Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 6 September 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission again asked armed forces and formations about the recommitment to cease fire, as well as instructions on interaction with the SMM. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in the disengagement areas and elsewhere, including in Verkhnoshyrokivske, Novolaspa and Svitle.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Shymshynivka and Buhaivka. It facilitated and monitored repairs and maintenance to the Horlivka-Toretsk pipeline and the thermal power plant in Shchastia. The Mission continued to monitor the situation at schools near the contact line on both sides. It visited two border areas not under government control. The SMM monitored two protests in Kyiv.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including about 70 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 210 explosions).

During the day on 6 September, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded one undetermined explosion 3-5km east-south-east.

Positioned in the north-western part of “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) for more than five hours, the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions 7-8km north.

Positioned for about five and a half hours in government-controlled Zalizne (formerly Artemove, 42km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions and one burst of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-5km at southerly directions, and one undetermined explosion 3km north.

On the night of 5-6 September, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, two undetermined explosions, one explosion assessed as an outgoing round, one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from west to east, one explosion assessed as an impact, one explosion assessed as an outgoing round, one rocket-assisted projectile from east to west, one explosion assessed as an impact, two undetermined explosions, 24 tracer rounds in flight from east to west, one rocket-assisted projectile from east to west, and one explosion assessed as an impact, followed by a total of 35 tracer rounds (22 from west to east, 13 from east to west), all at unknown distances north and north-north-east.

Positioned almost 3km west of government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw and heard one airburst assessed as an artillery round (type unknown) 3-4km north.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 40 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (16 explosions).

Positioned on the eastern edge of government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 5-7km east. Positioned 1.5km north of government-controlled Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 5-7km south. Positioned on the eastern edge of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 10km east.

Positioned 3km south of “LPR”-controlled Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 10-15km north-west. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Pankivka (16km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 15-20km north-east.

Positioned on the south-eastern edge of government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and one burst of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5-10km south-east and south.

The SMM again asked armed forces and formations about orders they had received following the recommitment to cease fire from 25 August, as well as instructions on interaction with the Mission.

A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier in government-controlled Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk) told the SMM that he was aware of the recommitment to cease fire but that he was unable to provide a copy of the relevant order, due to the absence of his commander. He said that he was aware of instructions on interaction with the Mission but could not provide a copy of them, for the same reason.

A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at a checkpoint near government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) told the SMM that he had signed an order related to the recommitment to cease fire and that his unit had specific instructions on interaction with the Mission. He did not provide copies of any documents. A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier elsewhere in Krasnohorivka told the SMM that his superior had instructed him verbally about the recommitment to cease fire, but he was unaware of any instructions on interaction with the Mission.

Armed persons in the Trudivskyi area of “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (15km south-west of city centre) and a man in military-style clothing in “DPR”-controlled Staromykhailivka (15km west of Donetsk) told the SMM that they had not heard of new instructions regarding interaction with the Mission.

Armed persons at a heavy weapons holding area and a permanent storage site in “DPR”-controlled areas, as well as in “DPR”-controlled Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk), told the SMM that they had not received any new orders regarding the use of weapons, a code of conduct, or documents related to interaction with the Mission.

Two men in military-style clothing at separate checkpoints near “LPR”-controlled Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk) told the SMM that they had received verbal orders not to shoot or respond to any fire and had signed documents stating that they had received and understood the orders.

A person at a checkpoint near “LPR”-controlled Zhovte told the SMM that his group had not received new instructions on interaction with the Mission and that there was a standing order not to talk to the SMM.

Persons in military-style clothing, some of whom were armed, at four checkpoints near the “LPR”-controlled settlements of Mykolaivka (15km east of Luhansk), Pionerske (19km east of Luhansk), Pankivka, and an area of Luhansk city by the Siverskyi Donets river (12km north-east of city centre) refused to speak with the SMM.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 5-6 September, while on the eastern edge of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 5-7km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area, and one undetermined explosion 3-4km south; the Mission was unable to assess whether this explosion occurred inside or outside the disengagement area.

Positioned north of the disengagement area near government-controlled Zolote, and in government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) near the disengagement area south-west of “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery revealed the presence on 4 September of 22 howitzers (16 self-propelled, six towed) west of Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) and 16 towed howitzers south of Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw 13 stationary tanks (T-64) at a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk), 12 tanks (type unknown; 11 were stationary and one was travelling south-east) at a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) and five tanks (T-72) travelling south in the same area. Aerial imagery revealed the presence on 4 September of 21 tanks (type unknown) and four surface-to-air missile systems (type unknown) south of Buhaivka.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. At a site beyond respective withdrawal lines in areas outside government control in Donetsk region, the SMM noted that six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were present, as previously observed, and 13 mortars (12 PM-38, 120mm; one 2B11 Sani, 120mm) remained missing.

