Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 25 September 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and a similar number in Luhansk region compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded tracer rounds inside the Petrivske and a flare inside the Zolote disengagement areas, respectively. Its access remained restricted in the disengagement areas.* The Mission saw 13 howitzers in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled Novooleksandrivka. An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle spotted mortars and armoured combat vehicles near Myrne, an area outside government control in Luhansk region. The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs and maintenance of essential infrastructure in Krasnyi Lyman, Vesela Hora and Zolote. It visited one non-government-controlled border area.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including over 170 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (54 explosions).

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 24-25 September the SMM recorded 104 undetermined explosions, five explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds, an undetermined number of explosions assessed as caused by recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) and infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) fire, small-arms and heavy-machine-gun-fire and bursts and shots of automatic grenade-launcher and IFV (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire, all 2-5km south-east.

On the night of 24-25 September the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, 24 tracer rounds in flight from east to west, an undetermined explosion, five tracer rounds in flight from east to west and 14 from west to east, followed by a total of three undetermined explosions, 74 tracer rounds in flight from east to west, 24 from west to east, two from north to south, and two rocket-assisted projectiles in flight from west to east, all at undetermined distances north.

On the night of 24-25 September the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three tracer rounds in flight from east to west, two from north-west to south-east, three from west to east, 20 from east to west and 30 from west to east, all 0.5-3km south-west, followed by a total of 39 tracer rounds in flight from east to west, six from west to east, a projectile in flight from north-west to south-east followed by an explosion assessed as caused by a rocket-propelled grenade, all 0.5-3km south and south-west and four undetermined explosions 2-4km south.

Positioned at the Donetsk Filtration Station on 25 September the SMM recorded six undetermined explosions 1-1.5km south.

Positioned at the railway station in non-government-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM recorded two undetermined explosions 4-6km south-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard 30 undetermined explosions, small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire 2-5km east and 3-5km south.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including however, no explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (one explosion).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 23 September the SMM camera in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (43km south of Donetsk) recorded nine tracer rounds in flight from south-east to north-west 0.5-1km south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On 23 September the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote recorded an outgoing flare about 2.5km east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, the SMM observed 13 stationary towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near “DPR”-controlled Novooleksandrivka (75km south-east of Donetsk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in non-government-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) on 22 September an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 54 IFVs, 13 armoured personnel carriers (APC) (11 MTLB, two BTR-80). (These observations are in addition to those reported in SMM Daily Report 23 September). Aerial imagery of the same area on 19 September revealed nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and 12 towed howitzers (D-30).

The SMM saw two tanks (T-72) near “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh) (90km south-east of Donetsk) in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region the SMM noted that a holding area continued to be abandoned and that all 15 mortars (PM-38, 120mm) were absent.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) stationary at a checkpoint near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk) and an APC (BTR-60) stationary at a checkpoint near Prokhorivka (53km south of Donetsk). An SMM mid-UAV spotted the following in government-controlled areas on 24 September: three APCs (BTR, variant unknown and two BRDM-2) near Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north of Donetsk), two APCs (BTR, variant unknown) near Shumy (41km north of Donetsk), two APCs (BTR, variant unknown) and two IFVs (one BMP-1, one BMP variant unknown) near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and an APC (BTR, variant unknown) near Malynove (19km north-east of Luhansk).

The SMM followed up on the incident at the ammunition depot in government-controlled Novoianysol (30km north-west of Mariupol). An SMM mini-UAV spotted extensive damage to buildings in the depot and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the area. At the door of one warehouse that had not been burnt, the UAV spotted about 30 soldiers, eight of whom wore what the SMM assessed as anti-exposure suits and gas masks.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance work, co-ordinated by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC). Positioned close to the Donetsk filtration station, the SMM monitored as the Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel demined an area north of the station to enable workers from the Voda Donbassa water company to enter and inspect a pipeline. The Voda Donbassa workers later told the SMM that the pipeline did not require repair in that area. The SMM also facilitated and monitored repair work to the Petrivske water pumping station near government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk), to power lines between non-government-controlled Yuzhna Lomuvatka (60km west of Luhansk) and Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk), to water wells in “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk) and to the water pipeline in a government-controlled part of Zolote.

Armed men withdrew security guards from the SMM’s Horlivka forward patrol base (39km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 23 September. Despite indications from the JCCC and “DPR” members that a resolution would be found, no guards had returned to the patrol base by the end of the reporting period.

The SMM visited a border area outside government control. At the Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) border crossing point for about 80 minutes the SMM observed 30 cars (15 with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, and 11 with “DPR” plates), three covered heavy-goods trucks, two vans, one covered cargo truck (all with Ukrainian licence plates), two covered heavy-goods trucks/refrigerated trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with a “DPR” plate) in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM also observed 22 cars (nine with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation, one with Lithuanian and two with Polish licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates,), five vans (four with Ukrainian licence plates, one with “DPR” plates) and six pedestrians enter Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC at a checkpoint on the northern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.

• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During this reporting period the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (Donetsk) remained non-operational.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.