Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 27 December 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and the same number in Luhansk region (one explosion) compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission monitored, with mirror patrols on both sides of the contact line, and facilitated, on the spot, an exchange of detainees between Ukraine and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including near Verkhnoshyrokivske and at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM visited a border area outside of government control. 

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including ten explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions).

On the evening and night of 26-27 December, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded a projectile in flight from east to west and two undetermined explosions, all 1-3km south. During the day on 27 December, the same camera recorded a projectile from west to east 1-3km south.

On the evening of 26 December, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded ten projectiles in flight from east to west 5-8km north. During the day on 27 December, the camera recorded an undetermined explosion 5-8km north.

On the evening of 26 December, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 4-6km south-east and three undetermined explosions 4-6km south-west. During the day on 27 December, while at the same location, the SMM heard three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-5km south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM again recorded a single explosion as it did during the previous reporting period.

The SMM monitored, with mirror patrols on both sides of the contact line, and facilitated, on the spot, an exchange of detainees between Ukraine and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions at the entry-exit checkpoint in government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk) and at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk). Later in the evening, the SMM monitored the arrival of detainees at Kharkiv airport. Members of the Government and representatives of religious communities were also present.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned on the northern edge of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as the detonation of a mine or an explosive remnant of war 3-4km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

About 1.5km north-east of the north-eastern edge of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM saw, for the first time, barbed wire across road P22 and a red square sign with a skull and crossbones reading “Danger Mines” in Russian language.*

While near government-controlled Zolote and Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), west of the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM noted calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines, in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Bohoiavlenka (46km south-west of Donetsk).

In violation of the withdrawal lines, in areas outside of government control, the SMM saw a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) and four MLRS (BM-21) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw two tanks (type undetermined) near Spirne (96km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed five towed howitzers (2A65 MSTA-B, 152mm) and noted that seven towed howitzers (one 2A65 and six D-30), 28 mortars (12 M-120 Molot, 120mm, 15 2B11 Sani, 120mm and one BM-37, 82 mm) and nine anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) continued to be absent.

In areas outside of government control beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed two towed howitzers (D-30) and five self-propelled howitzers (2S1), and noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) continued to be absent. An armed “DPR” member prevented the SMM from accessing part of a compound in a heavy weapons holding area, citing orders from his superiors.*

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site beyond respective withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and noted that ten tanks (three T-64 and seven T-72) continued to be absent.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw eight infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (six BMP-1 and two BMP-variants), eight armoured reconnaissance vehicles (seven BRM-1K and one BRDM-2), an armoured recovery vehicle (BTS-4) and a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). In an area outside of government-control, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Petrivske.                                                          

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), during one hour, the SMM saw 22 cars, two buses and 13 pedestrians (nine men and four women, mixed ages) exiting Ukraine and 25 cars, a bus and 26 pedestrians (21 men and five women, mixed ages) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government, citing orders to do so. (See, for example, SMM Daily Report 2 December 2017.) The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Three armed “DPR” members stopped the SMM at a checkpoint west of “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol) and denied it passage to the east, citing orders from their superiors and stating that it was unsafe to proceed.
• An armed “DPR” member denied the SMM access to part of a heavy weapons holding area.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An “LPR” member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC at a checkpoint on the northern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that he had no information regarding de-mining in the area during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from travelling on road P22 about 1.5km north-east of the north-eastern edge of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area due to the presence of barbed wire across the road and a mine hazard sign.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.4

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Four SMM cameras continue to be tested until the end of December 2017.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate.”

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.