Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 30 October 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission followed up on reports of two civilian casualties in Kostiantynivka. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas and observed calm situations in all three while present. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including at a permanent storage site and near Kachkarske.* The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in Teple, Bakhmut, Lysychansk and Nikishyne. It facilitated and monitored repairs and maintenance to power lines between Novozvanivka and Troitske and of essential infrastructure in Shchastia and Artema. The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. It also monitored a public gathering in Kyiv calling for political reform. With respect to local elections in newly formed territorial units, the SMM monitored the security situation around polling stations in Odessa region.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including, however, a similar number of explosions (about 250), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 260 explosions).

On the evening and night of 29-30 October, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 120 undetermined explosions as well as bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-8km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west.

On the evening of 29-30 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two projectiles in flight from north to south, two projectiles from east to west, two projectiles from north to south, one projectile from east to west, two projectiles from west to east, two projectiles from south to north, three projectiles from west to east, four projectiles from east to west, ten projectiles from west to east, three undetermined explosions, seven projectiles from west to east, one undetermined explosion, and 11 projectiles from east to west, two undetermined explosions, two projectiles, and nine undetermined explosions, all 0.5-1km south.

During the day on 30 October, positioned at the railway station in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about four and a half hours, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 3-5km west, as well as about 70 bursts and shots of heavy‑machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-4km at directions ranging from west to north. The same day, positioned on the south-western edge of Yasynuvata for about 90 minutes, the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions and about 120 shots and bursts of heavy‑machine‑gun and small-arms fire, all 1-5km at directions ranging from south-west to west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (three), compared with the previous 24 hours (16 explosions).

The SMM followed up on media reports of civilian casualties. A police officer in government-controlled Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) told the SMM that at about 23:30 on 27 October outside of a restaurant at 4 Belousova Street in Kostiantynivka, an inebriated man (aged 33) pulled the pin out of a hand grenade, then panicked and threw it into nearby bushes, where it exploded. According to the police officer, two male passers-by (in their thirties) were injured by the resultant shrapnel; one of them was subsequently transported to hospital and released shortly thereafter. One of the injured men held the inebriated man until the police arrived. The SMM later spoke by telephone to the injured man who had been admitted to hospital, and he confirmed the police account.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske  (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 27 October, the SMM camera in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske recorded one projectile in flight from east to west, 0.5-1km south-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

On 30 October, positioned near all three disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM observed the presence of mines near the Petrivske disengagement area. On 27 October, an SMM UAV spotted over 100 anti-tank mines (TM-62), including 28 such mines in two rows across Pashi Anhelinoi Street, between “DPR”-controlled Petrivske and Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk). The mines extended along the road and into the fields on either side of the road; their fuses were visible.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw ten tanks (T-64) being transported in a south-westerly direction on flat-bed trucks near Teple (31km north of Luhansk), 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) on rail cars at the railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk), a towed howitzer (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) being towed north-east near Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk) and another towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) being towed east near Smolianynove (61km north-west of Luhansk). In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw a tank (T-64) modified with demining hardware near Nikishyne (60km north‑east of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in non‑government‑controlled areas, the SMM saw 45-50 tanks (T-72) parked in a fenced-in abandoned industrial compound south-west of Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw 12 towed howitzers (2A65), eight of which it saw for the first time. Two of the 12 howitzers were brought into the site from an adjoining field while the SMM was present, two further howitzers (2A65) remained in the field. The trucks towing the two howitzers to the site were each carrying 10-15 152mm shells. The SMM noted that 21 towed howitzers (13 2A65 and eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) were still missing from the site. In non‑government‑controlled areas, the SMM saw six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm). According to “DPR” members at the sites, both the howitzers and the MLRS were loaded. The SMM noted that 12 towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm) and one mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) were missing.

The SMM revisited a “DPR” permanent storage site, whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and saw that eight tanks (three T-64 and five T-72) were again missing. An armed person at the site delayed the Mission’s access by about 35 minutes.* The SMM was denied access to a second permanent storage site in a “DPR”‑controlled area as no one was present.*

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government‑controlled areas, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-variant) near Zolote on 29 October. In non-government-controlled areas, on 30 October, the SMM observed three armoured personnel carriers (MT-LB) and two infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-2) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed demining activity. In a field near Nikishyne, the SMM observed six people in dark green attire in a field conducting demining using metal detectors.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance, co‑ordinated by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), to power lines between government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) and Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), the thermal power plant in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), and the pumping station near government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe the poor condition of the wooden ramps at the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), which has continued to deteriorate and still shakes as people cross it. The SMM assessed that walking over the wooden bridge poses a security risk to pedestrians, including SMM monitors.

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), during about one hour, the SMM saw 19 cars (11 with Ukrainian, seven with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “LPR” plates), seven covered cargo trucks (six with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates), one bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) and four pedestrians exiting Ukraine. The SMM also saw 11 cars (five with Ukrainian and six with Russian Federation licence plates), four buses (three with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates), two covered cargo trucks (both with Ukrainian licence plates) and four pedestrians entering Ukraine.

At a border crossing near Marynivka (78km south-east of Donetsk), during about one hour, the SMM saw 17 cars (eight with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 21 cars (ten with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, and six with “DPR” plates) and one covered cargo truck (with Russian Federation licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering of about 1,500 people (mostly women aged 60‑70) in front of the national Parliament building on 29 October. About 160 National Guard and police officers secured the area and the event remained peaceful. The SMM heard a speaker address the crowd, calling for political reforms, including electoral-law reform, the establishment of an anti-corruption court and the lifting of parliamentarians’ immunity from prosecution.

With respect to local elections in newly formed territorial units, the SMM monitored the security situation around polling stations in Odessa region on 29 October. In Shabo (47km south-west of Odessa), the SMM saw three men (in their early twenties) discouraging people from “selling their votes”; the men were being accused of indirect campaigning by bystanders. These accusations ceased when police arrived. At polling stations in Roksolany (39km south-west of Odessa), Baraboi (27km south-west of Odessa) and Salhany (47km south-west of Odessa), the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government, citing orders to do so. (See, for example, SMM Daily Report 23 October 2017.) The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was denied access to a “DPR” permanent storage site as no one was present. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In Kachkarske (35km north-east of Mariupol), two unarmed “DPR” members prevented the SMM from accessing a compound, stating that the SMM would need permission from other “DPR” members to do so. The Mission informed the JCCC.  

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. At a checkpoint on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, two Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC told the SMM that it should contact JCCC headquarters for information on disengagement and demining activities, adding that they were not authorized to discuss issues concerning the disengagement area with the SMM. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

An armed guard denied the SMM access to a “DPR” permanent storage site for 15 minutes.  The SMM informed the JCCC. About ten minutes after the JCCC was informed, the SMM was allowed access to the site.

[1] Please see the annexed report for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During this reporting period the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (Donetsk) remained non-operational.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.