Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 29 September 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on reports of a civilian casualty from Zhovanka neighbourhood of Zaitseve, Donetsk region. The SMM observed damage to civilian properties in residential areas in Yasynuvata, Donetsk region. The SMM continued monitoring the three agreed disengagement areas and recorded ceasefire violations inside the Petrivske one. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including in Shcherbak in Donetsk region.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, as well as weapons missing from holding areas, on both sides of the contact line. The Mission facilitated and monitored repairs and maintenance of essential infrastructure in several areas, including the completion of repairs to power lines in Luhanske, as a result of which electricity was restored to about 30 houses; the SMM had sought via the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) security guarantees to facilitate and monitor these repairs since May 2017. The SMM monitored a gathering in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Odessa.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded about twice as many ceasefire violations,[1] including about 100 explosions, as in the previous reporting period (35 explosions).

On the evening of 28 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded two projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east 0.8-1.5km south. On 29 September, the same camera recorded 13 tracer rounds in flight from north-west to south-east, eight explosions assessed as impacts, and two undetermined explosions, all 0.8-2km south.

During the day on 29 September and while positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) for about five hours, the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions 3-7km south-east. On the same day, while positioned at the railway station in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 31 undetermined explosions 3-5km north-west. Positioned at the south-western edge of Yasynuvata, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-5km north-west.

On the evening of 28 September, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and 15 shots of small-arms fire 2-7km south-east and south-south-east. The following day, while in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 2-4km south-east.

During the day on 29 September, while positioned about 3km south-east of “DPR”-controlled Lozove (52km north-east of Donetsk) for more than four hours, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 1-4km north and north-north-east.

On the evening and night of 28-29 September, the SMM camera near the entry-exit checkpoint near government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded 62 tracer rounds, two explosions assessed as impacts and ten undetermined explosions, all at unknown distances at undetermined directions.

On the evening and night of 28-29 September, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded tracer rounds in flight, in sequence: seven from west to east, six from east to west, and 14 from west to east, followed by a total of ten tracer rounds in flight from east to west and 23 from west to east, all at unknown distances north.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, consisting of four explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 140 explosions).

During the day of 29 September, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 10km north-west of its position in government-controlled Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk) and two undetermined explosions 5km south-west of its position in “LPR”-controlled Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM corroborated reports of a civilian casualty. On 28 September the SMM followed up on reports that a 45-year-old man had been injured by a bullet while working in  his house garden at 10 Badaeva Street, about 1km from the contact line, in government-controlled neighbourhood of Zhovanka in Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk). At the central regional hospital in government-controlled Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk) medical staff told the SMM that a man had been admitted with a bullet wound to his right hip. The man’s wife told the SMM that at around 07:20 that morning she was working in the garden when she heard a shot and then saw her husband fall on the ground, adding that thereafter, she heard another four shots. The man had, according to his wife, previously sustained injuries from small-arms fire. 

The SMM observed fresh shrapnel damage to several civilian properties in residential areas in Yasynuvata. The SMM saw that four north-facing windows of the house at 19 Suvorova Street were broken. The owner told the SMM that shelling had occurred at around 06:30 on the morning of 29 September. At 20 Suvorova Street, the SMM saw that the south-facing wall of the house had sustained shrapnel damage, and the south- and east-facing windows were broken. The SMM observed shrapnel damage to the wall of a smaller building next to the house, and saw that the south- and west-facing windows were broken. The garage door and a car inside had also sustained shrapnel damage.

At 17 Engelsa Street, the SMM saw a broken south-west-facing window of a house. The owner said that he and his family had been inside the house at the time of shelling at around 05:40 on the morning of 29 September. The SMM also observed damage to a hotel, including shrapnel damage to the north-north-west-facing wall and gate, as well as broken windows. The administrator of the hotel said that he had heard shelling at around 06:00 in the morning of 29 September. At the power sub-station about 100m north-north-west of the hotel, the SMM saw a crater in the wall of the building, adjacent to its roof, that appeared to have been caused by a direct hit, as well as bricks and branches scattered on the ground. Some technicians were repairing a power line nearby. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon and direction of fire that caused all the above damage. No casualties were reported.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

In the morning hours of 28 September, the SMM camera in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske recorded 33 projectiles in flight from west to east 1-2km south-south-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

During the day on 29 September, positioned in and around the disengagement areas near government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the withdrawal line, the SMM saw 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in government-controlled Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

In government-controlled areas the SMM visited heavy weapons holding areas and noted that five continued to be abandoned and that all 51 towed howitzers (33 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm, and 18 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) were absent. At another such holding area the SMM noted that 21 anti-tank guns (18 MT-12, and three D-48, 85mm) continued to be missing.

In a non-government-controlled area the SMM visited a heavy weapons holding area noting that it continued to be abandoned and that six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were absent.

The SMM observed an armoured combat vehicle (ACV)[2] and tracks assessed as those of ACVs in the security zone. The SMM saw a light armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a 12.7mm heavy machine-gun 1.6km east of government-controlled Nyzhnia Vilkhova (27km north-east of Luhansk), heading west. It saw about five fresh tracks assessed as those of an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-variant) on road H21 in the northern outskirts of “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city, heading north.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance work, co-ordinated by the JCCC, to the thermal power plant in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the Petrivske water pumping station near government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk), the water wells in “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk), and the Mykhailivka-Kadiivka high voltage power lines in the area of “LPR”-controlled Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk) where the SMM saw four workers assessing the condition of the electrical cables. The SMM also observed the completion of repairs of the electric power lines near road M03 east of government-controlled Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk) restoring electricity to about 30 houses in Skeleva Street in Luhanske. The SMM had sought via the JCCC security guarantees to facilitate and monitor these repairs since May 2017.

In “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM saw five residents conduct repair work to a school’s gym building which had been damaged by shelling in March 2017. The SMM saw that a corner and roof of the building were damaged and some windows were broken.

In Odessa, the SMM monitored a demonstration outside the Consulate General of the Russian Federation marking, as noted in banners, the first anniversary of the dissolution of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People in Crimea. The SMM saw about 40 people (all men 18-55 years old), most of them in military-style clothing. They were carrying Crimean Tatar and Odessa Self-Defence flags, as well as the flag of Ukraine. Ten national police and three National Guard officers were present in addition to six uniformed security officers who were guarding the consulate.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC at a checkpoint on the northern side of the Zolote disengagement area said that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing the road leading west from Petrivske. The Mission informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• Three armed men in military-style clothing and with their faces covered had blocked a road junction about 1km east of “DPR”-controlled Shcherbak (92km south of Donetsk) with a vehicle labelled “police” in Cyrillic. They prevented the SMM from proceeding further south, citing special operations in the area. Other civilian vehicles were also being denied passage towards south. A man in civilian clothes approached the SMM, introducing himself as “head of police”, and said that since that was a “pre-border area”, the SMM had to co-ordinate its movement with “DPR”. Later the SMM was allowed to proceed south towards “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) only upon escort. The SMM informed the JCCC.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During this reporting period the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (Donetsk) remained non-operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other

impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.