Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 2 March 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. Its access remained restricted there and elsewhere, including, again, at three areas near the border with the Russian Federation in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, as well as near Patriotychne.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area. The Mission facilitated and monitored repair works to a water pumping station in Artema and to water wells in Krasnyi Lyman. In Kharkiv, the SMM followed up on reports of an exchange of border guard officers between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 50), compared with the previous reporting period (72 explosions).

On the evening and night of 1-2 March, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 66 projectiles in flight from west to east and nine undetermined explosions, all 0.5-3km south. On the late afternoon of 2 March, the same camera recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from east to west, three projectiles from west to east and six projectiles from east to west, followed by totals of six projectiles from west to east, four undetermined explosions and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 0.5-3km south.

On the early morning of 2 March, the SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), recorded two projectiles in flight from south to north, a projectile from north to south and two undetermined explosions, all at undetermined distances south-east. During the day, positioned at the south-western edge of Avdiivka for about five hours, the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions 3-5km south-south-east.

During the day on 2 March, positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five hours, the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions and more than 70 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 2-5km west. Positioned in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM heard 170 shots of small-arms fire 1-2km west.

On the early morning of 2 March, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded projectiles in flight, in sequence: one from west to east, two from east to west, one from west to east, four from east to west, one from west to east and four from east to west, all 1-4km north. Positioned 3km south-west of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard eight explosions assessed as outgoing rounds and 23 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-7km east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (34), compared with the previous reporting period (35 explosions).

Positioned on the eastern edge of Demenkove (government-controlled, 42km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions and 55 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 5-7km north-west. Positioned in Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 10km south-west.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned near the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, the SMM noted calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines, in a government-controlled area, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) on 28 February spotted three towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm) near residential buildings east of Mykolaivka Druha (55km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines, but outside designated storage sites, in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw a mortar (PM-38, 120mm) loaded on a military truck in Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun, [2] as well as other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, an SMM mid-range UAV on 28 February spotted four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Mykolaivka Druha. On 2 March, the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP-1) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (a BRDM-2 and a BRM-1K) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) on a flatbed truck near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), two reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-1) near Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk), an IFV (BTR-3) in Avdiivka and seven IFVs (BMP-2) near Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk).

In a non-government-controlled area, an SMM mini-UAV on 1 March spotted 17 IFVs (seven BMP-1, six BMP-2 and four BMP-variant), ten armoured personnel carriers (one BTR-80, one BTR-70 and eight MT-LB), three mine clearing devices (KMT-9) and other military-type vehicles in Donetsk city.

The SMM monitored and facilitated repair works to the Petrivske pumping station in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to water wells in Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM reached three border areas not under government control, but was denied access by members of the armed formations (see below).*

In Kharkiv region, the SMM followed up on media reports of an exchange of border guard officers between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. At the international border crossing point near Hoptivka (33km north of Kharkiv), the Mission saw a convoy of seven cars and two ambulances (all with Ukrainian military licence plates) moving from the border crossing point towards a nearby airfield. Later, a State Border Guard Service officer told the SMM that the exchange had been completed.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government, citing orders to do so (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), an “LPR” member, citing orders from “superiors” again told the SMM that it had to leave the area.
• At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), an “LPR” member again told the SMM that it had to leave the area.
• An “LPR” member again denied the SMM access to the Chervona Mohyla railway station near Voznesenivka, saying that it was a border area.
• An armed “DPR” member denied the SMM access to a compound near Patriotychne (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol). When the Mission noted that such denial would be a restriction to its freedom of movement, the armed member said he was aware of it and that was not his concern.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An “LPR” member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that he had no information regarding de-mining in the area during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information regarding demining activities over the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said that he had no information regarding any de-mining in the area in the last 24 hours. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• In Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol), an armed “DPR” member followed the SMM around the village at a distance of four meters.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka and at the Oktiabr mine were not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.