Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 25 January 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission observed an impact site in a residential area of Sakhanka. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, where it observed calm situations. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including in Sorokyne, Olenivka and Luhansk city.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Sievierodonetsk and Klynove. The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs of water wells in Krasnyi Lyman. The SMM observed a ten-truck convoy marked “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation” travelling through non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region and was prevented from following it into a compound in Luhansk city. The Mission visited two border areas not under government control.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations^[1], including, however, fewer explosions (70), compared with the previous reporting period (83 explosions).

In continuation of the sequence of ceasefire violations recorded in the early evening of 24 January (see SMM Daily Report 25 January 2018), on the evening and night of 24-25 January, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 30 undetermined explosions and 53 projectiles in flight (27 from east to west and 26 from west to east), all 0.5-1.5km south. In the afternoon of 25 January, the same camera recorded 32 projectiles in flight (31 from east to west and one from west to east), all 0.5-1km south.

On the evening and night of 24-25 January, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven explosions, four shots of automatic grenade-launcher fire and about 70 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-8km south-east. The following afternoon, the SMM heard 15 explosions, eight shots of automatic grenade-launcher fire and six bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4-7km south-east.

During the day on 25 January, positioned on the south-western edge of government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions, 20 shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire and about 70 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-4km east and south-east.

During the day on 25 January, positioned near government-controlled Berezivka (44km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion assessed as an outgoing round 1-3km east-north-east and heard and saw the airburst of a surface-to-air-missile system (9K35 Strela-10) 500m east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including almost 100 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (one explosion). Positioned near “LPR”-controlled Sabivka (13km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 88 undetermined explosions 15-20km south-south-west, assessed as a live-fire exercise.

The SMM saw damage caused by shelling in a residential area of “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol). On Tsentralna Street, the SMM observed the tailfin of a mortar shell (120mm) embedded in a shallow crater in the asphalt, 10m from houses on either side of the road. In a circle around the impact site, the SMM observed pockmarks assessed as caused by shrapnel from the explosion. Similar pockmarks were observed on a fence 5m east of the impact site. The SMM assessed the shell as fired from a south-western direction. The SMM observed two “DPR” members attempting to remove the tailfin using a hammer and hook. Several local residents (men and women, forties to sixties) told the SMM that shelling occurred in Sakhanka around 17:30 on 24 January.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) traveling west near Klynove (68km north‑east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw five tanks (T-64) on flatbed trailers in Pokrovsk (former Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk) and two tanks (T-72) being towed on flatbed trailers near Hranitne (78km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas of Luhansk region beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM noted as missing 21 anti-tank guns (18 MT-12 and three D48, 85mm).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles^[2] in the security zone. The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near “DPR”-controlled Luhanske (15km south-west of Donetsk) and two APCs (MT-LB) in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs works to water wells in “LPR”‑controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 25 January 2018).

The SMM observed a convoy of trucks with “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation” written in Russian on the side. The SMM observed ten covered cargo trucks, three support vehicles, two ambulances (all with Russian Federation licence places), as well as two cars marked “Police” and three further vehicles (all with “LPR” plates) driving west through LPR”‑controlled Sorokyne (formerly Krasnodon, 43km south-east of Luhansk). The SMM attempted to follow the convoy into a compound at 4a Darhomyzhskoho Street in Luhansk city, but was prevented from doing so by four “LPR” members (two armed) who closed a gate in front before the SMM vehicles were able to enter. One of the “LPR” members told the SMM that it needed permission from other “LPR” members in order to access the compound.*

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for 30 minutes, the SMM saw nine cars and two civilians exiting Ukraine, and two cars and 17 pedestrians entering Ukraine. While at the border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk), for 15 minutes, the SMM observed ten pedestrians exiting Ukraine and three pedestrians entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government, citing orders to do so. (See, for example, SMM Daily Report 12 January 2018.) The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• In Luhansk, four “LPR” members (two armed) prevented the SMM from entering a compound after a convoy of ten covered cargo trucks with Russian Federation licence plates marked “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation.” One of the “LPR” members told the SMM that it needed permission from other “LPR” members in order to access the compound.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An “LPR” member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information regarding de-mining in the area during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. ⁴
• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information regarding demining activities over the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [3]
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.⁴

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), on two occasions, men wearing camouflage attire allowed the SMM to pass through the checkpoint only after submitting to a visual inspection of its trailer.

Other impediments:

• A planned meeting between the SMM and the staff of an orphanage in Sorokyne was cancelled after the interlocutor told the SMM that it needed written “authorization” from “LPR” members in Luhansk in order to visit the orphanage.