Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 25 October 2017
This report is for the media and the general public.
The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM continued monitoring all three disengagement areas and recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including near Verkhnoshyrokivske. In Verkhnoshyrokivske, men in military-style clothing pointed a heavy machine-gun at an SMM patrol stopped at a checkpoint. The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Miusynsk and Luhansk city. The Mission facilitated and monitored repairs and maintenance to the thermal power plant in Shchastia, water pipelines near Maiorsk and in Horlivka, and the gas distribution station in Dovhe. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored the ongoing gathering in front of the national Parliament building.
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 300 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions).
On the evening and night of 24-25 October, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 90 explosions (including two assessed as outgoing artillery (calibre unknown) rounds, 11 assessed as outgoing mortar (82mm and 120mm) rounds, two assessed as impacts of mortar (82mm) rounds, three assessed as outgoing recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) rounds, five assessed as outgoing infantry-fighting-vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) rounds, and one assessed as an outgoing rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) round), all 1-5km south-east. The Mission also heard three bursts of IFV (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire, three bursts of automatic-grenade-launcher fire, and about 500 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, and two minutes of uncountable overlapping bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-5km south-east.
On the evening of 24 October, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 21 projectiles in flight from south to north, two undetermined explosions, 12 tracer rounds in flight from south to north, six projectiles from south to north, and two projectiles from north to south, all 2-4km east-south-east. On the evening of 25 October, the same camera recorded an undetermined explosion 2-4km east-south-east.
On the evening of 24 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, four projectiles in flight from east to west, one undetermined explosion, six projectiles from east to west, two undetermined explosions, one projectile from west to east, 12 projectiles from east to west, seven projectiles from west to east, six projectiles from east to west, five projectiles from west to east, 11 projectiles from east to west, three projectiles from north to south, 23 projectiles from east to west, two projectiles from north to south, 26 projectiles from east to west, one illumination flare, two projectiles from north to south and 12 projectiles from east to west, all 500m south.
On the evening of 24 October, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded twenty bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 1-3km south-west. The same camera, the following evening, recorded one projectile in flight from east to west 3-6km north-north-east.
On the night of 24-25 October, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, six projectiles in flight from west to east, a projectile from east to west, one projectile from north to south, four projectiles from west to east, 53 projectiles from east to west, two undetermined explosions, a projectile from west to east, one projectile from south to north, seven projectiles from west to east, one illumination flare, two projectiles from west to east, 12 projectiles from east to west, five projectiles from south to north, two projectiles from west to east, one illumination flare, two projectiles from west to east, and 12 projectiles from east to west, all 2-5km north.
During the day on 25 October, positioned at the south-western edge of “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about 90 minutes, the SMM heard about 80 undetermined explosions and six bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4-9km southwest, and seven shots of small-arms fire, 2-3km north-west.
During the day on 25 October, positioned on the south-western edge of Avdiivka for about five hours, the SMM heard about 110 undetermined explosions and a similar number of bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-7km south-south-west, as well as eight bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, 2-3km east-south-east.
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 40 explosions).
The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*
On the night of 23-24 October, the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote recorded, in sequence, a flare in flight from north-west to south-east, an undetermined projectile in flight from north-east to south-west, eight undetermined projectiles from north to south, and a flare from north-west to south-east, all 3-8km east and east-north-east and assessed as outside the disengagement area.
On the night of 24-25 October, while in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 4-5km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area. The following day, positioned 1km south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.
On 25 October, positioned in and around the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM observed a calm situation.
At a checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol) where the SMM has frequently experienced freedom of movement restrictions (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 12 October 2017), the SMM was stopped by armed men.* As an SMM patrol comprising two vehicles waited to pass through the checkpoint, it observed a partially covered and unattended heavy machine-gun (12.7mm) ten metres in front of the first SMM patrol vehicle. A few minutes later, two men in military-style clothing approached the heavy machine-gun, reloaded its ammunition and pointed it directly at the first SMM patrol vehicle. They then repeated this action. After a few minutes, the armed men moved the heavy machine-gun, then stopped and again pointed the gun directly at the first SMM patrol vehicle from a distance of three metres. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC). (See SMM Spot Report 25 October 2017.)
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.
In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery revealed the presence of 14 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (type unknown) about 6km south-east of Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) on 23 October. On 25 October, the SMM saw three tanks (one T-64 and two T-72) being transported north on flatbed trucks in Luhansk city. (The SMM observed the flatbeds take the tanks to a maintenance facility across from the central bus station.)
Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery revealed the presence of 22 howitzers (ten self-propelled and 12 towed), 19 tanks (type unknown), and almost 100 military-type armoured vehicles about 6km south-east of Miusynsk on 23 October. On 24 October, the SMM saw a tank (T-72) on a stationary flatbed trailer on road H21 near Heorhiivka (15km south of Luhansk).
The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw five self‑propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm). It noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) continued to be missing.
The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in an area outside government control in Donetsk region, whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and noted that ten tanks (three T-64 and seven T-72) were again missing. The SMM was denied access to a second permanent storage site in a “DPR”-controlled area as its gates were locked and no one was present to open them.*
The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] and military-type armoured vehicles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, aerial imagery revealed the presence of three military-type armoured vehicles near Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk) and a military-type armoured vehicle near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), all on 23 October. On 24 October, the SMM saw four stationary armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRM-1K), five stationary IFVs (BMP-variants), and a stationary armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BRDM‑2) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) as well as two IFVs (BMP-2) and a military-type armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) with a heavy machine-gun (12.7mm) mounted atop on the northern edge (but outside) of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area. On 25 October, the SMM saw a stationary APC (BRDM-2) near Kodema (57km north-east of Donetsk), two further APCs (BRDM-2) in Semyhiria (58km north-east of Donetsk) and three IFVs (BMP-2) and a support vehicle (BMP chassis) moving west near Orlivka (22km north-west of Donetsk). In non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery revealed the presence of a military-type armoured vehicle near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk) on 23 October
On 23 October, aerial imagery revealed the presence of a new trench extension about 2.5km south-east of Troitske, not present in imagery of the area from August 2017.
The SMM also monitored the security situation at railway stations in non-government-controlled areas. Aerial imagery revealed the presence on 19 October of four military-type trucks and six trailers in a compound about 1km south-west of the railway station in Sukhodilsk (38km south-east of Luhansk); on 23 October of open cargo wagons at the railway station in Dovzhansk (formerly Sverdlovsk, 60km south-east of Luhansk) and a military-type truck about 1.5km to the west; and on 23 October of open cargo wagons at the railway station in Rovenky (54km south of Luhansk), ten tanker wagons at a loading station to the south-west, and open cargo trucks parked at the entrance of a compound with direct rail access, where a mobile crane was present.
The SMM observed mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and new mine hazard signs. The SMM observed two rows of anti-tank mines placed on the road in front of a checkpoint near “LPR”-controlled Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk). An armed “LPR” member removed the mines to allow the SMM passage through the checkpoint. Near government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed a demining team from the State Emergency Service. The SMM saw four large signs warning of the dangers of mines and UXO along a 2.5km stretch of road leading north from government-controlled Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk) for the first time.
The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works, co-ordinated by the JCCC, to the thermal power plant in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the gas distribution station in “LPR”-controlled Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk) and water pipelines near Maiorsk and in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk).
The SMM visited three border areas not under government control. During about 50 minutes at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk), the SMM saw 21 cars (14 with Ukrainian and six with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates), three trucks with covered cargo areas (two with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates), and one bus with Ukrainian licence plates exiting Ukraine, and eight cars (one with Ukrainian and six with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and three pedestrians entering Ukraine.
During about one hour at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM saw 13 cars (all with Ukrainian licence plates), one truck with a covered cargo area (with Belarusian licence plates), five buses with Ukrainian licence plates and 24 pedestrians exiting Ukraine, and seven cars (four with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates), one truck with Ukrainian licence plates and 18 pedestrians entering Ukraine.
During about 40 minutes at the border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed two pedestrians exiting Ukraine and six pedestrians entering Ukraine.
In Kyiv, the SMM continued to monitor the gathering in front of the national Parliament building. (See SMM Daily Report 25 October 2017.) The SMM saw about 50-70 people (mostly men, aged 40-60), many wearing military-style clothing, outside tents in front of the Parliament building. The Mission observed about 300 police and National Guard officers, similar to the previous day. The SMM did not observe any incidents during its presence.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the Mission’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government, citing orders to do so. (See, for example, SMM Daily Report 23 October 2017.) The Mission’s freedom of movement is also restricted by security hazards and threats on both sides of the contact line, including those related to mines, UXO, some of which vary from day to day. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
- The SMM was denied access to a permanent storage site in a “DPR”-controlled area as its gates were locked and no guards were present to open them.
Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
- The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
- The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC at a checkpoint north of the Zolote disengagement area told the Mission that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
- The SMM could not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.
Delay:
- An armed man in military-style clothing prevented the SMM from proceeding through a “DPR” checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske for 19 minutes. The SMM informed the JCCC.
[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During this reporting period the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (Donetsk) remained non-operational.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.