Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 25 February 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region between the evenings of 23 and 24 February, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 24 and 25 February, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM heard explosions from its forward patrol base in Popasna. The Mission followed up on reports of damage caused by weapons in Yasynuvata, Pidlisne and Molodizhne. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it observed ceasefire violations inside Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including at weapons holding sites in non-government-controlled Donetsk region and Siedove near the border with the Russian Federation.* The Mission monitored weapons withdrawal and observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in Vodiane and Donetsk city. The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs to a fibre optic cable in Vesela Hora. The Mission visited three border areas outside government control and was again restricted in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region. The SMM observed two public gatherings in Lviv region.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 150 explosions between the evenings of 23 and 24 February, compared with the previous reporting period (400 explosions). Between 24 and 25 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 65 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

In continuation of the ceasefire violations recorded in the early evening of 23 February (see SMM Daily Report 24 February 2018), on the evening and night of 23-24 February, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded an undetermined explosion, two projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west and two undetermined explosions, followed by totals of 53 projectiles in flight (20 from east to west, 22 from west to east, ten from south-east to north-west, one in vertical flight) and 54 undetermined explosions, all 0.5-1.5km south. During the evening and night of 24-25 February, the same camera recorded 27 undetermined explosions and 339 projectiles in flight (13 from east to west and 326 from west to east), all 0.5-3km south. During the early evening on 25 February, the same camera recorded 92 projectiles in flight from west to east, all 0.5-3km south.

On the evening and night of 23-24 February, while in Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 16 explosions 7-10km north-west. The same night and evening, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 95 undetermined explosions, including 28 outgoing explosions, 2-8km east-north-east, north-east and east, as well as about 70 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and 110 shots of small-arms fire 4-8km south-east. On the evening and night of 24-25 February, at the same location, the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions and nearly 80 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km south-east.

On 24 February, about 1km north-north-west of the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 84km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions at unknown distances south-east and south-south-east. On 25 February, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk recorded four undetermined explosions 1-2km south-south-east. The same day, an SMM patrol heard two undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance east and heard and saw an explosion (airburst) at 3km south-south-east.

Positioned 3km south-east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 50 shots of small-arms fire assessed as live-fire training (exercise) within the security zone, in breach of the 3 March 2016 Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on the full cessation of live-fire exercises. About 2km south-east of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 24 shots of small-arms fire 2-3km east assessed as live-fire training within the security zone, in breach of the same decision.

On 24 February, positioned about 2km west-north-west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions at unknown distances north-east, heard four undetermined explosions and saw an impact, all at 2.5-3km east, and heard three outgoing explosions and their subsequent impacts at unknown distances east. On the evening of 24 February, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Shyrokyne recorded, in total, four undetermined explosions and three projectiles in flight from west to east, all 1-4km north. During the early morning of 25 February, the same camera recorded 64 projectiles in flight from west to east 1-4km north. During the early evening of the same day, the same camera recorded three projectiles in flight from east to west followed by a projectile in flight from west to east, all 1-4km north.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 780 explosions, between 23 and 24 February, compared with the previous reporting period (about 270 explosions). Between the evenings of 24 and 25 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including two explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening of 23 February, while in Luhansk city, the SMM heard 30 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery (122mm) rounds approximately 1km north-north-west. Members of the armed formations in non-government-controlled Luhansk city had announced they would be firing related to a celebration.

In continuation of the ceasefire violations recorded in the early evening of 23 February (see SMM Daily Report 24 February 2018), while in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) on the evening and night of 23-24 February, the SMM heard 205 undetermined explosions assessed as caused by artillery (152mm) rounds, 130 explosions assessed as caused by outgoing artillery rounds (67 rounds of 122mm and 63 rounds of 152mm), 185 explosions of outgoing infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1, 73mm) fire, 224 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds (116 of 120mm and 108 of 82mm) and shots and bursts of automatic-grenade-launcher and anti-aircraft-gun fire, all 3-4km east-south-east and south- east. During this time, the SMM also heard ten outgoing explosions assessed as 120mm mortar rounds. (See SMM Spot Report 24 February 2018.) 

The SMM followed up on reports of fresh damage caused by gunfire and shelling, including in a residential area. On 24 February, at 10 Maiakovskoho Street in Kashtanove, a neighbourhood of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a hole in a north-facing window of a house, which it assessed as caused by small-arms fire from a north-westerly direction. A female resident said she had been home when the damage occurred during the night of 18 February.  

On 24 February, in Pidlisne (government-controlled, 69km north-west of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) led the SMM to road T0504 where the SMM saw five fresh impacts in a field 200-300m east of the road and a fresh impact in a field 200-300m west of the road. The SMM could not make further assessments due to security considerations.

