Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 14 September 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas, where it observed calm situations. Its access remained restricted in the three disengagement areas and elsewhere.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in areas outside government control near Nikishyne and Kalynivka. It observed demining activity near Nikishyne. The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs and maintenance of essential infrastructure in Shchastia, Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska. It continued to monitor the situation of schools near the contact line on both sides.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 220 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (45 explosions).

On the evening of 13 September, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 14 projectiles in flight from west to east, three undetermined explosions, 11 projectiles from west to east, three undetermined explosions, 19 projectiles from west to east, two undetermined explosions, one illumination flare in vertical flight, about 40 tracer rounds in flight from east to west, four projectiles from west to east, two undetermined explosions, three illumination flares in vertical flight, eight projectiles from west to east, one projectile from east to west, two undetermined explosions, and one projectile from east to west, all 8-10km south-south-west, as well as one projectile from south to north 4-5km east-south-east. During the day on 14 September, positioned in Avdiivka, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions and small-arms fire 2-4km south.   

During the evening on 13 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded two undetermined explosions 1-2km south-west.

During the evening on 13 September, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 85 explosions 8-12km north-west.

During the evening on 13 September, positioned at the Donetsk Filtration Station for three hours, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 1-2km south-west.

During the day on 14 September, positioned at the railway station in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 50 undetermined explosions and small-arms fire 2-10km at directions ranging from south-west to north-west. Positioned in the south-western part of Yasynuvata, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 1-3km west, one undetermined explosion 7-8km west-south-west, and small-arms fire 1km west.

During the evening on 13 September, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and one burst of small-arms fire 3-5km south and south-east. During the day on 14 September, at the same location, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 3-4km south-east.

During the evening on 13 September, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 5-7km south-east. During the day on 14 September, at the same location, the SMM heard about 40 shots of small-arms fire 1-1.5km south-west.

On the night of 13-14 September, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, one tracer round in flight from east to west, two tracer rounds from west to east, five tracer rounds from east to west, one tracer round from south to north, one tracer round from west to east, one undetermined explosion, three tracer rounds from west to east, 14 undetermined explosions, 23 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, four undetermined explosions, one tracer round from west to east, two tracer rounds from east to west, one undetermined explosion, two tracer rounds from east to west, one tracer round from south to north, one undetermined explosion, four tracer rounds from west to east, one undetermined explosion and six tracer rounds from east to west, all at undetermined distances north.

During the day on 14 September, positioned 1km north of government-controlled Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard ten explosions assessed as outgoing rounds 1km north-north-east and ten explosions assessed as the subsequent impacts at an undetermined distance east.  

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Kulykove (30km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard four outgoing explosions 5-6km north-north-west and six outgoing explosions at undetermined distances north-west and north-north-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including explosions attributable to 23 mortar rounds, compared with the previous reporting period (seven explosions).

On 14 September, positioned 5km east of “LPR”-controlled Illiriia (30km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 23 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar (82mm) rounds, 23 subsequent impacts, and 35 bursts of small-arms fire, all 1.5km south and assessed as part of a live-fire exercise.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but it was able to partially monitor them.*

On 14 September, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, government-controlled Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, in areas outside government control, the SMM saw again a tank (T-64) with a front-mounted mine sweeper near Nikishyne (60km north-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 20 July 2017). An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted, on 12 September, an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Kalynivka (55km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) travelling south at the junction between Bakhmut (67km north of Donetsk) and road M03.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed 16 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and 18 tanks (T-64), and noted that 23 mortars (nine PM-38, 120mm; 12 2B11 Sani, 120mm; and two 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm), 34 howitzers (16 self-propelled (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and 18 towed (D-20, 152mm)), two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) and 30 tanks (T-64) were again missing.  

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV),[2] tracks assessed as those of an ACV and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw one stationary armoured vehicle (KRAZ) fitted with a heavy-machine gun (12mm) and about 25 armed persons (of which some were wearing civilian clothes and others military clothes) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk); an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) travelling south near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk). In areas outside of government control, the SMM saw one stationary armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk). The SMM saw fresh tracks assessed as those of an IFV (BMP-variant) near Lyman (12km north-west of Luhansk) leading south. An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a stationary APC (MT-LB) near Kalynivka.

On 14 September, positioned 1km north-east of “LPR”-controlled Kruta Hora (16km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw for the first time on the south-eastern edge of a road three poles and a wire connecting them, assessed as tripwires for explosive devices, at about 50cm above the ground near an “LPR” position.

The SMM observed demining activities. In areas  outside of government control, on the northern edge of Nikishyne, the SMM saw a stationary tank (T-64) fitted with hardware for demining, previously observed (see above and SMM Daily Report 20 July 2017). In a field next to the road the SMM saw a stationary truck and a group of “DPR” members and marking an area with poles and red-and-white tape.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance, co-ordinated by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), on 13 September to water pipes in Zolote, and on 14 September to the thermal power plant in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and water wells in Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation at schools near the contact line. In Shchastia, the head of a school told the SMM that over 100 pupils (including ten internally displaced persons) were enrolled and that the school had sustained broken windows from shelling in February 2015; the SMM saw that the windows of the school were still broken.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An unarmed “LPR” member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC at a checkpoint on the northern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.

• The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing the road leading west from Petrivske. The Mission informed the JCCC.

• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that mines on the road south of the bridge were still present. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During this reporting period the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (Donetsk) remained non-operational.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.