The SMM revisited an “LPR” permanent storage site whose location was beyond withdrawal lines and noted that one tank (T-64) was still missing. The Mission revisited a “DPR” permanent storage site whose location was beyond withdrawal lines and noted that eight tanks (three T-64, five T-72) were still missing. At another “DPR” permanent storage site, the gates were locked and no one appeared to be present to provide the SMM with access.*

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft gun[2] and military-type armoured vehicles in the security zone. In government‑controlled areas, the SMM saw two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BRDM-2) travelling west near Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk), five APCs (BTR-80) travelling east near Trokhizbenka, and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) towed by a truck travelling north near Artema. Aerial imagery revealed the presence on 4 September of one military-type armoured vehicle east of Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk), three military-type armoured vehicles east of Troitske (30km north of Donetsk) and one military-type armoured vehicle at the entry-exit checkpoint south of Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw fresh tracks assessed as those of a tank (T-72) travelling east near Sontseve (55km south-east of Donetsk). Aerial imagery revealed the presence on 4 September of two military-type armoured vehicles east of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol).

The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs and maintenance on both sides of the contact line, co-ordinated by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), to the pipeline between Horlivka and government-controlled Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north of Donetsk) and to the Shchastia thermal power plant.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation at the schools near the contact line on both sides. In government-controlled areas, the SMM visited schools in Novohnativka (40km south of Donetsk), Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk), Zalizne and Popasna.

The director of the school in Novohnativka told the SMM that 36 pupils were enrolled, and that personnel of a Ukrainian Armed Forces unit stationed in the area provided firewood and food for the school during winter. The director of the school in Myronivskyi told the SMM that 257 pupils, including ten internally displaced persons, were enrolled, and that Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel had previously repaired the heating system, helped with transportation, and taught mine awareness lessons. The director of the school in Zalizne told the SMM that 152 pupils were enrolled and that the school’s basement shelter has been used only once (in December 2015) due to nearby shelling.

On 5 September, the head of the educational department of Popasna district administration told the SMM that one school building in the district had been rented by a Ukrainian Armed Forces unit for use as accommodation while it repaired a nearby bridge. (The Mission visited the school and confirmed the presence of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel.) She said that no other school buildings in the district were in use by military units, and that the department was unaware of schools encountering any problems with the military.

In areas not under government control, the SMM visited schools in Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol) and Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). The head of the school in Sakhanka told the SMM that the school had been functional since September 2014, except for two weeks following shelling on 12 December 2016, and that 30 pupils were enrolled. Two persons at the school in Debaltseve told the SMM that the school’s roof and windows had been damaged by shelling in the past, but that the damage had been repaired.

The SMM visited two border areas not under control of the Government. At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), during one hour, the SMM saw 43 cars (31 with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation, two with Georgian, two with Lithuanian, and one with Czech Republic licence plates, and one with “LPR” plates) and five trucks with covered cargo areas (with Ukrainian licence plates) in queues to exit Ukraine, and 21 cars (ten with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates, and three with “LPR” plates), one motorcycle (with “DPR” plates) and one truck with a covered cargo area (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw ten pedestrians (seven men, aged 30-50; three women, aged 30-40) exiting Ukraine and 17 pedestrians (12 men, aged 30-60; five women, aged 20-40) entering Ukraine.

During 20 minutes at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk), the SMM saw nine cars (three with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) and one truck with a covered cargo area (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine and four cars (three with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine.

In Kyiv the SMM monitored two protests. In front of the Cabinet of Ministers building the SMM saw about 1,000 people (80 per cent middle-aged men), most of whom wore helmets with the logo of the oil company Ukrnafta, and many of whom held flags with the same logo. Participants displayed banners with messages regarding Ukraine’s oil sector, including “No to bankruptcy of Ukrnafta”. The protest ended peacefully.

The Mission also saw about 500 vehicles blocking Hrushevkoho Street near the national Parliament building, as well as a gathering of about 500 people (90 per cent middle-aged men). Speakers called for regulation of taxation of imported vehicles and affordable customs clearance for the owners of used cars with foreign licence plates. The SMM saw some protestors enter a committee building of the national Parliament. About 200 law enforcement officers, some of whom were in riot gear, and 30 buses with additional personnel were present in the area of both protests.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• A man in military-style clothing stopped the SMM at a checkpoint west of “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol) and denied it passage to the east, stating that his superiors had told him that “DPR”-controlled Kozatske (86km south of Donetsk) – the patrol’s destination – was off-limits to the Mission. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• An armed person stopped the SMM at a checkpoint on road H21 near “LPR”-controlled Svitle (11km north of Luhansk) and denied it passage when the Mission refused to provide its patrol plan. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• An armed man insisted on escorting the SMM during its visit to “DPR”-controlled Novolaspa, allowing the Mission to visit only one house and speak with the owner only in the armed man’s presence. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was unable to access a permanent weapons storage site in an area outside government control in Donetsk region because the gates were locked and no one appeared to be present at the site. The Mission informed the JCCC.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing areas in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing secondary roads north of the Zolote disengagement area. At a checkpoint on the northern edge of the area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place over the previous 24 hours. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing side roads other than the main asphalt road south of the Zolote disengagement area. Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the disengagement area told the SMM that no demining activity had been conducted in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that mines on the road south of the bridge were still present. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

• At the eastern entrance to Novolaspa, two armed men delayed the SMM’s access to the village for 25 minutes. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During this reporting period the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (Donetsk) remained non-operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.