On 24 February, approximately 1.25km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a fresh impact 12-13m north of road T0504, which it assessed as likely caused by a mortar round fired from a north or north-westerly direction. Some distance away, the SMM also saw two fresh impacts 10m south of the same road. It could not make further assessments due to security considerations.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 23 February, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions 3-5km south-west (assessed as outside of the disengagement area).
On 25 February, positioned about 2km south-east of Zolote-4, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1-1.5km south-west and a shot of small-arms fire 3-4km south-west (both assessed as inside the disengagement area).

During the day on 25 February, positioned near the disengagement areas near Petrivske, the SMM noted a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, in government-controlled areas on 24 February, the SMM saw five towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Vodiane (government-control, 15km north-west of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines, in areas outside of government control, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 28 tanks (three T-72 and the rest undetermined) on 23 February at a facility in Donetsk.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.* In government-controlled areas on 24 February, the SMM saw 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and noted that nine anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), a towed howitzer (2A65), six towed artillery pieces (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), and 28 mortars (12 M-120 Molot, 120mm, 15 2B11 Sani, 120mm, one BM-37 82 mm) continued to be missing.

In areas outside of government control on 25 February, the SMM saw six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and noted that five mortars (four PM-38 120mm and one 2B11) continued to be missing. 

On 25 February, the SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and observed two tanks (one T-64 and one T-72) and noted that eight tanks (three T-64 and five T-72) were missing. The SMM was unable to enter a second permanent storage site the same day in non-government-controlled areas as no guards were present.*  

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. On 24 February, the SMM saw six stationary armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Orikhove-Donetske (government-controlled, 44km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas on 24 February, approximately 1.5km north of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk), the SMM spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) as well as an IFV (BMP-1) moving in a nearby field. In Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk), the SMM observed an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) and an IFV (BMP-2), both stationary and 500m from a checkpoint and facing south-west. On 23 February, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 15 IFV (BMP variants), ten APC (eight BTR variants, two MT-LB variants) and nine armoured recovery vehicles (three BREM-1, three BTS-4A and three MT-55) at a facility in Donetsk.

The SMM monitored and facilitated repairs to a fibre optic cable in the area of Vesela Hora in order to restore Vodafone mobile telecommunications services in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (See SMM Daily Report 23 February 2018.) After the conclusion of repairs, Vodafone officials told the SMM that the connection had been restored in non-government-controlled areas; the SMM observed that in Luhansk city, the network connection was restored.  

The SMM visited three border areas not under government control. On 24 February, for about 20 minutes at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw one cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) and two pedestrians (women about 45 years old) entering Ukraine and three pedestrians (two women and one man, 35-45 years old) exiting Ukraine. On 25 February, at the same border crossing point, the SMM was unable to monitor due to yet another restriction imposed by an “LPR” member.*

On 25 February, at the border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for 30 minutes, the SMM observed two pedestrians (male) entering Ukraine and no pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

On 25 February, at the border crossing point in Novoazovsk (101km south-east of Donetsk), for 30 minutes, the SMM did not observe any cross-border traffic. 

On 24 February, the SMM saw that a monument honouring the Soviet Army in World War II in the Bohdan Khmelnytskyi Central Park of Culture in Lviv had again been  vandalized. Words against “Communists” and “the Soviet Union” were spray-painted onto the monument in Ukrainian and Russian, respectively (see SMM Daily Report 16 February 2018).

On 25 February, the SMM observed two public gatherings near the Huta Peniatska monument in Lviv region. The SMM observed around 200 people honouring victims of 1944 events. High-ranking Polish officials and priests from the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Roman Catholic Church were in attendance. The SMM saw 300 police officers present.

About 100m away, the SMM observed 25 people (mostly men, 18-30 years old) protesting the amendment to the Polish law on the Institute of National Remembrance. Protestors shouted but remained at a distance. The SMM saw ten police officers present.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government, citing orders to do so. (See, for example, SMM Daily Report 23 February 2018.) The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 25 February, at a non-government-controlled heavy weapons holding area, a “DPR” guard in military-style clothing and wearing a balaclava denied the SMM access, saying that it needed permission to enter the site.
• On 25 February, the SMM could not enter a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area in Donetsk region, as the storage facility was locked and could not see any sign of a guard onsite.
• On 25 February, at the north-western entrance to Siedove (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk), an armed “DPR” member, citing “strict orders” not to allow any entrance to the village, except by local residents and municipality services, prevented the SMM from proceeding,.
• On 24 February, at a border crossing point in Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), an “LPR” member, citing orders from other “LPR” members, told the SMM that they had to maintain a 5km distance from the border crossing point. After 20 minutes the SMM departed the area.
• On 25 February, at the border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), an “LPR” member, citing orders from other “LPR” members, told the SMM that it had to leave the area. The SMM left the area.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 24 and 25 February, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An “LPR” member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• On 24 and 25 February, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information regarding de-mining in the area during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• On 24 and 25 February, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information regarding demining activities over the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• On 24 and 25 February, the SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.4

Delay:

• On 25 February, at a non-government-controlled permanent storage site, a “DPR” member prevented the SMM from entering the site. After 21 minutes, the SMM was allowed to enter.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoints in Marinka, was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.