30 June, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds 2-5km west-north-west, as well as about 30 undetermined explosions and about 60 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-7km west-north-west and north-west.

On the evening of 30 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 32 projectiles in flight from west to east 4-6km south.

During the day on 30 June, positioned on the south-western edge of Yasynuvata for about one hour, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and about 30 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 1-6km at directions ranging from south-west to west. The following day, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata for about six hours, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and about 130 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-4km south-west and west-south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (one explosion) between the evenings of 29 and 30 June, compared with the previous reporting period (88 explosions). Between the evenings of 30 June and 1 July, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 50 undetermined explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. All the ceasefire violations recorded between the evenings of 30 June and 1 July were recorded after the start of the recommitment to the ceasefire at 00:01 on 1 July near Orikhove-Donetske (government-controlled, 44km north-west of Luhansk).

During the day on 1 July, positioned in Orikhove-Donetske, the SMM heard about 50 undetermined explosions and over 50 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km south-east.

On 30 June, the SMM observed fresh damage caused by gunfire in a residential area of Yasynuvata. At 45 Hoholia Street, on the western edge of the town, the SMM saw two fresh holes in the north-west-facing side of a garage about 5m from a house, assessed as caused by small-arms fire from a westerly direction. A resident of the house told the SMM that he had heard gunfire between 17:30 and 18:00 on 29 June.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 29 June, inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw a fresh crater in the paved road and the tailfin of a recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) round nearby about 1km north-west of a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area (while positioned at the same location during the day on 28 June, the Mission had not observed the crater). The SMM assessed the crater as having been caused by a recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fired from a northerly direction on the night of 28-29 June. A Ukrainian State Border Guard Service officer at a checkpoint about 300m north of the disengagement area and a member of the armed formations at a checkpoint on its southern edge told the SMM that there had been explosions and gunfire inside the disengagement area on the night of 28-29 June.

On 1 July, positioned inside the Zolote disengagement area on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a military truck with three Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers and a car with Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers enter the disengagement area.

During the day on 30 June, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations. The following day, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 1 July, the SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) moving west about 1.5km north-east of Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 29 June, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two probable self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Pershe Travnia (57km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), an anti-aircraft weapon[2] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 29 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2) near Pershe Travnia and an SMM mini-UAV spotted two IFVs (one BMP-2 and one BMP variant) near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk). On 30 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (type undetermined) and a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Lebedynske (16km east of Mariupol). The same day, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk). On 1 July, the SMM saw an armoured recovery vehicle (BTS-4) near Muratove.

On 1 July, in Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two stationary APCs (BTR-80) on either side of a former communal building and 15-20 Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, some of them armed with assault rifles, on the premises of the building. The building is located about 200m from a functional school building and about 20m from its playground. Four local residents (women, aged 40-70) told the SMM that they did not feel safe with military presence in the centre of the village and that they were concerned about letting their children use the playground due to the proximity of military presence.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 29 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP-2) near Obozne (18km north of Luhansk) and an SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-variant) near Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk), as well as a recent 50m-long extension of a trench system near Khrystove (18km north of Luhansk), about 900m east of the contact line. On 30 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP-1) and an ACP (BTR-80) near Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol).

The SMM observed mines, demining activities, mine hazard signs and unexploded ordnance (UXO). On 29 June, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted five anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across a road between Starohnativka and Bila Kamianka, about 2km east of the former (see SMM Daily Report 4 April 2018). About 2km further east, the mini-UAV also spotted 14 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across and along either side of the same road and extending into a field on the northern side of the road on the north-western edge of Bila Kamianka (see SMM Daily Report 9 March 2017).

On 30 June, the SMM observed sappers with metal detectors from non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region sweep a 300m-long section of a road between Styla (non-government controlled, 34km south of Donetsk) and its intersection with a road in Petrivske. At the intersection, where the Mission had previously observed an object assessed as an anti-tank mine (TM-62) with a command wire (see SMM Spot Report 23 June 2018), another member of the armed formations told the SMM that all mines around the intersection had been removed on 28 June. The Mission did not observe any mines or wires there.

On 30 June, on road H20, about 2km south-west of Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed for the first time red square mine hazard signs with “Danger Mines” written in white in the Russian language placed on a barbed wire fence. The fence was built around a central reservation area (20m-long and 3m-wide) of the road, about 50m south of a checkpoint of the armed formations. Inside the aforementioned area, the SMM saw at least ten circular, freshly dug mounds approximately 30-40cm in diameter. (The SMM has regularly observed civilians using this road.)

The same day, about 3km north-east of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed a grey plastic tube with a metal bottom on the southern side of road T0519, assessed as an empty cartridge of a recently fired 152mm artillery round.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. On 30 June and 1 July, positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details).

The SMM visited three border areas not under government control. On 30 June, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for ten minutes, the SMM saw three cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates, and one with “LPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) and two pedestrians entering Ukraine, and 27 cars (15 with Ukrainian, seven with Russian Federation, two with Belarussian and one with Georgian licence plates, and two with “LPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (with “LPR” plates), two buses (with Ukrainian licence plates) and eight pedestrians in a queue to exit Ukraine. After ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On 1 July, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for one hour, the SMM saw 27 cars (ten with Ukrainian licence plates and six with Russian Federation licence plates, and 11 “DPR” plates), four buses (three with Ukrainian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

The same day, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM observed no traffic or pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine.

In Mariupol (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed about 40 people (men and women, aged 40-60) gathered in front of the SMM office. One of the participants told the SMM that the gathering was held in support of Ukrainian filmmaker Oleh Sentsov, who has been in detention in the Russian Federation. (See SMM Daily Report 4 June 2018.)

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 30 June, at a checkpoint east of Kozatske (nongovernment-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations, one of whom was armed, denied the SMM passage towards Porokhnia (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol), citing orders from other members of the armed formations.
• On 30 June, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 30 June, at a checkpoint in Zaichenko on two occasions, armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from accessing Pikuzy and Sakhanka (nongovernment-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), claiming that it was not safe for the SMM to proceed there. On the second occasion, two members of the armed formations also said that they had “specific orders” not to allow the SMM to visit the two villages. (See SMM Daily Report 30 June 2018.)
• On 1 July, for the fourth consecutive day at the same checkpoint in Zaichenko, two armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from accessing Pikuzy and Sakhanka, claiming that it was not safe for the SMM to proceed there.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 30 June, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• On 30 June and 1 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times. [3]
• On 30 June and 1 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]     Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2]     This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3]     The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.